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ABSTRACT 
 
Ever since the military takeover of 1952, the post-monarchic political system of 
Egypt has been dependent upon a variety of mechanisms and structures to establish and 
further consolidate its powerbase. Among those, an intertwined web of what could be 
described as ‗patronage politics‘ emerged as one of the main foundations of these tools 
and was utilized by the regime to establish the fundamentals of its rule. Throughout the 
post-1952 era, political patrons and respective clients were existent in Egyptian politics, 
shaping, to a great extent, the policies implemented by Egypt's rulers at the apex of the 
political system, as well as the tactics orchestrated by the populace within the middle and 
lower echelons of the polity. This study aims at analyzing the factors that ensured the 
durability of patronage networks within the Egyptian polity, primarily focusing on the sort 
of social structural reconfiguration that has been taking place in the popular communities 
of Egypt in the beginning of the 21
st
 Century. Dissecting the area of Misr Al Qadima as an 
exemplar case study of Cairo‘s popular quarters, the research mainly focuses on 
examining the role of the lesser notables, those middle patrons and clients that exist on the 
lower levels of the Egyptian polity within the ranks of the National Democratic Party and 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Henceforth, the sociopolitical agency of these lesser notabilities 
shall constitute the prime concern of the writing and, in doing so; this research also 
attempts to draw some linkage between the micro-level features of the popular polities of 
Cairo and the macro-level realities of the Egyptian polity at large, in the contemporary 
period.          
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The Rise of the Lesser Notables in Cairo’s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics 
of the NDP and the MB 
Chapter I: Introduction, Theoretical Framework and 
Methodology/Approaches                
Aims and Objectives 
In the light of the increasingly expanding literature dealing with an encompassing 
conception of state-society relations, which goes beyond the definition of the state as a 
sheer amalgamation of institutions, there seems to be a need to revisit the concept of 
political patronage and try to somehow fit it within this larger sketch of state-society 
relations. This research aims at analyzing the conditions that give rise to patronage in the 
Egyptian polity, venturing then into dissecting some of the recurrent features of this 
patron-client web in order to examine the main factors that affected the prevalence of 
patronage politics in Egypt, particularly throughout the Mubarak phase. Emphasizing 
upon the upcoming research questions, this study seeks to provide a better understanding 
of the factors that ensured the durability of these patronage networks until present. This 
will be primarily achieved via tackling the issues of transition and liberalization that are 
associated with the sort of social structural reconfiguration that has been witnessed in the 
Egyptian polity in the beginning of the 21
st
 Century. The main focus of this research will 
be dedicated to examining the socioeconomic and political roles of the ―lesser notables‖ 
as intermediaries in the realm of state/society relations
1
. In the course of this writing, the 
term ‗lesser notables‘ refers to those middle patrons and clients that flourish on the lower 
                                                 
1
Look pages 48-50 for an elaboration on the concept of the ―lesser notables‖. Chapter II also deals with this 
term in detail, contextualizing the notables and their lesser successors, and the role they played within the 
Egyptian polity ever since the Ottoman period. Hana Batatu was one of the first contributors that used the 
term to describe a certain category of rural notability in Syria in Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of Its 
Lesser Rural Notables, And Their Politics. The term ‗lesser notable‘ was later used by Salwa Ismail to 
describe the type of notabilities that this research deals with.   
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levels of the Egyptian polity within the ranks of the National Democratic Party (NDP) 
and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and whose sociopolitical agency appears to be 
comparatively discarded in the literature pertaining to Middle East politics.      
Research Questions 
With the seeming mobilization of societal echelons and sociopolitical classes that 
is taking place in the Egyptian polity in the early 21
st
 Century, there is indeed a new 
realm of relevant political actors that clearly differs from the ones prevalent in the 
previous periods. For example, the 1980‘s and 1990‘s witnessed the elevating importance 
of the political agency of the business community as opposed to the military and the 
technocratic classes, which were rather dominant during the socialist heydays of 
Nasserite Egypt. Could this be considered as a part of a bigger wave of political culture 
change within the country? And to what extent has this alteration empowered new 
classes/echelons of patrons and clients? And, if so, can one identify a certain set/sets of 
neo-patrons and clients? Moreover, what is the role of the lesser notables, those middle-
range patrons/clients that play a sizable role in shaping the dynamics of the Egyptian 
polity? And what are the major commonalities/differences between those of them that 
adhere to the NDP in comparison to the others that ally with the Muslim Brotherhood? 
Literature Review 
 Undertaking this writing requires the usage of several primary and secondary 
sources. Taking into account the relatively informal nature of the information required, 
primary testimonies from relevant personnel in the NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood 
shall formulate an essential section of the resources used in this study. In addition, a wide 
scope of secondary sources will also be synthesized. Subsequently, this Literature 
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Review will be divided into two sections. The first one covers the theoretical framework 
of postulations dealing with patronage politics and the relevant applications that relate to 
the Egyptian case, whereas the second displays the major writings that contribute to the 
methodology and approaches that this research will prospectively follow. 
Theoretical Framework 
  In general, patronage politics could be considered as an existent theme within 
almost all political systems. Some analysts have indeed argued that patronage is expected 
to flourish further in those political systems that are more dependent upon personal rule 
in their dynamics. Jackson and Rosberg state, ―It is a dynamic world of political will and 
action that is ordered less by institutions than by personal authorities and power…but 
without the assured mediation and regulation of effective political institutions…At the 
apex of all personal regimes is a ruler, a paramount leader who enjoys a position of 
uncontested supremacy‖.2 Consequently, the existence of a ruler with such unmatched 
power allows him to ensure the sustainability of the regime.  
However, for this aim to be achieved, a series of collaborations and alliances 
between the ruler and several other actors has to take place to make this process of 
consolidation of power a mutually beneficial course of action that is advantageous to the 
various parties involved. This is actualized through patronage, which is a complicated 
web, usually consisting of several patron-client networks
3
. Here, an amalgamation of 
mutual beneficiaries that vertically expands throughout the system in a top-down 
approach is evident and, subsequently, co-option, rather than coercion, becomes more 
widespread as an essential medium for exercising political power. 
                                                 
2treboR H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg (1981) Personal Rule In Black Africa. Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, p.12-22  
3 Ibid, p.39-42 
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John Martinussen expands upon this notion, portraying the scheme of patronage 
networks in a concise fashion: 
The system of patronage…works by the personal ruler doling out 
generously from the public resources and benefits he controls. This 
patronage is extended to his own clan members and also to a selection of 
clan leaders whose political support is deemed necessary. The clan leaders 
can then, at their level within the power hierarchy, use some of their 
resources in a similar manner to ensure political backing from certain lower-
placed clan leaders – and so on, until crumbs from the tables of the mighty 
eventually fall on the small-scale farmers and other poor people.
4
 
 
The term ―clan‖ refers to political alliances and interest groups. Martinussen elaborates 
that the machinations by which patron-client ties extend from the apex of the political 
system to its bottom are best described in the milieu of webs and networks that work their 
way in a top-down approach. Illustration 1.a below shows a generic network of patron-
client relations. Of course sub-patrons and clients tend to emerge as the network 
approaches further towards the bottom of the hierarchy/polity.  
Illustration 1.a: The patron-client model 
 
                                                 
4
 John Martinussen (1993) Society, State, &Market. London: Zed Books. p.193  
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Patronage politics and Informal Networks 
Henry Moore states that, with the inception of the post-1952 phase, the Egyptian 
polity was a vivid arena for patronage politics. He cites that in Egypt informal groups of 
relatives and friends play a more important role in patron-client networks than the formal 
ones.
5
 Generally speaking, with the advent of patron-client networks as a primary 
medium for facilitating political power, the majority of Egyptians; i.e. the common 
people or the sha`b, gradually developed a sense of skepticism towards their rulers along 
with a conviction of the inefficiency of the formal/official venues of the government. 
―The sha`b understand the high costs of participating in formal politics and thus develop 
other institutions to serve their needs…Elites structure politics so that most people cannot 
participate in the system or their participation is not much more than a charade‖.6 
More often than not, the sha`b is suspicious of the government and its intentions 
on the one hand, and on the other they are more concerned with the concept of "shilal" or 
"cliques". For them, the importance of the shilla surpasses the importance of any formal 
sort of union.  Moore also resorts to the observation that these shilal or cliques were 
somehow encouraged to form conglomerate units together, pivoted by the growing 
bloating of the public sector in the 1960's. "The more heavily bureaucracy weighs upon 
the society; the more likely it is that vertical patron-client networks give way to 
horizontal shilal. In Egypt, corruption appears to be extensive yet decentralized. As 
                                                 
5
 Henry Moore (1977) ―Clientelist Ideology And Political Change‖ In Patrons and Clients, ed. Ernest 
Gellner and John Waterbury. London: Duckworth. p.271 
6 Diane Singerman (1995) Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, & Networks In Urban Quarters of 
Cairo. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.9 
Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter I 
15 
 
bureaucracy becomes heavier, it is likely to become more corrupt, especially near the top, 
in the absence of effective political coordination and supervision".
7
 
More recently contributors, such as Diane Singerman, paid special attention to the 
concept of informal networks and the sizeable role such networks play as alternative 
venues of political participation, especially for those within the lower-middle and lower 
classes in the Egyptian polity. In what could be described as a very relevant anecdote and 
a starting point to the subject-matter of this research, which attempts to shed some light 
on the politics of the middle and lower echelons of patrons and clients in the Egyptian 
polity, Singerman asserts that, in actuality, little attention has been given to those societal 
forces in the conventional literature tackling Egyptian politics: 
While there are classic works on elite politics in Egypt, its political 
economy, class formation, interest groups, the bureaucracy, and the 
military, the politics of the common people or the sha’b have received 
little attention. Their political demands, actions, and grievances remain of 
secondary interest to elite analysis. It has been anthropologists, historians, 
and sociologists who have told us about the politics of the common people 
while the ―high politics‖ of the elite…remained the domain of political 
scientists. However, if one truly wants to consider state-society relations, 
it seems only natural to try to link up these two arenas of interests.
8
 
 
In addition to the fact that these classes have been, more or less, discarded in the typical 
analysis of Egyptian politics, Singerman asserts also that, in practice, they are also 
considerably influential, with an actual role to play in the overall portrait of the Egyptian 
polity. 
         Here, it is also noteworthy to mention that informal politics are not exclusively the 
domain of the lower-middle and lower classes of the Egyptian society. In fact, the 
                                                 
7
  Henry Moore (1977) ―Clientelist Ideology And Political Change‖ In Patrons and Clients, ed. Ernest 
Gellner and John Waterbury. London: Duckworth. p.271 
8
 Diane Singerman (1995) Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, & Networks In Urban Quarters of 
Cairo, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. p.5.  
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Egyptian elite also tends to utilize the machinations of informalities, perhaps in a 
different fashion than the lower echelons, and sometimes to penetrate the formal structure 
of the official institutions, yet the end-result is to serve some political benefit. Therefore, 
it is safe to note that the essence of informal networks somehow infiltrates through the 
hierarchy of the Egyptian polity as well. Hence, Singerman also asserts that, when it 
comes to the lower echelons, those informal networks which were primarily enhanced in 
the lack of formal/official avenues of political participation are in fact open arenas for 
patrons and clients to flourish. ―The Sha`b have turned exploiting the government into a 
fine art. People in the community who had a particular talent for dealing with bureaucrats 
or a wide range of connections to elite politicians and officials were sought after and 
valued. Individuals repeatedly stated that the government was something to ―take from‖, 
an outside external force to be patronized‖9  
 These characteristics are actually congruent to what Salwa Ismail later described 
as the biytkabrluh figures in the popular quarters of Cairo. The portrayal of Hajj Saleh, a 
strongman in Bulaq, exemplifies that: ―The ethos of someone biytkabarluh involves 
rights and obligations on the part of the person occupying the position. Moral deference 
toward [this] figure derives from relations of kinship, regional origin, and the moral 
standing of the person‖. On the one hand, Hajj Saleh‘s active participation in charitable 
work gives him the image of a ―man of good‖, and on the other his links with the police 
reaffirm his status as a ―man of power‖. Subsequently, the hajj is regularly utilized by the 
state apparatus as an influential intermediary with the local community.
10
 Indeed, here the 
profile of Hajj Saleh fits the persona of the ―lesser notables‖, which are described by 
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Ismail as the political powerhouses of Cairo‘s new urban quarters. Interestingly, these 
lesser notabilities are characterized, as noted by Ismail, with an evident amalgamation of 
pragmatic and moral statures combined. These notables in fact constitute the focal point 
of this research. 
 
The Trap of Cultural Arguments 
Of course here it is noteworthy to mention that patronage politics is not a natural 
element that is imbedded solely in the Egyptian political culture per se. In fact, similar 
features of informal politics could be traced and proven in other polities over the globe. 
Nazih Ayubi prudently notes that: 
Although patronage and clientelism have a long history and an elaborate 
vocabulary in the Middle East…they are not the inevitable outcome of 
certain essential and permanent cultural traits. They are in reality 
behavioral correlates to articulated modes of production and attitudinal 
accompaniments of a stage of transition that requires a higher degree of 
intermediation between the rural and the urban, between the local and the 
central, between the public and the private. The study of patron-client 
relationships, cliques, cronies and informal networks…can be useful and 
indeed very interesting. Their validity will be constrained however if they 
are viewed as being exclusively culturally specific, rather than socially 
and politically contingent.
11
         
 
Thus, putting in mind the considerable impact of the prevalent modes of production on 
the political beliefs and attitudes within a human polity, it is rather essential to avoid any 
sort of cultural essentialism that would signify patron-client networks as a peculiar 
feature of the Arab polity at large, or the Egyptian one in specific. Accordingly Ayubi 
states that, for instance regarding the Shila, a concept that was mentioned earlier as an 
important unit of analysis mainly introduced by H.C. Moore and others, ―Shilas and other 
types of cliques and informal networks should not be regarded as a Middle Eastern 
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peculiarity: we know increasingly more about their presence in countries such as Italy, 
Japan and even the United States of America‖.12 
 But here we are faced with an analytical dilemma: If, as stated earlier, patron-
client networks actually appear and flourish in a wide variety of human polities, despite 
the clear differences such polities might bear in terms of governing systems and 
depending upon the modes of production that have prevailed in them, could we still make 
use of such a concept in understanding any polity at all? Once again, the challenge here is 
to make the proper linkage between the micro and the macro levels of analysis: 
It is this analytical shift, however, from micro- to macro- politics that 
represents the most challenging conceptual difficulty with clientelism. 
Given the intellectual history of a concept drawn from anthropology and 
applied without much theoretical adjustment to complex political systems, 
it is not surprising that the concept loses much of its explanatory power as 
one moves from interpersonal relationships to clientelistic structures (i.e. 
corporate clientelism) at the local or the national level.
13
             
 
Therefore contextualization, in terms of historical factors and political/economic 
circumstances, is essential if we are to trace patron-client bonds and potentially attempt 
reaching some observations or findings pertaining to the realities of a human polity. In 
fact, Ayubi attempts to venture through this dilemma by analyzing the historical context 
in which patron-client networks developed in the Middle Eastern polity at large. This will 
be further displayed in Chapter II.    
 
Putting Patrons and Clients in Context: The Rise of the Lower Echelons 
In Power, Class, And Foreign Capital in Egypt: The Rise of The New 
Bourgeoisie, Malak Zaalouk describes the rise of a powerful group of commercial agents 
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within the Egyptian middle class post Infitah, or the open door policy, which was 
inducted by President Anwar Sadat in the 1974. She asserts: 
Although on a global level the group does not own the means of 
production it does fulfill the function of global capital through its activity, 
and is simply placed on the lower echelons of the global bourgeois 
hierarchy. Locally the group very definitely partly owns and controls the 
means of production, both through its membership in the ascendant new 
bourgeoisie as well as its connections with the state bourgeoisie still 
controlling the state property. The group‘s class position is therefore quite 
complex…linking class structures of both peripheral and metropolitan 
societies. These groups…provide the access points for foreign economic 
entry and political influence.
14
   
 
In a sense, these groups represent some of the horizontal shilal born out of lower level 
alliances that are formed to deal with the state‘s cumbersome bureaucracy. Indeed, their 
influence was further enhanced as fillers of the market and the space vacated by the state 
in the prime of the Infitah era. Overall, one can safely argue that what could be dubbed as 
a new class of patrons and clients was in the making in the post-Infitah era. Shortly after 
occupying their position in the socioeconomic map, the commercial agents emphasized 
upon by Zaalouk were in fact the reserves that were drawn upon by Gamal Mubarak and 
clique in order to formulate Egypt‘s new class of patrons, i.e. the business society, as will 
be dissected in the fifth and sixth chapters.   
Assessing the structural reconfiguration that took place within the Egyptian polity 
leading up to the rise, or perhaps the reemergence, of a particular category of 
patrons/clients and the demise of another is indeed essential. The reemergence here 
actually refers to the fact that, despite the seeming domination that the state had over the 
modes of production in most of the Arab World in the beginning of the post-colonial era, 
this has not been always the case. Over most of the Islamic dynasties that spanned with 
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the Arab conquest of the Middle East, commercial agents had played an important role as 
viable societal actors and sometimes mediators between official authorities and 
informal/popular groupings, as will be shown in the context of Chapter II. Moreover, and 
even during the ―modern‖ era, Nazih Ayubi states that, ―The expansion of home market, 
the export of agricultural commodities and the distribution of imported goods all provide 
a basis for a rapid increase in the ‗circulation function‘ and for an economic 
strengthening of the role of members of the merchant class, who essentially act as 
‗linkmen‘ between modes of production or divisions of labor‖.15   
 Practically speaking, Carrie Wickham also argues that the with gradual retreat of 
the state from the public sphere, which accompanied the implementation of the Infitah 
policy, the room was more or less open for the popular forces to operate, and a prime 
popular force was that of the Islamic movement.  ―Mainstream Islamists such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood have developed a parallel network of Islamic institutions including 
private clinics, mosques, schools, banks, and investment companies. Moreover, 
beginning in the 1980‘s, Islamists have won control of the executive boards of 
professional syndicates and university faculty clubs‖.16 Interestingly, the Muslim 
Brotherhood had to rely upon a scheme of patronage politics that was quite similar to that 
of the Egyptian regime in order to establish its foundational networks: ―Islamic activists 
have cultivated ties of patronage and employees at the lower rungs of the state 
bureaucracy, as well as with elected members of local municipal councils, enabling them 
to bend existing rules and evade control efforts from above‖.17  
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Indeed, within the popular quarters, the Municipal Councils (MCs) constitute a 
prospective venue for establishing networks and alliances between the NDP or the MB, 
on the one hand, and the popular notabilities, on the other, as will be displayed in 
chapters IV and V.  Henceforth, an overview of the system of local governance in Egypt 
is well in place. The upcoming snapshot regarding the municipalities is essential, for it 
paves the way before scrutinizing the role of lesser notabilities as state/society 
intermediaries that partake in patronage politics at the local level. In doing so, the 
research at hand is especially concerned with the role that the municipality plays as a 
venue of formal politics that opens the door for lesser notabilities to practice political 
patronage and infiltrate the ‗formal‘ state-institutions in the process.     
 
A note on the Municipal Councils (MCs) and the Characteristics of the local system of 
Governance in Egypt 
At the local level there are 4496 village and 199 town municipalities in Egypt. 
Municipalities are controlled by their elected councils, which have relatively little 
power
18
. Municipal elections last occurred in April 2002 and were delayed from 2006 to 
2008 before being held again in 2008. Roughly 70% of the ruling NDP‘s candidates ran 
unopposed. The NDP eventually won 97% of municipal seats.
19
 
In terms of local finance and fiscal decentralization, the municipalities suffer 
from insufficient resources and a negligible say in the management of their own budgets. 
They get the majority of their financial resources from the central government in the 
form of annual subsidies. Within each governorate, the Municipal Council is expected to 
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exercise governance on the local level of the village or the town. These councils have 
been largely disempowered and somewhat overshadowed by the governor, whose actual 
jurisdictions are also quite limited when compared to the powers of the central 
government in Cairo
20
.  
Despite the variations in economic systems adopted by the government 
throughout the post-1952 phase, the lack of emphasis upon decentralization as a national 
policy was a recurrent theme within these various economic systems. The Ministry of 
Local Development, delegated with the authority to supervise the process of 
decentralization on the local level, has been receiving minimal budgetary allocations. In 
1981/2 its share of the total governmental expenditure was 1.8 %, while in 1997/8 this 
share was even reduced to 1.5 % of the total budget.
21
 Also, despite the increasing 
dependence of the local municipalities on the allocations coming form the central 
government, these state allocations were reduced or, at best, remained stagnant in a way 
that does not cope with the growing needs of these administrations.
22
 In the recent years, 
however, and almost coinciding with the advent of the neoliberal program of Gamal 
Mubarak, the NDP has appeared more adamant on adopting a scheme of 
decentralization that gives the municipalities some autonomy in managing the affairs of 
the polities within which they operate. As shall be argued in Chapter V, it is rather safe 
to assume that one of the main factors that led to the NDP‘s adamancy on revitalizing 
the municipalities is, in practice, the potential role that can be played by these 
municipalities as the powerbases of the party in the face of the MB. 
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The Politics of Popular Quarters  
Salwa Ismail argues that popular classes do play a meaningful role in Egyptian 
politics. She draws attention to the socioeconomic structure of Cairo‘s haphazard 
(‗ashwa’iyyat) areas and the context that nurtured the development of informal networks 
within these neighborhoods as a pattern of effective organization and governance. This 
contribution is quite relevant to this research as it sheds light on the particular dynamics 
that characterize the dealings of the typology of middle patrons and clients that the study 
at hand is concerned with.
23
  
It should be noted that, with a sizeable portion of its population residing in 
informal/haphazard slums, Egypt‘s major cities like Cairo and Alexandria act as open 
venues for an array of informal politics. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood has 
capitalized upon the already existing socioeconomic structure of such areas to further 
strengthen its stratum is rather apparent. According to Ismail, ―The Islamists anchor 
themselves in oppositional spaces already formed or in the process of formation. The 
terms of this opposition are spatial, social, cultural, economic, and political…These 
neighborhoods propose a reformulation of the popular city, recovering the social role of 
the street‖.24   
A good exemplar of that stratagem was portrayed post the October 1992 
earthquake when a variety of charitable societies (Gam`eyat) affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood expanded their network of beneficiaries to the popular lower classes that 
needed food and shelter at the time, ultimately adding points to their credibility and 
popularity and subtracting quite a few from the regime and its personnel. 
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Salwa Ismail defines the popular social forces that emerged in the aftermath of the 
open door/liberalization policies as follows: 
Popular is defined in opposition to the dominant forces-the political and 
economic elites. It also refers to the economic and social position of a 
number of classes or fractions of classes which, because of the blurring of 
boundaries, are not easily distinguishable. The fluidity and blurring of 
lines has to do with occupational mobility and the fact that members of 
these classes hold more than one job simultaneously. A common feature 
between them, however, is the predominance of informal economic 
activities. This applies to artisans, petty traders, low-level service sector 
workers, construction workers, and craftsmen. 
25
   
 
Logically speaking, the relative absence of the state on the street level gave room for 
popular and informal networking to operate as an alternative outlet for political action. 
―State disengagement from welfare provision and the residents‘ efforts at creating self-
sufficiency, in social and economic spheres, point to a significant change in state-society 
relations. The social or moral contract defining these relations in the 1950‘s and 60‘s has 
weakened, if not dissolved‖.26   
Subsequently, the playground for popular networking was open for the Islamic 
movements to dominate. This was reflected in the ballot box in 2005 with 88 Muslim 
Brotherhood candidates winning their seats in the parliament. The fact that there was 
virtually minimal presence for the NDP and the other secular parties on the popular level, 
as opposed to the Islamic popular movements that dominated on the street level, gave 
room for the Muslim Brotherhood to score their biggest parliamentary victory to date, 
despite an array of irregularities that were imposed by the regime in an attempt to halt the 
widespread electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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Approaches/ Theoretical Framework 
The Weberian Paradigm: Benefits, Problems and Limitations 
Political patronage is a socioeconomic/political phenomenon that is 
acknowledged within various intellectual approaches. This study shall synthesize a 
variety of perspectives, including, elitist, liberal, and leftist views of the term, in an 
attempt to construct a crucible of analytical perspectives that could dissect such a feature 
and display its effects on the Egyptian polity. In essence, these different perspectives bear 
elements of meaningfulness relating to the securitization of patronage as a socioeconomic 
phenomenon and this research will aim to reflect upon and utilize different aspects of 
such perspectives in an attempt to enrich the arguments postulated by the research. These 
various approaches are not mutually exclusive and can be utilized to offer an array of 
perspectives regarding political patronage as a social phenomenon.  
The elitist approach, for example, argues for the occurrence of patronage as a 
natural outcome that erupts primarily due to the discrepancies in access to resources, 
among the populace. Quite often, the elitist classes are the main beneficiaries from such 
discrepancies, which grant them some sort of a preferential treatment. Regardless of the 
changes that might take place within the political system in terms of ideology or policies, 
political power is likely to remain in the acquisition of the elite classes, among which the 
circles of patronage are likely to rotate.
27
 In the Egyptian case, this explanation holds 
some value that should not pass unnoticed. In is indeed realistic to say that the ‗big‘ 
political patrons usually belong to certain socioeconomic classes, as was the case during 
the Nasser and the Sadat eras and even under Mubarak. However, the stature of these so-
called elitist classes varied along these different phases. For example, as shall be 
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reviewed in the course of this study, the socioeconomic and cultural background of the 
‗big‘ patrons in the Nasser era differs to a considerable extent from those that appeared 
during the Sadat years and so forth.  
On the other hand, liberal/pluralist analysis states that patronage takes place due 
to the lack of proper democratization and openness in political arenas such as the 
Egyptian polity, and views that, with the actualization of a properly implemented pluralist 
political process that allows participants equal opportunities, political patronage would 
most probably vanish.
28
 Despite the fact that the research at hand does not adopt the 
aforementioned perspective, it is sometimes useful to look at patron-client networks as a 
deviation from the bureaucratic/ institutional prototype that is usually championed by the 
'modern' nation-state. This helps in understanding and scrutinizing the intricacies of the 
popular communities and the entirety of the Egyptian polity, at large, by comparing the 
actual realities lived and the actions undertaken by the populace to the expectations they 
are subject to as citizens in a modern state. Via contextualizing the actions of the people 
in the popular polity of a city like Cairo, one notes that what is often considered as an 
improper/illegal act in one of the modern nation-states of today, can be perceived as 
mundane or ordinary in the popular community. The examples that shall be cited in this 
study suggest that, in the everyday dealings of the Egyptian polity, value-laden issues 
such as 'corruption' and public/private divides are, by and large, context-based. 
Additionally, certain elements of the Weberian approach as well could be useful 
in the course of this research.
29
 Weber views large institutions, including the military, the 
bureaucracy, and other political input structures not as cohesive political actors but rather 
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as venues within which patrons and clients could flourish.
30
 This perception will be 
presented as this study delves into scrutinizing the various formal institutions of the 
Egyptian state, i.e. the NDP, the cabinet, the parliament…etc and shows that, more often 
that not, there is no unitary logic that governs the actions of such institutions and makes 
them cohesive political actors. Instead, one finds that there is an ongoing process of 
tension and competition between contesting entourages of patrons and clients within such 
state venues, which determines to a great extent the politico-economic orientation and the 
subsequent policies adopted by such institutions, as exemplified in the case of the NDP. 
Gellner and Waterbury use elements of the aforementioned Weberian approach. 
They offer a wide variety of contributions on patronage in theory and practice, with a 
special focus on Mediterranean societies. In the course of their writing, they provide an 
essential gist concerning some of the dominant theories that deal with patronage and 
political power. In doing so, Gellner and Waterbury display an overview of how patron-
client structures acquire or lose their moral force, pinpointing the fact that patronage 
networks usually go through a continuous process of reformulation that alters the 
powerful/relevant patrons and clients, in accordance with the socioeconomic and political 
contexts prevalent at various junctures. This point is essential in our quest for analyzing 
the potential of sustaining patronage politics in Egypt post-Mubarak as we investigate the 
efficiency of these structures in maintaining the status quo of the regime.
31
  
Sydel Silverman also draws attention to a methodological concern regarding the 
observation of patronage politics. ―The problem is, firstly, a methodological one. On 
what grounds do we identify patterns in our data and call them patronage? Do we look at 
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the behavior and the effects of action or do we ask people what they think is happening 
and how they feel about it? If we do both, is this a matter of summing up diverse kinds of 
information, or do we ‗weight‘ them differently? And how do we handle discrepancies in 
different kinds of information?‖32 Silverman provides some responses to these queries, 
but ultimately asserts that dissecting the interaction between the public and the private 
affairs of individuals, and comprehending the attitudinal tendencies of people via the 
economic and political contexts of the state-society scope of interaction can help us 
establish a viable reflection on the origin of political patronage and how it capitalizes 
upon the already existing societal and cultural structures.  
In the case of Egypt, patronage politics capitalized on some embedded tendencies 
in the cultural realm of most Egyptians, primarily the distrust of the ruling 
establishment/institution and the conviction that informalities and underground dealings 
are more efficient ways in addressing people‘s needs than government agencies. In 
practice such tendencies were also very pragmatic in nature, for, more often than not, 
informal networks were more beneficial to the majority of Egyptians than the ‗formal‘ 
ones when it came to realizing economic or political objectives
33
.   
Looking at the Egyptian polity during Mubarak's rule, one finds that the tactics of 
patronage and consolidation of power were still dominant, shaping, to a large extent, the 
policy choices adopted by the Mubarak regime. Robert Springborg cites some of the most 
relevant factors that have influenced shaping the scope and magnitude of patronage 
tactics of the Egyptian president. The political elite and its role within the political 
economy, the newly arising bourgeoisie and the state, the military, the system of political 
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control, and the secular and Islamist opposition to the regime are among the most 
relevant aspects that are tackled by Springborg as the main factors of concern pertaining 
to the Egyptian polity during the Mubarak era
34
. These are areas for acquiring power and 
authority, and the tactics that were used by Mubarak to consolidate his power were 
mostly dependent upon the changes in these arenas. Depending on field research 
conducted in Egypt, Springborg's analysis of the clientele networks in the military in 
particular offers a synopsis of the structure of this realm, especially during the Abu-
Ghazala period that ended with his elimination from office in 1989. 
 
Limitations of the Weberian Paradigm and Relevance of the Network Approach      
Yet one has to put into consideration that there are certain limitations when it 
comes to the utilization of the Weberian approach in the context of the Middle Eastern 
polity. Ayubi says: 
Both the Marxist and the Weberian paradigms were tried for the study of 
Middle Eastern societies…but being basically western paradigms 
pertaining to capitalist societies, none of them has been found to be fully 
satisfactory…In pre-capitalist societies as well as in societies with 
articulated modes of production, one may find, first, that modes of 
production are very closely intertwined with modes of coercion and 
secondly- which is often related to the previous and which is particularly 
pronounced in the case of the Middle East- that modes of ‗distribution‘ or 
of ‗circulation‘ are just as important, if not more so, than modes of 
production.
35
 
 
Thus, with a greater focus on modes of circulation, primarily of goods and services, as 
opposed to sheer production, Ayubi points out a meaningful limitation of the Weberian 
and other paradigms when it comes to analyzing Middle Eastern polities. Here, the 
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emphasis on modes of circulation is also relevant to the purpose of this study as it 
highlights the importance of the role of the Lesser Notables, primarily perceived as the 
commercial agents and the intermediary middlemen that often come into play as the 
facilitators of such a process of circulation.  Other scholars, such as Joel Migdal, have 
also criticized the Weberian approach, or at least the way it was utilized, in the context of 
state-society relations.  
Migdal first offers a recap of the major schools of thought that dealt with state-
society relations in the realm of social sciences in the 20
th
 Century, specifically in the 
post World War II era. In the 1950‘s, Talcott Parsons and others pioneered what could be 
dubbed as a ―social system approach‖, which pretty much stressed on the indispensable  
role of core societal values in shaping state structures. In the 1970‘s, Samuel Huntington 
and an array of other social scientists championed the essentiality of the institutional 
capacity of state structure. Seemingly, the main attention of these scholarly contributions 
has been dedicated to the quest for enhancing the exploitative capacity of the state, 
predominantly via consolidating and strengthening its authority.
36
 Much of this scholarly 
contribution drew heavily upon a Weberian paradigm that places huge emphasis on an 
ideal model of the state as a conglomerate of foundational structures/institutions.        
Yet the dilemma here arises, as outlined by Migdal, from the fact that, in 
actuality, it is the continuous process of struggle and negotiation between ―state‖ and 
societal actors that should be the focus of attention if we are to analyze state-society 
relations:  
Weber‘s definition has the state firing on all cylinders, and, while he 
certainly did not mean the ideal type to be taken as the normal…that is 
precisely what has happened in subsequent scholarship. Of course, in real 
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human society, no state can do all that an ideal-type state 
can…Tremendous variation has existed among states in the levelers that 
their leaders and officials have controlled in order to garner resources and 
to accomplish a skewed distribution of economic (and other) 
opportunities…If real states fell short of the standard…all sorts of words 
had to be invented to express the gap between actual…and the ideal. 
Terms such as corruption, weakness, and relative capacity implied that the 
ways things really worked were somehow exogenous to the normative 
model of what the state and its relations to the society are, or should be.
37
    
 
Thus, there is more to the tale than the simple monopoly of power by the state. It seems 
that Weber‘s definition gave room for others to consider the ideal state as the one 
conducting ―legitimate‖ violence, exercising power in a monopolistic manner. ―The 
assumption that only the state does, or should, create rules and that only it does, or 
should, maintain the violent means to bend people to obey those rules minimizes and 
trivializes the rich negotiation, interaction, and resistance that occur in very human 
society among multiple systems of rule‖.38 Indeed such a conceptualization of the state is 
not necessarily realistic, let alone conducive, when it comes to a fruitful understanding of 
state-society relations.   
              Instead Migdal, in conjunction with a variety of other scholars as well, propose a 
notion of a ―state in society‖, mainly referring to the dynamism and the ongoing 
interaction between the official venues of the state structure and the popular/informal 
actors within the society. In this regard, Migdal seems to be playing along the same notes 
of the vibrant postulations of the state offered by scholars such as Michel Foucault and 
Henry Lefebvre. Foucault considered the modern state as the conglomerate of a spatial 
mold where individuals are plotted into slots with designated values, such as, for 
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instance, the appreciation of the concept of private property 
39
in most of the Western 
liberal democratic states of today, or, similarly, the values of state-socialism in Eastern 
European states during the domination of the communist bloc. 
Subsequently, two main aspects come to the forefront if we attempt to analyze the 
state in a manner that surpasses the sheer emphasis on the essentiality of state-
institutions.  First, the image of the state, which is signified in the outstanding physical 
/moral structures of greatness and elevation of the state: City halls, courts, 
ministries…etc. Then, second, there is the practice which is manifested in certain actions, 
usually channeled via certain actors or agencies: 
It must be thought of at once (1) as the powerful image of a clearly 
bounded, unified organization that can be spoken of in singular terms…as 
if it were a single, centrally motivated actor performing in an integrated 
manner to rule a clearly defined territory; and (2) as the practices of a heap 
of loosely connected parts or fragments, frequently with ill-defined 
boundaries between them and other groupings inside and outside the 
official state borders and often promoting conflicting sets of rules with one 
another and with the ―official‖ Law. Theories that do not incorporate the 
two sides of the paradoxical state end up either over-idealizing its ability 
to turn rhetoric into effective policy or dismissing it as a grab-bag of 
everyman-out-for-himself, corrupt officials.
40
    
 
A very similar conclusion is also drawn by Oskar Verkaiik who denotes, based upon the 
Pakistani popular culture, that distinguishing between the ―state-idea‖ and the ―state-
system‖, and focusing on how the notion of bureaucratic state power can be used to 
legitimatize as well as discredit the works of the state apparatus, is quite relevant to the 
case of the popular conceptualization of the state in Pakistan.
41
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Along the same lines, regarding an alternative view of the state as an imbedded 
milieu that is interactive with the society, other contributors, such as Salwa Ismail, 
proposed a society-in-state model, in which improvisation prevails. Based upon 
observational accounts and extensive fieldwork in the popular urban quarters of Cairo, 
Ismail states, ―The image of the state that emerges in the account of the market 
arrangements…underscores a mode of operation that is characterized by improvisation. It 
would be difficult to prescribe a unitary logic to how local government is managed on 
daily basis. By the same token, the proposition that there is a society that stands outside 
obscures the coalitions that bring ―society in state‖ to reverse Migdal‘s (2001) 
proposition on ―the state in society‖‖42    
The Network Approach 
 Logically speaking, the harsh emphasis on the bureaucratic institution/Weberian 
paradigm that swapped the academic realm in the post World War II era had to make its 
way through to the domain of policy making. For example, the neo-liberal model that 
was, and probably still is, championed by the Breton Woods institutions, the World Bank 
and the IMF, places great importance on a scheme of liberalization that views economic 
reform as a process that is dedicated to ―dismantling economic arrangements that served 
the interests of political power holders, and replacing them with arrangements that 
reflected the ―logic of economics‖. In this view, liberalization was seen as causing a shift 
from cronyism, patronage, and rent seeking to transparency, accountability, and well-
defined property rights‖43. Nonetheless, in reality, what took place throughout most of 
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these ―liberalization‖ schemes was a process of substitution of particular typologies of 
patronage for the benefit of others, yet under the umbrella of economic reform
44
.  Here, 
Steven Heydemann states that it could be rather meaningful to utilize a ‗network‘ 
approach, instead of depending solely on a rigid view of ‗formal‘ institutions as the 
primary unit of analysis.     
 In fact, if we are attempting to dissect patron-client networks, or any other form of 
informal networks, a clear conceptualization of what is meant by networks is essential for 
starters. Wasserman and Galaskiewicz illustrate, ―Instead of analyzing individual 
behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs, social network analysis focuses its attention on social 
entities or actors in interaction with one another and on how those interactions constitute 
a framework or structure that can be studied and analyzed in its own right‖45. The 
aforementioned proposition is quite relevant in the course of this research as well, for it 
attempts to address the socioeconomic and political patron-client networks imbedded 
within the Egyptian society. For instance, as shall be displayed in Chapter IV, the 
network approach provides us with the opportunity to contextualize the relatively sizable 
set of socioeconomic and political networks instrumented by the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) in Egypt. Instead of focusing solely on the MB as the main unit of analysis 
pertaining to the sociopolitical phenomenon of Political Islam in Egypt, it is rather 
important to situate the project of the group within a larger state/society structure that 
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contains an overarching web of socioeconomic and political patronage networks that are 
partially created and sustained by the MB.        
  So, provided that one succeeded in outlining the boundaries of particular networks 
in action, the dilemma still remains and it could be summed up as follows: How can such 
a configuration of networks be utilized in the context of a schematic, or put differently, 
macro-level analysis? As mentioned earlier, Nazih Ayubi and others have warned of the 
challenging nature of making the linkage between the micro and the macro levels of 
analysis. This is one of the most problematic issues of studying social phenomena such as 
patronage. Perhaps a potential solution could be offered, again, by Steven Heydemann: 
A central item on the network agenda is to bridge the gap between the 
micro-and the macro- order…One way that network analysis provides a 
―bridge‖ between the micro- and macro- orders is that successive levels are 
―embedded‖ in one another. Individual relational ties are the crucial 
components of dyads; dyads constitute triads; triads are contained in higher 
order sub-graphs; and all are embedded in complete networks…The beauty 
of the network analysis is that it allows a researcher to tie together so many 
interdependent parts that constitute micro- and macro- social orders.
46
        
 
More often than not, and somehow by definition, social networks do exist in human 
groupings. In short, a social network is an amalgamation of human ties.  Perhaps the 
study of some networks does not necessarily offer us compelling linkage with macro 
orders, for instance due to the geographical exclusivity or the regional nature of some 
social networks. Yet in the case of patronage politics, which we are interested in the 
course of this writing, the formulation offered by Heydemann, Wasermann, and 
Galaskiewicz, among others, seems to be quite useful and potentially beneficial. This is 
due to the fact that networks of political patronage, as will be argued later in this study, 
do pose an interesting amalgamation of relationships that require a certain set of vertical 
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as well as horizontal linkages to, firstly, exist, then, survive. As a matter of fact, the 
preliminary definition of patron-client networks that was given earlier in this chapter 
interestingly overlaps with the conceptualization of networks as pivoted by Wasermann 
and Galaskiewicz in the previously cited quotation.   
 
Second Generation of Analysts: Contextualizing Patrons and Clients within State-
Society Relations  
 It could be argued that the contributions of James Scott and Joel Migdal opened 
the door for a second generation of analysts that are concerned with informal networks 
and politics to emerge, tackling the issue from an alternative point of view. If we 
tentatively place the works of John Waterbury, H.C. Moore, and Robert Springborg, 
among others- whose contributions were quite meaningful and indeed illuminating in 
shedding light on several elements of political patronage in the Middle East- within a 
categorical first generation of analysts dealing with the conceptualization of patron-client 
networks, then the following could be probably classified as the second generation. First, 
taking a look at a variety of scholars that tackled the issue of informal politics in the 
context of state-society interaction in different regions over the globe is beneficial, if we 
are to sketch a generic synopsis of patronage politics. Then, moving on to the specificities 
of the Middle East, a closer scrutiny of the scholarly contributions pertaining to the 
Middle East shall be also displayed. 
Contextualizing it all: How Do we Link Patrons and Clients to State-Society Relations?      
 As mentioned earlier, viewing the state as a multifaceted actor that intersects with 
the society on a wide variety of echelons helps in shedding light on the pervasiveness and 
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the important role played by informal networks. More often than not, these networks 
operate as interlocutors between these two entities, or concepts if you will.    
To begin with, a primary issue regarding any perspective on state-society 
interaction is indeed the concept of ―sovereignty‖ and how it is perceived and practiced 
within a polity. Thomas Hansen and Finn Stepputat argue that, in actuality, state 
sovereignty is not as solid and well-defined as considered by most, and perhaps it never 
was. ―The state finds itself in constant competition with other centers of sovereignty that 
dispense violence as well as justice with impunity – criminal gangs, political movements 
or quasi-autonomous police forces that each try to assert their claims to sovereignty. In 
such situations, the state is not the natural and self-evident center and origin of 
sovereignty, but one among several sovereign bodies that tries to assert itself‖.47The 
findings postulated by Hansen and Stepputat were predominantly derived from a body of 
research dealing with various developing and developed countries, including the quasi-
state of Northern Cyprus, Malaysia, China, India, and South Africa.  For example, 
Hansen and Stepputat assert that ―the shock and feelings of vulnerability vis-à-vis the 
huge but strangely anonymous forces of global finance capital are palpable in countries 
like India and South Africa that until the early 1990‘s had sheltered their economies 
behind high tariffs and heavily interventionist economic regimes‖.48     
 Sovereignty then becomes an arena of contestation, and societal/ informal actors 
also tend to develop their own scheme of sovereignty. For instance: 
Exploration of ―repertoires of authority‖ in urban India…demonstrates 
that those who define and wield informal sovereignty often are 
accomplished business people, activists, local politicians, as well as 
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criminal figures. They have managed to capture, privatize or make semi-
autonomous territories, institutions, identity forms, and practices in the 
interstices of the fragmented configuration of sovereign power in the 
modern city- spaces. India‘s dynamic democracy has enabled these men to 
present themselves as populist heroes, representing manly virtues (mard) 
and defending neighborhoods and community life. J.F Bayart captures a 
similar phenomenon in Africa in the ubiquitous ―trickster‖ as an enduring 
cultural model of the daring, creative, and highly mobile individual – 
physically and socially – who may end up as a respected businessman or 
political figure.
49
       
 
Interestingly, a seeming resemblance could be traced between the figures of ―mard‖ in 
India and the ―trickster‖ in Africa and that of the ―futuwwa‖ on the Arab street. Such 
figures are apparently historical and somehow present in the social/cultural paradigms of 
the various populaces, yet versatile enough to reshape and adapt to the realities of the 
modern-day polity.
50
  
 John Sidel also introduces a persona of a local strongman with similar features as 
he dissects the characteristics of ―bossism‖ in Southeast Asia, with particular focus on the 
case of the districts of Cavite and Cebu in The Philippines. Acknowledging the analytical 
potency of the concept of patronage with regard to comprehending the machinations of 
informal politics in the provinces of The Philippines, Sidel yet notes that there is more to 
the concept of ―bossism‖ than the cooptation and endowment of resources that are 
usually prevalent with patronage politics. Coercion also plays a role in the tactics 
implemented by the bosses. ―Local politicians in the Philippines have indeed maintained 
patron-client relationships, but they have also long relied heavily upon vote-buying, 
fraud, intimidation, and violence to win elections. In localities where bosses 
succeed…monopoly over coercive means, access to scarce resources and state office also 
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seriously compromise the terms of exchange that lively electoral competition is assumed 
to dictate to patrons in need of loyal client supporters‖.51   
 And, despite the fact that Sidel argues that the cases of provincial politics which 
he examined in The Philippines are not necessarily representative of the entirety of a 
complicated polity as such, he still states that several similarities do exist with the way 
analogous strongmen operate within the polity of The Philippines and elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia at large. Some of these strongmen are state-based; some are exposed to 
coercion and get no private economic benefit; and others do in fact establish their own 
economic dynasties. Similar typologies exist with relative variations in countries like 
Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
52
     
 Therefore, with an array of divergences in the scope and magnitude of this 
phenomenon of ‗bossism‘ in those South Asian localities, a sketch of various analogous 
features could be still drawn: 
Bosses have emerged and entrenched themselves when and where the 
commanding heights of the local political economy have lent themselves 
to monopolistic control. Insofar as such monopolistic control over the 
local economy has hinged on state-based derivative and discretionary 
powers, bosses have depended heavily upon super-ordinate power brokers, 
whose backing has underpinned their emergence, entrenchment, and 
survival, and whose hostility has spelled their downfall or death. Insofar as 
control over the local economy has rested upon a solid base in proprietary 
wealth outside the purview of state intervention…bosses have withstood 
the hostile machinations of super-ordinate power brokers and successfully 
passed on their empires to successive generations in dynasty form.
53
      
 
Overall, Sidel‘s analysis draws one‘s attention to a few important pointers concerning 
patron-client networks and informal polities in general. Importantly, the degree of 
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reciprocity that exists within a patron-client relationship and, consequently, whether such 
a relationship could be signified as a patron-client bond or a variation of that seems to be 
an essential theme in his writing.  
Patron-client networks, as displayed earlier in this study, are mainly established 
upon a notion of mutual benefit and exchange of resources from the patron, possibly 
financial, administrative, or other typologies of resources, for political support and 
loyalty on the part of the client. However, and by nature of a mostly vertical relationship 
between agents with varying degrees of power and capacity, reciprocity is not always 
guaranteed and it depends pretty much on the supply and demand of available patrons 
and clients. For example, the bargaining power of a certain patron could vary if there are 
several patrons that are competing for a particular/limited group of clients, and vice 
versa.  Logically, if there is only a limited supply of patrons that could provide a certain 
service or exploit a specific set of resources, then the power they hold as opposed to their 
respective clients will be quite sizable, and the room for exercising such power by 
manipulating the client will increase. Here, the shades between cooption and coercion get 
somewhat blurry and difficult to distinguish.     
 As a matter of fact, any attempt to contextualize patrons and clients, or any other 
sort of societal forces within a particular polity, has to take into consideration the element 
of ―space‖, introduced earlier by scholars as Foucault and Lefebvre. In his study of 
Guatemala, Finn Stepputat says that, in the case of displaced Guatemalans, new forms of 
political transformation and identity have erupted which are directly linked to the politics 
of space. For example, displaced Guatemalans in Mexico succeeded in establishing a 
variety of alternative governing bodies to channel their demands, representing thousands 
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of displaced people.
54
 This tactic again resembles other occurrences in a multiplicity of 
polities where the space confined by the community is somehow out of the reach of the 
official/formal venues of the state apparatus.
55
    
Along the same lines, Asef Bayat speaks of a certain notion of ‗street politics‘ that 
is mainly derived from the daily interaction of societal forces on the streets in a plethora 
of so called ―Third World‖ polities. Based on research conducted in Iran, South Korea, 
and the Latin American cases of Chile and Brazil, Bayat describes such politics as: 
A set of conflicts and the attendant implications between a collective 
populace and the authorities, shaped and expressed episodically in the 
physical and social space of the ‗streets‘- from the alleyways to the more 
visible pavements, public parks or sports areas. The ‗street‘ in this sense 
serves as the only locus of collective expression for, but by no means 
limited to, those who structurally lack any institutional setting to express 
discontent.
56
   
 
Bayat reckons that, within this milieu of street politics, social networks do exist and are 
mostly passive, but potentially active. An essential element in shaping such street politics 
is ―the operation of what I have called the passive network among the people who use 
public space. Any collective political act -mobilization- requires some degree of 
organization, communication and networking among actors. For the most part, this is 
constituted deliberately either formally or informally‘‘.57  
 Hence atomized yet common individuals exist in street politics with shared goals 
and objectives, and are very possibly mobilized for joint action. The degree and 
frequency of such mobilization varies of course depending upon the socio-economic 
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context they prevail within. The interaction between these networks and the state 
apparatus is, usually, a very complicated process that varies, again, in accordance with 
the context pertaining. Bayat proceeds, ―states may be able to restrict deliberately 
organized demonstrations or rallies; they are often incapable of prohibiting street 
populations from working, driving or walking – in short, from street life. The more open 
and visible the public place, the broader the operation of passive networks and therefore 
the wider the possibility of collective action becomes‖.58 Indeed what is described by 
Bayat as ―street politics‖ is quite applicable to the case of urban quarters of Cairo and 
elsewhere, where such networks are arguably active and effective in accomplishing the 
economic, and sometimes political, needs of the populace, or the sha’b as portrayed 
earlier and illustrated later also in the course of this study by Singerman and Ismail.      
 Along with street politics, comes also a notion of street/popular ―culture‖. Several 
analysts noted the fact that informal politics are actually the product of/the producer of a 
wide array of attitudinal and conceptual tendencies. For example, Oskkar Verkaiik who, 
based on fieldwork that focuses on the Muhajir social movement (MQM) in the popular 
neighborhoods of Pakistan, draws a vivid image of the street culture of modern-day 
Pakistan and how it is echoed in the ethos and dynamics of this movement. A variety of 
factors come into play when it comes to the context within which such features are 
formulated, and, more recently, the forces of globalization catapulted via a plethora of 
actors, from the mass media to the international economic institutions, has become one of 
these decisive factors:     
A picture of street culture emerges that is more violent, less organized, 
more racially and ethnically biased, and more excluded from mainstream 
society than early-modern working-class culture…such a street culture is 
                                                 
58
 Ibid, p.66  
Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter I 
43 
 
―a complex and conflictual web of beliefs, symbols, modes of interaction, 
values, and ideologies that have emerged in opposition to exclusion from 
mainstream society.‖ It is ―not a coherent, conscious universe of political 
opposition but, rather, a spontaneous set of rebellious practices that in the 
long term have emerged as an oppositional style…The homogenizing 
tendencies in the field of economics, international politics, and mass 
media do not necessarily lead to an uniformization in cultural styles and 
expressions. They instead intensify the production of locality and local 
identity in cultural terms 
59
 
 
In fact this portrayal also resonates with other sketches of popular culture in several 
spheres in the developing world. Again, Diane Singerman‘s illustration of the attitudinal 
tendencies of the sha`b or the common people of Cairo‘s popular quarters is a good 
exemplar. 
60
  
So, with the continuous erosion in the state‘s capacity, the distrust of the state 
within inner-city areas increases with ―state power abuse, human rights violation, extra-
judicial persecution, and the omnipresence of secret intelligence services…the public 
imagines itself increasingly in opposition to a state captured by corrupt politicians. This 
opposition between a fragmenting, corrupt state and the nation calling for the rule of law 
helps explain the public support for a ―politics beyond politics‖‖.61 Whether it is in the 
shape of ethnic purity, an Islamic revolution, or even, as sometimes catapulted by the 
military when portraying itself as the only institution capable of establishing order and 
integrity, a military takeover, as was illustrated in the case of Pakistan in 1997, this 
denotation of ―politics beyond politics‖ is quite palpable. Again similar occurrences have 
taken place in the popular quarters of a wide variety of developing countries regarding an 
alternative sort of politics, separate and distinguished from the mainstream venues of 
politics.  
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Overall, the abovementioned contributions aim at revisiting the modes of state-
society interaction in various polities, emphasizing the increasingly important role played 
by patrons/clients. With the incremental retreat of the formal/official state-apparatus, 
there was an inevitable enhancement in the prowess of a variety of societal actors on the 
street level. Several versions of what could be described as patronized notables appeared, 
and in certain cases reemerged, as pivotal political forces. The agency of these key-
players is closely linked to the politico-economic roles ascribed to them. Whether it is the 
bosses of Southeast Asia, the tricksters in South Africa, or the reemerging Arab futuwas, 
the capacity to have access to and circulate resources among potential incumbents has 
been a main determinant in shaping the scope and magnitude of political agency, enjoyed 
by these neo-notables.   
 Finally, before moving on to the particular contributions regarding informal 
networks and patronage politics in the Middle Eastern region, first, some light has to be 
shed on the notion of democratization and its role in enhancing development via battling 
corruption. In this case, consider patron-client networks in the bureaucracy, for instance, 
as the form of corruption that is to be battled.  The problem here resides in the fact that, 
in most of the developing countries that are usually targeted with the process of 
democratization, patron-client networks are embedded within a grassroots level that 
exceeds the sheer façade of the bureaucracy. This raises many questions on the relevance 
of the typical arguments made for the potential economic benefits of democracy in such 
countries. In line with what was reiterated earlier in this writing regarding the negligible 
effect that the neo-liberal policies of institutionalization and reform had on imbedded 
patron-client bonds, economists such as Mushtaq Khan say that there are, in practice, 
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powerful structural reasons why this is not likely to happen: ―Economic characteristics of 
developing countries make patron–client politics both rational for redistributive coalitions 
and effective as strategies for achieving the goals of powerful constituencies within these 
coalitions …The organization of personalized patron-client factions is driven not by the 
absence of democracy but, rather, by the structural features of the economies of 
developing countries that make modern welfare driven redistributive politics unviable‖62. 
 
Enter the Middle East: Patronage politics in a different light?  
Cited earlier in this writing, in the context of outlining the essential role played by 
informal political networks as alternative venues of political participation, Diane 
Singerman can be considered as one of the main contributors that tackled the issue of 
informal networks in Middle Eastern societies. Singerman belongs to a second generation 
of Middle East scholars who attempted to shift the focus that characterized the majority 
of scholarly contributions on Middle East politics from sheer elitist politics to a 
consideration of the popular forces of the sha`b or the common people. She suggests that 
political patronage/clientelism operates on a level that is rather different from what is 
conventionally suggested in the realm of social science research: 
The party itself functions in a clientelistic manner, providing services and 
―the spoils of the system‖ to faithful party supporters in exchange for vote 
and loyal support. ―Party-directed patronage is typically directed to ‗entire 
categories, coalitions of interests, groups of employees,‘…and consists of 
‗mass favors‘ granted no longer at the administrative level alone but also 
at the legislative level‖. Machine politics operate in a similar fashion, 
where politicians succeed in ―privatizing‖ public goods, ―that is, by using 
the immense resources of the state for purposes of private, productive 
generosity‖. Yet networks can be a vehicle for those who are not 
supported by the immense resources of the state, to protect and further 
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their interests in a more subtle, subterranean way, without attracting the 
notice of the state.
63
     
 
Here, Singerman points out to the important role of horizontal/reciprocal networks in 
shaping the machinations of the sha`bi, or popular, polity of Cairo. These networks in 
fact serve and provide for the Egyptian populace a huge array of needs: employment, 
health care and educational facilities, among other services of course.   
 The role of informal networks in managing the affairs of various Middle-Eastern 
polities was also emphasized by analysts such as Janine Clark who, based upon work in 
Jordan, Yemen and Egypt asserts that the prevalence of such networks is one of the most 
valid reasons for the rise of Islamist politics in these countries. Adopting a committed 
social-movement-theory approach, Clark focuses on the networks perpetuated by Islamic 
Social Institutions (ISI), describing them as ―middle-class networks bringing Islamists 
and non-Islamists together…expanded and strengthened via ISIs‖64. Clark also cites that, 
from her findings, moderate Islamism, such as that of the Muslim Brotherhood, seems to 
be a ―movement of the marginalized, educated middle class‖65. However, this note is not 
quite revealing, mainly because of the extreme heterogeneity of Cairo‘s ―educated middle 
class‖.  
Apart from the relatively blurry distinctions that shade this particular ―class‖ in 
most of the polities of the developing countries, one notes that already within this Cairene 
middle class there is the urban upper-middle class, the lower middle class, in addition to 
other sub-classifications as well. These classifications are usually rendered depending 
upon a plethora of factors that determine the level of the social and cultural capital 
                                                 
63
 Diane Singerman (1995) Avenues of Participation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. p.136   
64
 Janine Clark (2004) Social Movement Theory & Patron-Clientelism: Islamic Social Institutions & The 
Middle Class in Egypt, Jordan, & Yemen. Comparative Political Studies. Vol.37.No.8 October. p.941  
65
 Ibid.  
Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter I 
47 
 
enjoyed by the person. These factors include the type of the job occupied, the educational 
background, the level of income, and, most of the time, the place of residence of the 
household: 
Middle classes in developing countries consist of a collection of classes 
that can collectively be described as the ‗intermediate‘ classes. Political 
entrepreneurs from different sections of the intermediate classes are 
unlikely to share common interests or to be constrained by the fate of the 
capitalist sector. The only viable redistributive strategy for developing 
country political entrepreneurs in the absence of any fiscal or regulatory 
space is to organize enough organizational muscle to be able to capture 
resources through a combination of fiscal, off-budget and even illegal 
means. The intermediate classes include the educated classes with college 
or university education, the petty bourgeoisie…66     
 
Being a primary focus in the context of this writing when it comes to informal networks 
and clientelist tendencies, it is safe to assume that, as echoed earlier by Ben Nefissa and 
others, patron-client relations are quite potent and relevant to the machinations of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the National Democratic Party (NDP).     
Commenting on what she views as a deficient approach in tackling the issue of 
patronage politics, Singerman says, ―Not merely embodiments of exploitative patron-
client relations, informal networks can be more accurately characterized by Lomintz‘s 
notion of ―reciprocity networks‖…In Cairo networks provide not only economic but 
political security. An understanding of networks as both a political resource and a 
political institution for the sha`b moves beyond the negative connotations surrounding 
clientelism‖.67 Thus, in short, although political patronage does exist, perceiving it as a 
main explanatory tool, disregarding the reciprocal nature of informal networks which 
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predominates, for example, in the popular quarters of Cairo, will surely be misleading in 
any attempt towards comprehending the Egyptian polity.   
 What I shall try to convey in the context of this writing, however, is the 
observation that these two aspects, the horizontal networks and the vertical patron-client 
bonds, both exist within the Egyptian polity and that they are not actually mutually 
exclusive but rather interconnected. As a matter of fact, one could argue that vertical and 
horizontal networks, more often than not, do collude and interact on all echelons of the 
Egyptian polity.
68
 If patron-client relations assume a ―vertical‖ notion of a hierarchical 
allocation of resources from patron to client/s, their survival and dispensary nature can 
not be maintained without the presence of effective ―horizontal‖ networks that are 
pervasive enough to cut across various individuals, communities and socioeconomic 
classes. For example, the existence of particular patrons and respective clients within a 
certain state bureaucracy, may it be a party, a ministry, or an educational institution, is 
usually associated with the presence of informal horizontal networks, or shillal in the 
case of Egypt, where the allocations are disbursed horizontally. The Egyptian polity, with 
its lesser notables arising in the popular quarters of Cairo, is perhaps a case in point. 
 Salwa Ismail dissects the emergence, or rather re-emergence, of the Lesser 
Notables in the popular quarters of Cairo. The informal communities of Cairo constitute a 
bulk of the areas tested by Ismail, and, in a study dealing with the patterns of interaction 
in Cairo‘s informal communities; she traces the development of a particular form of 
patron-client networks, namely those relations that erupt between the old and new settlers 
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of these communities. ―Clientelistic relations exist between early settlers and followers 
and between ―contractors‖ and small buyers. They also exist between residents and 
powerful figures from outside the community, who are involved in appropriating large 
plots of land‖.69  
Another figure presented also by Ismail in later contributions on the Egyptian 
polity is that of the ―biytakabrluh‖, a figure introduced earlier in the course of this 
research. In fact, the interesting thing about such a figure is that it is quite widespread and 
perhaps even celebrated within the Egyptian popular culture, yet rarely presented or 
displayed as a viable social and political actor in the literature pertaining to the Middle 
East. The lesser notabilities of Cairo‘s popular neighborhoods as outlined by Ismail are 
mostly ―real estate contractors, workshop owners, and wholesale-retail merchants. In 
other words they come from a social stratum whose ranks have expanded with the 
economic liberalization and privatization policies. The trajectories of those…share some 
common socioeconomic features. Some belong to merchant families that have been in 
business for two or three generations‖70.     
Again, Singerman tells us of an interesting story that catapults the machinations 
of this typology of lesser patrons. Although the figure cited here as the ―patron‖ is in fact 
a politician, he still belongs to a lower echelon of notability that is rather immersed in the 
neighborhoods of the sha`bi communities:  
The ties between the ―patron‖ and the supposed ―client‖ were very close 
and reciprocal. The ―client‖ received loans from the politician, gifts of 
food and clothing for her family, publicly subsidized apartments, 
employment for her and members of her family, assistance with 
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bureaucratic problems and a great deal of information and knowledge 
which the ―client‖ then utilized to support her personal and familial 
networks. Through this relationship, the ―client‖ developed a powerful 
base within the community, building on her family‘s already strong ties to 
the merchant community. At election time, the client returned these 
services by organizing the election campaign and marshaling local 
political support in the district. This relationship was extremely well 
publicized and promoted by both the politician and the local leader.
71
  
 
In a sense, this tale reemphasizes the fact that, within Cairo‘s popular quarters, and as 
asserted earlier, vertical patron-clientelism seems to be operating in conjunction with 
horizontal networks. 
 Placing patron-client networks of political entrepreneurship within the social 
structure, Khan states that ―Pyramidal patron-client networks are then likely to emerge as 
the most rational form of organization for faction leaders at all levels of the social 
structure. Faction leaders promise rewards to their clients based on their organizational 
support, who in turn mobilize those below them, all the way down to foot soldiers who 
may only be mobilized during elections, strikes, riots, and other political events‖.72 
Indeed this pyramidal web is utilized by the Lesser Notables who, in turn, reproduce their 
notability in accordance with the resources at their disposal.   
One of the main objectives of this research is to build upon the contribution of the 
aforementioned second generation of analysts who called for an alternative perception 
regarding the dynamics of informal networks in general. The special focus of this study, 
being the lesser notabilities of the Egyptian polity during Mubarak‘s era in specific, 
renders some attention to the postulations of those who dealt with the informal networks 
of Egyptian politics in the ascent of the 21
st
 Century. These contributions seem to offer a 
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sketch of a particular political agency, that of the lesser patrons, which is still in the 
making. As stated by Ismail, ―The political agency of the Lesser Notables is in the 
process of forming, and we need to pay attention to their modes of action, alliances, and 
allegiances [and] the politics of the lesser notables and the possible directions that their 
implication in local and national politics may take‖73. 
   
Methodology 
 For the purpose of this research, verification and authenticity of resources shall 
be a chief concern due to the usage of a multitude of primary sources, largely interviews 
and personal accounts. In Egypt: The Stalled Society, Hamied Ansari presents a few 
pointers regarding this aspect. The author mainly deals with the sociopolitical diagnosis 
of the state-structure in the post 1952 regime through the investigation of agricultural 
patterns and the role of the rural sector within the state. This writing is crucial for the aim 
of the study at hand, as it provides a scope of methodological tools that are used by the 
author in collecting data pertaining to the relationship between the agrarian bourgeoisie 
and the Egyptian state. Ansari's strategy of verification of information, which basically 
depends on the contextualization of the primary sources in accordance with the realities 
of the time and place subject to investigation, is a methodological tool that shall be 
followed in the course of this research.
74
 Hamied Ansari categorically states the 
difficulties faced upon collecting data due to the highly informal nature of the structures 
dealt with in the case study of the village of Kamshish
75
 around which the focus of his 
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book revolves. Access to primary sources, mainly direct interviews with villagers and 
officials, formulated a basic pool of information that was utilized by the author, a 
technique that shall be attempted in the course of this dissertation as well.   
In the course of this study I have conducted fieldwork in the areas of Cairo‘s 
popular urban quarters (Al-Ahiaa’Al Shae`bya) in order to trace the socioeconomic and 
political dynamics of lesser notabilities within the lower echelons of the Egyptian polity. 
My particular focus is on the area of Misr Al Qadima (Old Cairo), which is arguably the 
oldest residential quarter in contemporary Cairo. The selection of this particular area rests 
on two main factors; the first of them being the surveys and statistics available on the 
scope and magnitude of political mobilization and participation in Cairo‘s popular 
quarters; through data on party membership, voter turnout…etc. Some of this information 
was made available via the Central Authority for Population Mobilization and Statistics 
(CAPMAS) and Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. 
The second factor of course rests on the plausibility of conducting fieldwork and 
research in such an area. I initially aimed at pinpointing seven or eight areas or quarters 
that could be viable exemplars for Cairo‘s popular communities, with the intention to 
focus on two or three of them afterwards, depending on the availability of informants and 
middlemen that could act as linkages to such quarters. Eventually, Misr Al Qadima‘s two 
main quarters (the relatively recently-constructed 'Ain Al Sirra and the older quarter of 
Misr Al Qadima proper) were the popular areas that I tended to focus upon in this study 
as will be outlined in the upcoming chapter. In the context of the field research, the role 
of informant which was highlighted in similar areas of research by Verkaiik, Ismail, and 
Singerman was crucial, for he/she is likely to function as the link and facilitator of the 
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transfusion of information between the researcher and the area within he/she operates. In 
conducting my fieldwork, I primarily depended on what is usually referred to as 
‗snowball sampling‘, which is mainly a process that depends on utilizing the sources of 
information available as they come across from the respondents pertaining. Existing 
respondents were able to put me in contact with their circles of acquaintances, and these 
circles were also useful in order for the researcher to connect with other circles and so 
forth. Then open-ended interviews that allow for the respondent/s the room to talk 
relatively openly with a considerable degree of ease, and without a specifically prescribed 
topic of discussion, were also utilized. This was pivotal in order to allow more ease and 
fluidity when it comes to expressing a viewpoint or telling a certain story that might be of 
relevance. The mission of the researcher, then, becomes one of assessment and analysis 
of information, depending on the interest of the researcher of concern. This is actually 
quite resonant to an oral history approach, which attempts to generate research areas and 
foci depending, as much as possible, on the raw/uninterrupted narratives of respondents.
76
    
However, here I also tended to utilize a participant/observant approach
77
 that 
allows one to take part in the interactive dealings of the populace or the researched and, 
at the same time, also observe/monitor the way these dealings operate and the 
information that is infiltrating through. Again, this approach could be beneficial for the 
researcher because, primarily, being solely perceived as an outsider that is alienated from 
the area you are studying could potentially hinder the openness and connectivity that the 
people of such areas receive a person with, especially in a comparatively intimate 
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socioeconomic/cultural setting such as that of Cairo. Despite the fact that I have been a 
resident of Cairo for most of my life, and that I could subsequently claim to have some 
fair knowledge of a number of its quarters, the truth remains that in order for me to 
undertake the kind of research outlined here, this factor could only be a bonus that sure 
required a lot of additional fieldwork and research to build upon. After sketching a 
prospective set of features for the ‗Lesser Notable‘ in Chapter II, I shall present, in 
Chapter III, an overview of Misr Al Qadima as a popular polity. Chapters IV and V deal 
with the sociopolitical agency of the lesser notabilities and their affiliations with the MB 
and the NDP, in an attempt to scrutinize the scope and magnitude of the role played by 
the lesser notabilities in the Misr Al Qadima area. Finally, Chapter VI shall display a set 
of conclusions and findings relating to the current/prospective politico-economic roles of 
the lesser notables in the Egyptian polity at large.   
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Chapter II: Who are the Lesser Notables? Historical Background and Modes of 
Production and Circulation, Affiliations, and Political Roles 
This chapter aims at outlining some of the features of what could be dubbed as a 
typology of notables within the pre-modern Middle Eastern/Muslim society, with special 
focus on the Mamluk and Ottoman periods, venturing then into displaying some of the 
features of the Lesser Notables of Cairo today. In doing so, it does not attempt to draw 
direct and necessary linkages between the notables of the Mamluk and the Ottoman eras 
and those of today. Given the remarkably different socioeconomic, political and historical 
contexts, such an exercise could be of minimal benefit. Instead, the point is to trace some 
examples of the usage of the term ―notables‖ in the literature on the Middle East and 
portray the implications they bear pertaining to the socioeconomic and political roles 
ascribed to those notables, within the urban as well as the rural milieus. Along that 
process, striking similarities as well as crystal-clear differences between the category of 
the Middle Eastern notability in the past and its contemporary counterpart shall become 
rather clear. 
The Muslim City 
Perhaps a glimpse of the Islamic city during the early caliphates of the Umayyads 
and Abbasids is important, if we are to sketch out some of the common features of urban 
life at the time. Arguably, the mechanisms by which the Muslim city came into being 
resemble, in essence, those that led to the construction of most civic conglomerates in the 
medieval period. ―The village needed the town; but the town could not exist without the 
food produced by the peasant and delivered to the urban market, whether for sale or in 
payment of taxes. The basic unit of Near Eastern society was the ―agro-city‖, the urban 
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conglomeration together with the rural hinterland from which it drew its food and to 
which it sold part at least of its manufactures.‖78  
Indeed, a plethora of scholars have suggested that there emerged a certain set of 
commonalities amongst various Middle Eastern cities with the ascent of Islam. For 
example, based upon extensive study of North Africa, George and William Marcais noted 
that the shape of the Islamic city was determined only in part by the exigencies of power, 
determining where and how the citadel, the city walls, and the gates are placed, for 
instance. Yet in part the character of the city was also largely influenced by being Islamic 
or, in other words, by constituting an essential aspect of the Islamic caliphate. ―The 
congregational mosque in the center of the city, the religious schools beneath its shadow, 
the hierarchy of suqs…the residential quarters with their ethnic or religious solidarity, the 
cemeteries and shrines of saints outside the walls: all these, they suggested, existed and 
were where they were because the city was a Muslim city‖79. 
The religious/ethnic distribution of quarters was evident in medieval Muslim 
cities. Taking the example of Damascus, Ira Lapidus states that the quarters in practice 
reflected a sense of communal homogeneity. ―Jews and Christians, and the various sorts 
of each, had their own districts. Among the Muslims different ethnic groups- Arabs, 
Kurds, Turkomans- lived apart. So too in the Arab Muslim majority, population 
affiliation with the different Muslim schools of law was the basis for district quarters, as 
were common or presumed ancestry, clan ties, or common village origin‖.80 There was 
also a socioeconomic basis for the division of quarters. Some of them were based on the 
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clienteles of notable families and others were specialized in certain economic activities, 
such as, tanning, weaving and other manufactures as well. ―Basically they were whole 
communities made up of notables and commoners both, rich and poor‖.81  
Going somehow further, other historians, such as Massignon, stated that there was 
also an evident socioeconomic dimension that played a role in the physical and moral 
construction of the Muslim city. This is catapulted via the mounting importance of the 
professional corporations or guilds. The guild in fact acted as ―a convenient vehicle of 
control by the state over professional and social activities in the city‖.82  
There was one type of socio-religious institution above all which 
dominated the life of the Islamic city: The professional corporation or 
guild, going back beyond Islamic times into the Sasanian empire, 
encouraged by the Ismai‘lis, having a religious basis and sanction 
expressed by the in rites of initiation and the cult of patron saints. Such 
corporations created within the framework of turuq, the brotherhoods of 
mystics, provided the basis of urban society in the Muslim world: of 
solidarity between man and man, and of individual self-respect, the 
craftsman‘s belief in the worth of his own labor.83                   
 
Hence, in the eyes of Massignon, the urban Muslim society was predominantly corporate. 
―Urban Muslims had some special power of organizing themselves, maintaining their 
communal existence in the face of political power‖.84  
The Guilds 
The example of the political relevance of the commercial guilds could be viewed 
as one of the early manifestations of a commercial-political relationship within the milieu 
of the medieval Muslim City. However, other historians noted that this corporate nature 
of guilds within the Muslim city was not as predominant as reckoned by Massignon. 
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According to this line of thought championed by C. Cahen and S. M. Stern among others, 
the guilds of the early Muslim city were not actually guilds in the medieval European 
sense. These guilds, ―insofar as they existed, were instruments of state control. It was 
only at a late period that they acquired a life of their own…Here we may ask whether 
even the guilds of the Ottoman times had so much of an independent life as we may be 
tempted to think. Except in a few specialized cases, did they exist in a fully articulated 
and autonomous form‖85 Overall, there seems to be a disagreement among historians with 
regard to the scope and magnitude of the political role played by those commercial agents 
at the time; however they mostly cite that regardless of the size of that role, it still 
existed.  
 As stated earlier, it is highly likely that associational professional institutions that 
already existed prior to the Muslim conquest of the Middle East have made their way 
through onto the period of the Islamic caliphates. This trend also continued with the 
beginning of the age of the smaller Muslim states/dynasties. The earliest records marking 
the presence of a guild system in the medieval Middle East date back to the twelfth 
century. These earliest texts were the references ―in twelfth century treatises of the hisba 
both in the East and in Spain to foremen of trades‖86. These foremen were responsible for 
ensuring that the tradesmen under them would carry out the muhtasib’s orders. ―Similar 
Evidence is also forthcoming from the Mamluk period…The role of the foremen, as 
assistants of the various delegates of the government, is a constant factor in the history of 
the organization of the crafts and trades in Islam‖.87     
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 The guild system has nonetheless witnessed various phases of rise and fall that 
somehow coincided with the politico-economic policies of the Muslims dynasties 
prevalent during the lifetime of the guilds. In practice, the ascent of the guild-system was 
associated with the rise of the role of the artisans as viable economic actors in the milieu 
of the Muslim city. With the ―decline in conquests and in the recruitment of Arabs into 
the army, growing numbers of Arabs started to move into the productive sectors.‖88 
Hourani states that: 
Under the Sunni rule, the guilds were persecuted, submitted to a thousand 
restrictions, deprived of any legal rights. There was a legal functionary, 
the muhtasib, whose main duty was to supervise the guilds and to nip in 
the bud any attempt at independent action…Quite different was the 
position of the guilds under the Fatimids, where they enjoyed great 
prosperity. Recognized by the state, they seem to have possessed 
considerable privileges, and to have played an important part in the 
commercial revival that took place under Fatimid rule. It was the Fatimids 
that founded the guild of teachers which formed the great university of Al-
Azhar…In 1171, Fatimid anti-Caliphate was destroyed by 
Saladin…Immediately the guilds were submitted to a very strict control.89       
 
Here, it is noteworthy that other medieval historians would doubt that the degree of 
control exercised by the Muslim state varied a great deal when comparing the policies of 
the Sunni states as opposed to the Shiite ones. However, there seems to be a sense of 
agreement that, regardless of the particular Muslim state that reigned supreme, the role of 
the muhtasib as the supervisor of commercial activities was somewhat crucial
90
.  
The Notables: The Ulama and the Commercial bourgeoisie: Patrons and Clients 
With the demise of the Abbasids around 1248 A.D, the relationship between the 
government and the society within the majority of the Muslim Middle East was given 
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shape by two main determinants. First, there was almost a monopoly of political power 
by politico-military groups of primarily Turkic origin, who were of course Muslim but 
kept themselves at a distance from the Arabic or Persian speaking peoples over whom 
they prevailed. Second: 
There was a close relationship between the commercial bourgeoisie and 
the ulama, those learned in the law and other religious sciences…this 
connection had several aspects: members of the bourgeois families took to 
learning and the men of learning married into such families. The ulama 
possessed a certain economic and social power through their control of the 
awqaf, and both groups shared an interest in a stable, prosperous and 
cultivated urban life. Members of the great bourgeois families and of the 
ulama together provided an urban leadership: their wealth, piety, culture 
and ancient names gave them social prestige and the patronage of quarters, 
ethnic or religious groups, crafts, or the city as a whole. 
91
      
       
Here, both the commercial bourgeois and the ulama formulated a typology of urban 
notables. The stature of those notables was not merely moral or social; on the contrary, 
urban notables had some essential politico-economic functions to fulfill.    
 Looking at the class origin of the ulama, we will find that, despite the fact that 
they were the core of the urban elite; they pretty much came from all walks of life and 
thus were undifferentiated from the rest of the population. By and large, the door was 
open for competence in the kind of religious and judicial knowledge required for the 
acquisition of the ulama status and, subsequently, if we trace the professional and class 
origin of these ulama, one finds that some of them were merchants, some were artisans, 
and others were bureaucrats.
92
 By virtue of these hybrid origins, the ulama held firm ties 
with the majority of echelons of the Muslim society. 
93
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Being the prime interpreters of Islamic law, the social, economic, and political 
agency of the ulama was crucial: 
The ulama were intimately involved in [shari`a's] application in everyday 
social and economic life. They were the judges and lawyers of the cities. 
Family life was under their jurisdiction. Commercial transactions, property 
transfers and contracts in general to be legally binding had to be witnessed 
and registered by people competent in Islamic law. The regulation of the 
markets was entrusted to the ulama and they were in addition the 
managers of the cities‘ educational, religious, and philanthropic 
institutions. All community interests were thus represented by this 
unspecialized, multi-competent body which was the religious, 
professional, commercial, and managerial elite all in one…the spokesmen, 
the leaders of the people.
94
  
 
Additionally, the ulama also helped create a spectrum of communal cohesion within the 
urban Muslim society, as they constituted a higher order of associational life that cut 
across various social echelons, mainly via the schools of law, which were in practice 
assemblages of scholars. ―They were made up of ulama study groups, teachers, disciples, 
interested members of the community and patrons; and ulama administrative clienteles 
such as the multitude of deputies, witnesses, orderlies, clerks…clienteles which radiated 
their influence and were to a limited degree an ordering force in the lives of the common 
people‖.95               
Within most of the Mamluk and Ottoman states, there was a ruler (sultan) beneath 
whom an entire system of control was present: the governor and his household, the 
secretaries in the government agencies, the muhtasib, the qadi…etc. But in conjunction 
with these political actors, there was an important societal spectrum that had to be co-
opted by the state, and that is where the political agency of urban notables comes in: 
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The notables, the leaders of the bourgeois and the ulama, obeyed the 
government not only form fear or self-interest, but from concern for peace 
and security…But they were also ―leaders‖ responsible to the urban 
population. At times they could use their independent power over it to 
mobilize urban forces and put pressure on the ruler. This mobilization was 
carried out through an ancient machinery of contacts between notables of 
the city and leaders of quarters, popular preachers, shaykhs of turuq, 
leaders of certain crafts…In this process, even those who held posts under 
the ruler might take part: the qadi could become a spokesman for the local 
ulama, the shaykhs of quarters or villages could act as clients of local 
leaders.
96
       
 
In that sense, the urban notables were primarily key players on the streets of the city due 
to their affluence and capacity to stir the affairs of the street through networking and 
exercising of power.
97
 More often than not, the political agency of urban notables went in 
accordance with the already existing political system. Mostly, ―a strong government ruled 
in close partnership with the bourgeois and their leaders, and the influence of the leaders 
was thrown on the side of the existing order‖.98   
Practically speaking, the notables could not replace the rulers due to their extreme 
diversity and lack of an organizational institution that could mobilize and unite a major 
part of these networks, possessed by the notables, at a particular point in time. By nature, 
these networks were fragmented and lacked a sense of cohesiveness. This spectrum of 
organizational control over the local notability and their active networks ―could be only 
done by the military rulers, hence the long predominance of ―Turkish‖ or Mamluk ruling 
groups, acting both as rulers and as patrons…until much later the decline of Ottoman 
authority led to the re-emergence of local leaders in the provincial cities‖.99   
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 The phenomenon of zu`ar in Mamluk Syria sheds some light on the mechanisms 
of patronage politics at the time. In Damascus, the zu`ar (literally the troublemakers or 
scoundrels) were present around the late fifteenth century, however some sources note 
that the phenomenon had existed in previous periods under various names. The zu`ar 
were: 
Self consciously organized groups of young men…with recognized chiefs, 
called kabirs, some of whom claimed to be descendants of the prophet. 
They wore uniforms and a distinctive headdress…The zu`ar were 
recruited from the working population…Carpenters, criers, shopkeepers, 
and spinners were among them. They were organized by quarter and 
mostly in the turbulent quarters…They resisted what they regarded as 
unwarranted or excessive taxation, assassinated abusive Mamluks and tax 
collectors…The zu`ar were the core of the late fifteenth century and early 
sixteenth century popular resistance to the Mamluk regime.
100
 
 
Inasmuch as they were sources of opposition for Mamluk domination, the zu`ar had to be 
also co-opted by the Mamluks who aimed at winning them over, utilizing their 
organizational capacity to strengthen their rule.  
The Mamluks utilized the zu`ar as ―clienteles whom they protected, armed, paid, 
and honored by reviews in military village violence. They employed them in wars, in 
repression of Bedouin or village violence, as personal following in disputes the Mamluks 
had with each other, and in their efforts to control and extort money from the population 
of the city‖.101 Overall, it could be argued that in the Syrian cities of Damascus and 
Aleppo, as well as in their other powerhouses in Egypt and elsewhere, the Mamluks 
cultivated several networks of arms and money in dealing with the powerful socio-
political key-players. On one hand, this strategy helped create a sort of clientele that 
played an efficient role in the administration of these cities and, on the other, it 
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maintained a sense of social equilibrium that reinforced the grip of the Mamluk regime 
over the affairs of the territories it controlled. 
The Ottomans: Modernization 
Indeed it could be a shortcut to logical deduction or research to try to abbreviate 
the extended political history of the complex set of provinces that were under the 
Ottoman rule into a unified theme of features concerning the political agency of notables. 
For example, in the case of Egypt, a comparatively extensive period of Ottoman rule 
roughly lasted from 1517 until 1805, when Mohammad Ali reigned supreme and initiated 
his own dynasty. Instead, we will try to derive some potential linkage between the 
political role played by the notables in the late Ottoman period and the features of the 
social structure and the political system that accompanied the widespread wave of 
modernization of the late 1800‘s, with a special focus on the Egyptian case.    
On aggregate, and throughout the various Ottoman provinces, the pattern of 
political notability that was existent during the Islamic Caliphates continued to prevail. 
Mostly, the notables of the Arab cities during the Ottoman period were local men that 
earned a certain standing of socioeconomic and political relevance.  
Under the Ottomans as before, these notables acted as intermediaries 
between the ‗men of sword‘ and the local Muslim Population. Basically, 
they were loyal to the Sultan, but they were also leaders of their cities and 
heirs of urban civilization of Islam. At times they tried to curb Ottoman 
power or the use of it, and they had the means of doing so: They could 
mobilize public opinion by making use of preachers, heads of quarters, 
leaders of popular organizations, and they had some influence through 
their links with the religious hierarchy throughout the empire.
102
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Such notables were drawn mainly from the traditionally renowned families of ‗notables‘, 
some of which played a key role until modern times. Examples include the Khalidis and 
Alamis of Jerusalem, the Jabiris in Aleppo, the Gaylanis in Baghdad, and the Bakris in 
Cairo.
103
  
 
Egypt Under Mohammed Ali (1805-1848) and The Change in Modes of Production: 
Exit the Classical Notables…Enter The Lesser Notables? 
 With the advent of Mohammed Ali in 1805, it was obvious that the political role 
of the classical urban notables of Egypt was somehow waning. Along with the 
diminishing political agency of the notables, there was also a sense of political void at 
large when it comes to the political activity of the urban population. Hourani notes that 
there seems to be a virtual vacuum with regard to the presence of any proof of political 
action of urban notables in Egypt throughout the 19
th
 Century and perhaps up until the 
Urabi rebellion in 1881 when the local notables took part in the army rebellion that aimed 
at confronting Egypt‘s Khedive, Tawfik, who was also Mohammed Ali‘s great grandson. 
In fact, the exposé of Egypt in the nineteenth century is an anomalous one: ―At one end, a 
gradual increase in the political activity of the urban population…reaching its height in 
the period between the first revolt against the French and the movement which carried 
Mohammed Ali to power; much later in 1870‘s, a sudden upsurge, and in between 
virtually nothing, a political vacuum‖.104   
In essence, some would argue that the phase of modernization that took place 
within the Ottoman provinces brought a practical end to the political influence of the 
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notables. Indeed the reforms of the tanzimat period in the Ottoman Empire and the 
similar attempts in Egypt ―would, if carried to their logical conclusion, have destroyed 
the independent power of the notables and the mode of political action it made possible‖ 
ideally establishing a ―uniform and centralized administration, linked directly with each 
citizen, and working in accordance with its own rational principles of justice, applied 
equally to all‖.105 Despite the fact that these reforms met some success, on aggregate they 
failed to deliver the aspired objectives. The reasons for this minimal success vary, but, 
importantly, one can outline the essentiality of the presence of an absolute ruler in most 
of the cases such reformations were attempted. Quite often, the ruler was only willing to 
apply these alterations in the governing system as far as they did not threaten his 
supremacy. Rather, most rulers attempted to capitalize on such reformations in order to 
consolidate their supremacy.  
In Egypt, the process of administrative reform was accompanied with the 
monopolization of political action which came along with the rise of a paramount ruler, 
Mohammed Ali, who established an authoritarian scheme of political power, independent 
of the Ottoman Empire and its policies. Along with this political scheme, there was also 
an alteration in the modes of production of the Egyptian state. ―With Muhammad Ali‘s 
arrival, the move towards a capitalist mode of production began…State centralization 
was enforced, while the semi-communal organizations of the countryside, as well as the 
artisan and commercial guilds and the Sufi orders…were all dissolved‖.106   
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           With the abolition of the Iltizam system, which empowered a certain class of 
Mamluks and other powerful notables in order to collect taxes from peasants, 
Mohammed Ali had indeed ensured the demise of any potential political rivalry that 
could arise from notable figures within the Egyptian society. ―By collecting taxes 
directly, Mohammed Ali ensured that no new class of multazims should arise; when, 
towards the end of his reign, a new class of landowners began to come into existence, 
they did not at first possess the same means as the Mamluks of putting pressure on the 
government.‖107 It is true that this class of landowners was soon able to attain a position 
of power within the rural economy, but landownership by itself did not create political 
power once more until Khedive Ismail began to depend upon the landowners‘ help and 
support in the 1870‘s.108        
  Of course one could still argue that there was some political action on the popular 
level during the Mohammed Ali era, however the outlets for such action were limited. 
The instruments of political action had also been destroyed. The tax farms 
had gone, the associations of the craftsmen remained…and so did the 
turuq, but the stricter policing of the street and the bazaars made popular 
action more difficult. In the countryside, the sedentarisation of the 
Bedouin, and the growth of the power of the umda, the government agent 
in the villages, destroyed other possible means of action. It seems too that 
Mohammed Ali set himself deliberately to dispense of those popular 
leaders who, in the period of confusion before he came to power, had 
served as mobilisers of popular support in favor of the contenders for 
power. 
109
       
In fact Mohammed Ali incepted his rule with the eradication of those that supported him 
initially, such as Umar Makram, a local notable who was also an intermediary with a 
popular following and access to the military.  
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 Towards the end of the 19
th
 Century, the political agency of the notables was on 
the rise again. With the considerable increase in the urban population and the revival of 
Al Azhar as a religious institution under the patronage of Khedive Ismail, political 
notability came to the forefront of the Egyptian polity again. Increasingly, and with the 
expansion of the Egyptian army to meet with the aspirations of the newly rising Egyptian 
state under the Mohammed Ali Dynasty, Egyptians of rural origin gradually became the 
backbone of the newly established state institutions, particularly the army. The arising 
leaders were of Egyptian as well as Mamluk origins, and they were incrementally 
accumulating landowning privileges, primarily through the land grants of the ruler. ―Riaz, 
Nubar, Sharif, Barudi are the new politicians, and behind them one can see in the 
shadows different groups inside the ruling family. As politicians they still work in the 
traditional way, by building up their own households and systems of clients‖.110    
 After the first shock of the British occupation of 1881, the political role of the 
notables was given a further push. ―British rule was indirect; its official purpose was to 
make possible the end of the occupation…it needed intermediaries…In such 
circumstances, the notables could play a part, and as usual an ambiguous one, supporting 
the British occupation but also discreetly serving as the focal points of discontent‖.111  
 
The futuwwa: The advent of the Lesser Notables 
As stated earlier, with the decline of the Mamluk and, more so of the Ottoman 
states, it seemed that the waning political agency of the notable patrons- the muhtasib and 
the commercial bourgeoisie- was gradually giving way to the rise of other political actors. 
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In Egypt, Muhammad Ali somehow succeeded in eliminating the political relevance of 
the traditional Mamluk and local patrons. Despite the rough return of some political 
notability of sorts towards the end of the 19
th
/early beginnings of the 20
th
 Century, there 
was yet a political vacuum to be filled and utilized by the ruling elite. Perhaps here comes 
the increasing importance of a certain figure that was predominant in the folktales as well 
as the streets of the Middle Eastern city, that of the futuwwa. In Cairo, and perhaps up 
until the mid-20
th
 Century, each locality in the popular quarters was identified with one or 
several of those futuwwas. The term is usually used to ―denote a strong bold 
man…Generally; it has been applied to the masses but occasionally to members of the 
elite as well. In all cases the element of protection has been seminal to the role‖.112    
The conceptualization of the futuwwa had its roots in the later Middle Ages, when 
―the organization of the crafts seem to become more articulate, especially by adopting the 
ideology of the futuwwa…Salman Al Farisi plays a great role in the later traditions of the 
futuwwa, that ideal moral and social code, which also provided ideals and ceremonies to 
the associations of the craftsmen…Salman is honored as the patron of the guilds‖.113 In 
Egyptian folktales, the futuwwa is depicted as being ―generous, courageous, possessing 
muru’a (manliness). He is also in Egyptian epics, noted for his cleverness, cunning, sense 
of humor, and verbal skill‖.114 
 Nevertheless, in addition to the moral and personal attributions of the futuwwa, 
there are also some social and politico-economic roles that were fulfilled by this type of 
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personages in the milieu of the Egyptian city, mainly as leaders of the urban quarters. El 
Messiri notes that this sociopolitical role for the futuwwas was somewhat intensified 
towards the end of the nineteenth century: 
By the middle of the nineteenth century one no longer hears of resistance 
movements spanning several quarters, but rather of influential personages, 
including futuwwat, operating within quarters. While documentary 
evidence is scarce, one may nonetheless deduce something of the role the 
futuwwat played within the quarters or harat. In many ways these were 
social entities as well as physical and geographical units, and their 
inhabitants were often set off from those of the neighboring harat…To 
some degree interests among harat were conflicting, and it was in the 
context of defending those interests that the nineteenth century futuwwa 
exercised his role as protector. 
115
 
 
Regardless of the timeframe within which he predominated, a common feature of the 
futuwwa’s dealings with the inhabitants of the neighborhood, one may assume, was the 
fact that they were mostly based on intimate contact and personal ties.  
The 20
th
 Century futuwwa  
 In the beginning of the 20
th
 Century, one finds the futuwwa aiming at establishing 
himself within the neighborhood as ―the paragon of all those virtues and qualities that 
most citizens of old Cairo would like in some measure to claim as their own. Foremost 
among those qualities…is physical strength‖116. But this scheme of strength must also be 
accompanied with other qualities, such as bravery and generosity. Such characteristics 
are quite important in defining the kind of protection and services that are provided by 
the futuwwa to the inhabitants of the neighborhood in which he reigns as the supreme 
patron.
117
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 In fact, an essential part of the social identity of the futuwwa is defined by the 
network of social and economic activities he is involved in. In his own neighborhood, he 
is not only conceived as the leader and protector, but also as the problem-solver and the 
dispenser of much needed services and resources: 
Most of the problems the people bring to the futuwwa relate to work 
situations, or those that emerge from the traditional style of life and the 
values attached to it. Typically, people interacted on a personal basis with 
no formal contracts, bills, or receipts. In these arrangements a man was 
tied by his tongue…bound by what he had said. In this way if someone 
had borrowed money from his neighbor without receipt and refused to pay 
it back or denied that he had borrowed it, the futuwwa, after investigation, 
could force him to return the money. Some clients may take commodities, 
promising to pay later, and then continually postpone payment or refuse it 
altogether; the merchant would then seek help from the futuwwa. The 
futuwwa might even end a dispute by paying what was at issue himself.
118
   
 
Logically, with the virtual absence of official institutional venues for the facilitation of 
the affairs of the populace, the sociopolitical role of the futuwwa appears to be rather 
crucial as the arbitrator and settler of disputes. In spite of the vigorous process of 
modernization and institutionalization that overwhelmed the Egyptian state in the ascent 
of the 20
th
 Century, the formalization of state services could not meet the needs and 
demands of the urban dwellers
119
 and, consequently, the room was still open for such 
popular figures to operate efficiently within the popular quarters of Cairo.        
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 The futuwwa also played an economic role of extreme importance within the 
milieu of the neighborhood. This role connoted a sense of benevolence for the entirety of 
the community. He would ―supply the hitta with scarce commodities, such as oil or 
kerosene, to spare the people from black market prices. In the economic crisis of 1942, a 
certain futuwwa used to procure the Kerosene allotment of his whole hitta, protect it 
during delivery, and then distribute it equally throughout the hitta‖.120 Of course, such 
activities were not out of mere good will, but they were also pragmatic practices that 
reinforced the paramount role of the futuwwa as the sole leader and protector of his own 
neighborhood.     
 Therefore the futuwwa would work in financially rewarding jobs that would place 
him above the average wage-earner and help empower his stratum as the patron and 
leader of the locale within which he operates. For example, Aziza al-Fahla, one of the 
few examples of renowned female futuwwas in Cairo in 1930‘s and 1940‘s, earned 
enough from her work as a prime dealer in foodstuffs to enable her to purchase eight 
houses in her neighborhood, in addition to a  coffee shop and a few other commercial 
stores. Furthermore, as the leader and facilitator of various networks, the futuwwa does 
not operate alone, and his prestige and prowess is further dependent upon the number of 
supporters he acquires. These potential supporters come from all walks of life and are 
usually referred to as the shilla or the clique.
121
  
 In summation, one notes that the role of the futuwwa in the social structure of the 
urban masses was more of a protector as well as an alternative to the formal and mostly 
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inefficient state system. This ascribed role has sometimes placed him in confrontation 
with the ruling elite, yet in other times the futuwwa was utilized by these elites as an 
intermediary and a potential facilitator of a variety of social, economic, and political 
roles. In doing so, the futuwwa partially succeeded in ―minimizing the abuses and 
exploitation of the authorities‖.122 Perhaps up until today, the Cairene polity still holds a 
place for the functional role that was conventionally played by the futuwwa. As stated 
earlier and as shall be displayed further in the context of this writing, one could argue that 
the institutional substitutes for the functions performed by the futuwwa have not yet 
rooted themselves in the popular quarters of Cairo, and that is the main reason why the 
values associated with the futuwwa are kept alive until today. As shall be portrayed in the 
upcoming chapters, the socioeconomic/political roles ascribed to the futuwwa figure 
resemble to a great extent the functionalities fulfilled by the lesser notabilities in Cairo‘s 
popular quarters in the contemporary period.         
 
The 1952 Revolution: Contextualizing the reemergence of the Lesser Notables 
  
―If, beginning with the eleventh century, we examine what has happened 
in France one half-century to another, we shall not fail to perceive that at 
the end of each of these periods a two-fold revolution has taken place in 
the state of society. The noble has gone down social ladder, and the 
commoner has gone up; the one descends as the other rises. Every half 
century brings them nearer to each other, and they will soon meet. Nor is 
this peculiar to France…‖123 
Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America, 1835 
                                                                                           
The prominent historian/economist Galal Amin draws attention to an essential 
factor that played a paramount role in formulating the Egyptian polity in the aftermath of 
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the 1952 revolution, which is social mobility. Amin states that despite the fact that most 
of the sharp alterations pertaining to the Egyptian social structure were clearly observed 
post the Infitah policies in the mid-1970s, the accelerating pace of social mobility that 
characterized this period had its firm roots in the 1952 revolution. ―Economic 
liberalization may have itself been one of the main factors accelerating the rate of social 
mobility, but it has by no means been the only one. Important factors were at work long 
before the 1970‘s‖124. Indeed, with the advent of the nationalization and agricultural 
reform policies adopted by 1952 regime, new types of middle class professionals and 
technocrats rose into the forefront as the viable politico-economic segments of the 
society, and the regime depended upon such segments as the main constituency of 
support.  
The amalgamation of policies adopted by the 1952 regime, contributing to the rise 
in the rate of social mobility, include a variety of economic and political measure, such 
as, 
The successive land reform laws between 1952 and 1961, the 
nationalization and sequestration measures of the early 1960‘s, the raising 
of minimum wages and of the rates of income tax, as well as the very 
rapid expansion of free education and other social services. To this one 
must also add the rapid increase in the rate of investment in agriculture 
and industry from 1957 to 1965, which led to the absorption of large 
numbers of agricultural surplus labor in irrigation projects…The growth of 
bureaucracy and of government-created political organizations provided 
new career ladders for a great number of university graduates who could 
not be absorbed in agriculture or industry.
125
  
  
Along this process, the political and economic relevance of the classical notables, 
primarily the giant landowners and businessmen, which roughly constituted less than 1 % 
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of Egypt‘s population at the time, gave way to this considerably larger middle class, 
which was also gradually growing in terms of relative size and also in terms of the 
economic strata and political roles ascribed to it. 
126
 
In the 1970‘s, more sources of income were induced into the Egyptian economy, 
mostly external. After a few years of recession post the 1967 defeat, the open door 
policies of Sadat encouraged the absorption of a variety of external sources of income, 
including, foreign loans, increasing revenues from the Suez Canal, oil production, 
tourism, and, most significantly, labor remittances from abroad. Subsequently, Egypt 
witnessed an unprecedented rate of economic growth that reached 8 % in 1979,
127
 which 
enabled certain segments of the society to amass unprecedented accumulations of wealth 
as well. Those were mainly the intermediaries: merchants, real-estate bidders and 
contractors, and import-export facilitators were among those that benefited the most from 
this open door craze. ―President Sadat used to publicly take pride in the fact that his 
presidency witnessed an accumulation of wealth resulting in due to the surge in the pieces 
of residential apartments, buildings, and land. He practically measured the success of his 
policies with this indicator‖128. Indeed Sadat was keen on attracting those newly wealthy 
classes to the circles of political power, and, eventually, those that were at the apex of 
commercial and real estate activities were the newly viable politico-economic actors 
within the Egyptian polity.            
 Overall, it is safe to assume that the 1952 regime triggered a deeply entrenched 
process of social mobility that swapped the Egyptian polity for decades, empowering 
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various categories of social actors and enabling them to attain certain strata of economic 
and political dominance in various time-periods. This process was actualized in 
accordance with the socioeconomic policies adopted by the state. For example, during the 
Nasser years, the ruling regime put emphasis on the role of the newly rising 
professional/technocratic middle class, which was subsequently empowered via 
massively subsidized state services. On the other hand, the period of Sadat also witnessed 
an accelerating rate of social mobility that gave rise to a relatively new prototype of 
politico-economic notability; that of the intermediaries: 
For those social groups who have only recently had access to surplus 
income, investment in industry or agriculture may seem too risky, 
requiring more capital, a longer gestation period, and greater experience 
than is required by investment in residential buildings, transportation, 
tourism, or the import trade. Much of what is regarded by economists as 
‗unproductive‘ investment is in the channels preferred by these investors 
with less experience who are also more anxious to prove their social 
advancement than and less confident in their ability to maintain their 
newly acquired social status.
129
  
 
Arguably, with the widespread acceleration of these relatively new types of commercial 
activities that ensure rapid profitability, the loyalty to the state also diminished. In fact, 
most of the income accumulated in the 1970‘s and 1980‘s could not be attributed to state 
activities, but rather to its inactivity: ―To the merely passive role of the state in allowing 
people to migrate, and to its failure to regulate the rate of inflation and pattern of 
investment‖.130    
Hence, in a rough resemblance to, or perhaps continuation of, the political 
notability of urban and rural intermediaries cited earlier in this research, the phase of 
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Sadat witnessed an increasingly growing socioeconomic and political role for an echelon 
of socioeconomic actors that could be described as the ‗lesser notables‘. By and large, the 
Egyptian state has been comparatively successful in exercising efficient political and 
economic control over the central locales of the country: the major and relatively 
developed urban dwellings in Cairo and Alexandria, the avenues and squares in the 
towns, the checkpoints between governorates…etc. However, within the peripheral urban 
and rural popular quarters, there exists a sense of self-management that somehow 
requires the facilitation provided by intermediaries:   
The Egyptian state‘s recurrent problem as a central/centralized state is that 
of identifying the intermediaries through which it may observe global 
control over these communities, maintain public order and impose the 
social items regarding which the regime refuses to negotiate. Under the 
old regime, the role of the intermediary between central power and the 
local level was played, in the countryside, by the owners of latifundiae 
enjoying absolute authority over their villages…and, in the city, by the 
notability system and the futuwwa network…Under Sadat, and more 
clearly still under Mubarak until the end of the 1980‘s, the regime 
attempted to co-opt the Islamist trend for this role…The point is to know 
to what extent this redistribution of roles…will transform fundamentally 
the ways in which effective power is exercised in Egypt.
131
      
 
In the next section, I shall attempt to portray some of the features of this newly rising 
category of lesser notability that, arguably, had its roots in the scheme of social mobility 
initiated by the 1952 regime, and was further created by the open door policies of Sadat.       
The Lesser Notables in The Contemporary Period 
  
There is indeed some sound resemblance between the kind of attributions related 
to the biytkabarluh figures of authority in the popular quarters of Cairo today, cited 
earlier in Chapter I, and the aforementioned functions of the futuwwa figure which was 
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predominant in the Cairo and other Middle Eastern cities for hundreds of years. These 
two categories; the futuwwa as well as the biytkabarluh, appear to be distinctive from the 
traditional notables introduced earlier in this chapter:  
In comparison to the Ottoman notables, today‘s notables are of a lesser 
social status in the sense that they do not issue from prominent families 
with a long, established history. Further, their interventions in local 
communities are not of the same scale as the interventions of the earlier 
notables. Although a few of the contemporary local notability have 
managed to enter national politics through elections to the National 
Assembly, they could not be referred to as national figures.
132
  
 
In light of these differences, today‘s local notables have been described by Ismail as 
lesser notables.  
Today‘s lesser notabilities have also gone through a process of transformation that 
overwhelmed Cairo since the early 20
th
 Century.
133
 Within the popular quarters of Cairo, 
both the social polities as well as the functionality of protection, which was traditionally 
undertaken by the futuwwa, have changed to a certain extent. A plethora of sociopolitical 
and economic alterations took place in the milieu of the popular neighborhood, setting the 
ground for such transformation. First, there existed an increasingly heterogeneous 
population as a result of the continuing waves of rural-urban migration directed towards 
Cairo, which created a sense of tension between those various societal actors with 
different, and sometimes conflicting, ethnic and cultural backgrounds.  Then, with the 
incremental rise in the overall population and the subsequent overcrowding of the popular 
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quarters of Cairo, there seems to be a gradual erosion of the role familial and personal 
ties play, and the picture seems to be changing with regard to the role expected to be 
played by the local patron or leader. Another crucial transformation, albeit also subject to 
radical alterations in the rise of the neo-liberal phase in the early 1990‘s, is the 
―increasing intervention of the state in terms of policing and the maintenance of local 
order‖, which narrowed the scope of the activities of traditional popular politics134.               
 However, in spite of these transformations, several taxonomies of lesser 
notabilities are still operational in the popular neighborhoods of Cairo today. A multitude 
of merchants, real estate contractors and small to medium sized shop-owners have come 
to the forefront of political notability of the popular neighborhoods as viable actors, 
establishing ―their own economic and social networks through which they consolidate 
their positions in their neighborhoods‖.135 Examples of merchants and real estate 
contractors that belong to this category are quite recurrent and they usually come from 
modest social origins and build up their wealth via investing in commercial goods and 
real estate ventures. Most of these notables also invest in building their status by forging 
socioeconomic links with their neighborhoods: donating to charitable activities inside and 
outside their quarters, setting up tables for the needy during the month of Ramadan and 
other social and religious festivities, and organizing other collections of donations for 
activities in the neighborhood through local mosques. These activities are considered as a 
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sign of their goodness and an expression of humility and connectedness with the people 
of their own locale.
136
 
 Yet, importantly, along with the socioeconomic features of those lesser 
notabilities, there is also an essential political dimension that is crucial. Most of these 
figures also seek to cultivate links with the state authorities, ―organizing banquets to 
which the police commissioner (ma’mur), the head of the police investigative unit, and 
members of the local and national assemblies are invited…The organization of these 
activities allows for direct relations with the leadership‖.137 Subsequently, through their 
contacts with the public institutions of the state and their positions in the community, 
today‘s lesser notables are sought out by their clients to resolve disputes and sort out 
problems.          
 With the incrementally increasing relevance of the lesser notabilities on the 
political level, it was rather logical that they would start seeking positions in the local and 
national legislatures, mainly as a strategy for consolidating and further formalizing their 
political prowess and authority. 
In this respect the lesser notability could be said to be following in the 
steps of the commercial bourgeoisie. Over the last decade, large 
entrepreneurs and business persons have run, in increasing number, in 
elections to the National Assembly. As a consequence, their share of seats 
has been rising. In 2000, this entrepreneurial class won seventy-seven 
seats, accounting for 17 percent of the total…Merchants and contractors 
from popular quarters have joined the business class in running for the 
National Assembly seats. This entry of the lesser notables into national 
politics should be interpreted as a confirmation of their role as 
intermediaries with government…The notability is also active in party 
politics, as members in the local assembly, and as secretaries in the local 
secretaries to the ruling party local branches.
138
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In fact, it should be noted that the mounting importance of the Lesser Notables stems 
from their mediating role as state/society intermediaries within their neighborhoods. In 
addition to the resources they allocate locally to the citizens of their own quarters, they 
also maintain a network of ties with the state authorities, which enables them to provide a 
variety of services to the locals, as will be dissected later in throughout the upcoming 
chapters.  
 As mentioned earlier in Chapter I, perhaps the most vivid portrayal of the lesser 
notables of Cairo‘s popular quarters nowadays is exemplified via the biytkabarluh 
personas, observed in a wide spectrum of popular quarters. Indeed, the ethos of the 
biytkabarluh involves a certain set of duties and services that is expected to be provided 
by such a figure. Quite often, he/she is expected to gain access to state resources and 
services that would be otherwise very difficult for the local to acquire weren‘t it for the 
intervention of this particular biytkabarluh figure. This does correspond with the 
increasing blurriness in the boundaries between the state and the society or, put 
differently, the public and the private, which was inevitable with the advent of the Infitah 
policies.  
Arguably, the acceleration of the open door policies, along with the gradual 
retreat of the Egyptian state from the public domain, required the emergence of a new 
type of societal actors characterized by their capability of mastering ―administrative 
codes and procedures and their access to the ―informal‖ decision-making networks within 
ministries and government-service sectors‖.139 The profile of Hajj Saleh, a commercial 
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retailer and owner of a medium-sized shoe factory in the popular quarter of Bulaq 
displays that:  
Acceding to the position of someone biytkabarluh is materially inscribed. 
It is the hajj‘s visible links to formal institutions that are ultimately 
acknowledged and validated at times of intervention. The hajj‘s 
involvement in charitable work earns him the image of a ―man of good‖, 
while his links with the police establish him as a ―man of power‖. As 
someone biytkabrluh, the hajj is incorporated by the state apparatus of 
coercion to mediate in disputes with the local population.
140
 
 
Thus, by virtue of their social standing and the political role ascribed to them, individuals 
like hajj Saleh signify a notability of sorts.  
As a matter of fact, such figures of lesser notability have become so recurrent in 
the polity of the popular quarters of Cairo that they were depicted in the extremely 
popular novel ’Imarat Ya’coubian in 2003. In the novel, the author presents the ongoing 
rivalry and competition between the seemingly pious entrepreneur, Hajj Azam, who owns 
a wholesale-retail clothes store and also maintains strong ties with the ruling elites, and 
Hajj Abu Hamidou, a wholesale-retail merchant with Islamist inclinations and alleged 
links to the Muslim Brotherhood. Ultimately, and through his ties with the ruling elites, 
Hajj Azam succeeds in overcoming his Islamist rival, securing a seat in the Parliament, in 
addition to various business incentives facilitated via the backchannels that he gained 
access to with the aid of his contacts within the regime.
141
 This tale is quite illuminating 
if we attempt to observe the political role played by the Lesser Notables and the 
potentialities of them being co-opted by the dominant political forces. 
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The NDP versus the Muslim Brotherhood: A Contest over Lesser Notables? 
 If we look at the lesser notabilities of Cairo today, an essential query poses 
itself with regard to the linkage with state authorities. If access to the echelons of 
notability seems to be related to establishing profound networks with the state 
institutions, mostly co-opted by the NDP, then what about those elements that stand in 
opposition to the government, yet maintain a sense of socioeconomic networking that 
enables them to fulfill the role of the notability? In fact, the prototype that comes to mind 
is that of the Islamist notables who have met considerable successes in establishing a 
sizable web of patronage in a wide variety of urban as well as rural constituencies in 
Egypt. Could the government counteract the alternative patron/client stratagem that is 
capitalized by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist forces? As a matter of fact, the 
current governing regime is quite aware of the existential threat posed by these networks. 
In 2007 the state launched a massive campaign against the ―financial arm‖ of the Muslim 
Brotherhood all over the country, arresting hundreds of people that were allegedly 
associated with a variety of commercial activities that funded the activities of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.
142
 Yet will this be a sufficient machination for consolidating the NDP‘s 
power in the face of the Brotherhood? The scope and magnitude of the informal networks 
in Egypt seem to suggest otherwise. 
 By and large, the process of divorcing the state structure from the Islamist web 
of networks does not appear to be an easy bid, provided the fact that, as stated in Chapter 
I, those Islamist forces tend to pose themselves within the already existing structure of 
the state system, creating cohesive alliances and networks with state authorities and 
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personnel. Actually, Islamist commercial and financial networks are inevitably drawn 
into interwoven relations with the state. ―For example, in 1980‘s, the Islamic Societies for 
the Placement of Funds (ISPF) maintained close contacts with high-ranking government 
officials and prominent sheikhs. For various reasons…the government intervened to put 
an end to its speculative investments‖143. Although the regime proclaimed that its 
intervention was due to the irregularities exercised by these funds, the fact that it had 
initially licensed these entities then clamped down upon them when they started growing 
considerably as Islamist alternatives to secular banks, suggests otherwise. Hence, 
breaking those state/Islamist ties might be somehow dilemmatic as it might involve state 
and NDP personnel as well. 
 In the course of the upcoming chapters, this research will attempt to 
contextualize the machinations utilized by the Lesser Notables that adhere to the NDP as 
well as those that appear to be functioning under the umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB). In doing so, it is rather important to assert that a significant difference between 
these two prototypes, those allying with the NDP/state stratagem as opposed to the 
Islamist ones, is that while the former are usually co-opted by the state, the latter‘s roles 
and actions are ―framed by ideological articulations that challenged state legitimacy‖144. 
Indeed ―the state authorities could not tolerate the rise of a contending leadership, but we 
may also argue that in assiduously co-opting local figures, state authorities seek to inhibit 
the rise of independent leaders‖.145  
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Conclusions 
Throughout its vast history, the Muslim city has witnessed various schemes of 
political notability. Cairo is no exception, and the politico-economic role of those 
notables has been quintessential in maintaining the civic life, mediating between the 
locals and the state authorities. Political notability took various shapes and forms 
throughout the Mamluk and Ottoman periods; however, with the rise of Muhammad Ali 
into the apex of the Egyptian state in 1805, the grip of the state over the socioeconomic 
and political affairs was tightened, minimizing the role of those mediating notables and 
allowing for a class of lesser notability to arise. With this, an apparent rise in the 
importance of the role played by the futuwwa was evident within the popular quarters of 
Cairo. In a sense, the futuwwa represents a possible linkage between the traditional 
figures of popular political meaningfulness and the lesser notables of today.  
Within the context of the Egyptian polity, the advent of Mohammed Ali and the 
inception of the modern period brought forward a virtual vacuum in the polity. By then, 
there was more room for a multitude of local (lesser) notables to act as the necessary 
politico-economic intermediaries on sub-divided/smaller echelons. In essence, one could 
argue that on the level of the Harra (quarter) or the Hitta (neighborhood), there emerged 
an increasingly influential political agency for the futuwwa in the early 20
th
 Century. 
There are indeed very interesting similarities between the kind of politico-economic 
functions fulfilled by the futuwwa and those of the biytkabarluh figure, predominant in 
the present-day popular quarters of Cairo, and outlined earlier in the course of Chapter I. 
One could argue that those biytkbarluh figures in fact display an extension of the legacies 
of the futuwwas. Today, the lesser notables of Cairo play a crucial role as mediators and 
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facilitators of various commercial goods and administrative services. They have mostly 
anchored themselves within occupational vacancies that provide the locals with necessary 
functions, which made them, subsequently, a target of co-option for the viable political 
forces operating within Cairo‘s popular neighborhoods; the NDP as well as the MB.  
The chapter at hand can be considered as a framework for the subsequent work, as 
it attempted to outline some of the various historical manifestations of lesser notability 
figures in the Middle Eastern city since the Islamic Caliphate, focusing mostly on Egypt. 
In doing so, it introduced several popular figures that all shared the characterization of 
the lesser notability that possesses a considerable degree of socioeconomic and political 
agency in the urban quarter. Such figures can be indeed considered as the predecessors 
that set the stage for the emergence of ibn-al-balad, the urban lesser notable that actually 
thrived in the popular quarter in the 20
th
 Century, and whose persona shall be scrutinized 
further in the next chapter as it portrays the emergence of the 'lesser notable' of the 21
st
 
Century.     
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Chapter III: Misr Al Qadima: The Popular Quarter And The Polity of The Lesser 
Notable 
 
―In between a proud ancient history and huge walls that recite tales as old as mankind, 
and a crowded present that is full of adjacent houses and people, lies Misr Al 
Qadima…The features of this district do in fact draw a picture for the entire country with 
all its contradictions‖.146     
 
Misr Al Qadima, which in Arabic translates as Old Egypt, is arguably Cairo‘s 
oldest quarter. Built on the remnants of other predecessors to the Cairo that the Fatimids 
had constructed in the eleventh century A.D. such as, the Ancient Egyptian Memphis, the 
Roman fortresses of Babylon, and the Arabo-Islamic Fustat, this district is now home for 
more than 500,000 inhabitants that come from a plethora of social backgrounds and 
classes and occupy various socioeconomic roles and strata. Today, the area suffers from 
socioeconomic disparities that make it one of Cairo‘s poorest districts, in terms of income 
distribution and education. Moreover, and as shall be shown later in this chapter, the 
demographic profile of the area is characterized with a set of socioeconomic and political 
features that make this district a favorable environment for the emergence of the lesser 
notables as viable sociopolitical agents. As a prelude, the following introductory section 
shall provide a brief historical synopsis of Misr Al Qadima.  
Introduction  
 
The famous gated town of Babylon was located in the district currently called 
Misr Al Qadima, to the south of Cairo. This city was the dominant urban center just 
before the Arab conquest of Egypt and was connected with the Red Sea by a canal.
147
 
Cairo as it is known now had gradually developed over three centuries after the Arab 
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conquest of Egypt and it went through various phases of metamorphosis until reaching its 
status as the urban conglomerate that we know of today. The first two precursors of Cairo 
were Al Fustat, which was the first city to be constructed by Amr Ibn al-a`s post the Arab 
conquest of Egypt in 641 A.D. as a garrison town, and Al `Askar (The Military in 
Arabic), which was built by the Umayyads as the settlement containing the official 
residence of the Arab governors and their troops. Both of these towns were in essence an 
extension as well as a progression for the old town of Babylon and they were the basis for 
the chief city that was to be built by the Fatimids.        
In the ninth century the Egyptian sovereign Ahmed Ibn Toulun reckoned that Al-
`Askar and Al-Fustat were overcrowded and unsuitable to have room for his army and 
officials, accordingly in the year 870 A.D:  
He laid the foundations of his new capital city, Al-Katai‘. This name 
means the quarters and the city was divided into separate sections, each 
inhabited by a certain class or ethnic group. This was the first time a 
definite planning system was used by Arabs in Egypt. Touluns' 
administration followed the system of straight streets intersecting at right 
angles, forming a crude gradation plan…In 969 A.D. General Gawher El-
Sickilly of the Fatimids of North Africa started to lay out the foundations 
of ―Al-Kahira" which means "the conqueror‖. Al-Kahira included a 
Kalipha's palace, barracks for the army, stables for the cavalry, 
government buildings…etc. The site of this city was about 2-1/2 miles 
north of Al-Fustat.
148
 
 
Hence the centrality of what is known today as ―Misr Al Qadima‖ was well in place since 
the outset of the Cairene urban conglomerate. In practice, the development of Cairo took 
the shape and form of the Medieval Muslim city outlined earlier in the context of Chapter 
II, where ―each quarter of the city was assigned to a tribe or racial group that had joined 
the Fatimid invasion. Among these groups were Greeks, Turks, Berbers and Africans‖149. 
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 Throughout the centuries to come, Cairo expanded into a world capital; the most 
populated city in the world outside China at the time. ―The medieval cycle of Cairo's 
growth and subsequent decline began essentially with the accession of Saladin to the 
leadership of Sunni Islam. It rose sharply within the next 175 years, reaching an apogee 
during the long reigns of the Mamluk sultan al-Nasir ibn Qalawun before the middle of 
the fourteenth century‖.150 Map 3.a shows the urban expansion that Cairo has gone 
through since the Arab conquest.  
Map 3.a
151
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In fact, the shift to Mamluk rule was more than a mere change in dynasties. It 
symbolized, rather, a social revolution of grave importance. The elevation of the 
Mamluks into power saw through a flowering of Cairo as a medieval city, yet it contained 
within it the kernel of its own (and Cairo's) inevitable decline. Although Egypt has rarely 
been ruled by purely indigenous elements since the demise of the ancient Egyptian 
kingdoms, earlier conquerors had always assimilated with the population they ruled 
eventually.   
The Mamluks, on the other hand, remained a 'foreign' military caste, each 
generation recruited anew from abroad…As internal strife and external 
threats multiplied, the expansion of the city came to a temporary halt. The 
mirror image of the rise of Islam on the Anatolian plateau, signaled by the 
conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottoman Turks, represented a 
decline in Egypt's imperial wealth and autonomy. After the Ottoman 
conquest of Egypt in 1517, Cairo was reduced from its former status as 
centre of a vast empire to a mere provincial capital. Its talented cadre of 
architects and artisans were removed to Istanbul where they contributed to 
the transformation of that Byzantine Christian city into a magnificent 
Islamic capital. 
152
  
 
The essentiality of Misr Al Qadima as an integral segment of medieval Cairo was 
catapulted by the travelers that passed by the city at the time. Leos Africanus, who 
arrived in Cairo at the wake of the Ottoman invasion in 1517, describes Misr Al Qadima 
―as being ―endowed with a fair number of artisans and merchants‖. He cites that the 
island of…Rawdah [now Manial], across from old Cairo, as ―densely settled‖ and 
―[containing] approximately 1500 hearths‖153.  
Henceforth, throughout the reigns of the Mamluks and Ottomans, and regardless 
of the ups and downs that the city had to vent through, the essentiality of Old Cairo as a 
vital part of Cairo remained largely intact.  Up until the discovery of the Cape of Good 
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Hope route in the 16
th
 Century A.D., the transit trade route, connecting between Europe 
and Asia via North Africa in the Medieval and pre-modern phases, flourished gradually 
enhancing the importance of Al Fustat even further due to its central location as the main 
port on the banks on the Nile.   
 
Old Cairo: The Habitat of Ibn al-Balad 
As a matter of fact, tracing Old Cairo‘s politico-economic history does not only 
shed light on the constructional development of this section of the city, but it also helps in 
understanding the typologies of the residents that have dwelled within it. For instance, if 
we take a glimpse of the figure of ibn al balad, (a word that is usually used to describe a 
person belonging to the city and enjoying a certain stature of moral goodness, literally 
meaning ―son of the country‖)154, one notes that places like Old Cairo and other 
popular/traditional quarters of the city have actually served as the natural habitat for such 
figures. ―Historically it was the Cairenes who were identified as awlad al balad. From the 
mid-thirteenth century Egypt was dominated in succession by Mamluks and Ottomans, 
for a brief interval by the French, then by Muhammad Ali‘s regime…It was in the face of 
these alien Cairo-based elements that the indigenous inhabitant sought to preserve and 
assert his particular identity‖155.          
Traditionally, the locale of ibn al balad has been the popular quarter. Today when 
Egyptians refer to awlad il balad, it is usually in mention of those authentic and original 
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inhabitants of al ahiyya’ al sha`abeya (folk/popular quarters). Being original inhabitants 
is quite vital here as it distinguishes awlad al balad from the Sa`idis that originate from 
Upper Egypt or the Fellahin whose roots are traced back to Lower Egypt. Thus, a 
regional/geographical element is largely influential in the features of ibn al balad, and it 
is often linked to the Cairene popular quarter. Of course Misr Al Qadima (Old Cairo) is 
one of the chief popular quarters of Cairo and is predominantly characterized as being a 
hub of awlad al balad. ―These quarters are old and traditional…awlad al balad are found 
in these quarters, whereas one would not find ibn al balad in newer sections such as 
Zamalek or Garden City, because these quarters are inhabited largely by foreigners and 
westernized Egyptians, who are characterized by a different set of values and life-styles‖ 
156
.         
 Indeed what is referred to today as Misr Al Qadima is an amalgamation between 
some relatively modern neighborhoods (including `Ain Al Sira) which were constructed 
at a later stage in various points in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 Century and a traditional popular 
neighborhood which constructional and structural features have remained more or less 
the same since the medieval era. ―The appearance of some of these quarters has not 
changed for centuries; some of the street plans are the original ones of Cairo. The streets 
in these quarters are divided into harat [small alleys], darb utaf [narrow streets], and 
zuqaq [bigger streets], which probably follow the original divisions‖157. By and large, the 
heart of Cairo‘s traditional urbanism is in these districts which have been in existence the 
longest, that is, the quarters of medieval Cairo. 
However, not all of today‘s residents of these communities descend from 
inhabitants in the middle ages or even a century ago. The communities are 
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changing constantly. While a sizable number of rural migrants come to 
settle, at the same time many of the older residents leave their quarters for 
more modern ones. But despite this mobility we find that whatever 
traditional activities still survive in Cairo are found chiefly in these old 
quarters.
158
      
 
Today the term ―ibn al balad‖ is still used in reference to a person with the 
aforementioned traits and geographical/historical ties with the popular quarters. Overall, 
the parallels between this popular figure and those of the futuwwa and the beiytakabarlu 
figures, introduced earlier in the course of Chapters I and II, are quite compelling, which 
reinforces the assumption that the lesser notabilities of today are indeed closely linked to 
such typologies of folk figures even further.       
 
The Curse of the Dual City 
In the beginning of the modern period of Egyptian history, usually associated with 
the Napoleonic French Expedition of 1798, Misr Al Qadima still constituted an integral 
part of the Cairene conglomerate. ―After the French invasion of Egypt, the city was 
accurately described as composed of three distinct parts separated by agricultural land, 
Cairo the City and two suburbs, Boulack and Misr El-Kadima‖159. However, the arrival 
of the 1798 Napoleonic Expedition brought the cycle of growth and expansion of old 
Cairo to a virtual halt, with the intrusion outlining a viaduct between a medieval Cairo 
that had aged and decayed and a modern Cairo that is yet to be. Abu-Loghd states that, 
―The savants who accompanied the brief occupation mapped the city, estimating its 
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population at less than three hundred thousand. Although the French did not remain as 
colonizers, the processes of 'modernization' and 'reform' had begun‖.160 
In the aftermath of the French expedition and the subsequent ascent of the 
Mohammed Ali dynasty to power, the importance of the older quarters of Cairo, Misr Al 
Qadima included, started fading out gradually. Mohammed Ali and his successors 
initiated a massive construction project aiming at building a modern city adjacent to the 
older quarters of Cairo, shifting the chief socioeconomic, political, and administrative 
functions that had been historically fulfilled by the older city to the novel urban 
conglomerate. Parallel to what has taken place elsewhere in other Third World colonized 
cities; the dual-city pattern eventually stripped the older quarters of wealthy inhabitants 
who flocked to mimic the new consumption patterns set forward by the colonizers.  
In the process, the older quarters became neglected and degraded, as new 
migrants from the countryside joined the poorer population left behind, 
subdividing the large homes of the departed rich into cubicles, unable to 
maintain them, and eventually spilling out to the cemeteries east and south-
east of the city. All resources were devoted to paving the streets in the new 
quarters, to providing them with gaslights, piped water and even sewers. 
While the old quarters did not lose their important economic functions - 
handicrafts and the processing and distribution of foods - these products 
were increasingly purveyed to people of similar social standing.
161
 
 
Hence, the degradation of Misr Al Qadima and other districts in the milieu of old Cairo 
was a happening reality throughout the 19
th
 Century and up until the outset of the 20
th
 
Century.   
19
th
 Century Cairo: The Tale of Two Cities 
 With the rise of Khedive Ismail, Mohammed Ali‘s grandson, to power, the 
foundations of modern Cairo were being thoroughly being planned. Ismail had a deep 
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161
 Ibid, p.28 
Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter III 
95 
 
fascination with European culture, in general, and it is in this milieu that he spearheaded 
the establishment of a modern Cairo on the outskirts of the old one, with the goal of 
turning it into a London or a Paris of the East. Modern (western) architectural plans were 
put forward by pioneering European architects and a lavish budget was secured by the 
Khedive to ensure the successful completion of his venture. Indeed this came at the 
expense of the older quarters, accentuating the theme of divisions and the dual-city 
pattern cited above. Roughly, it is at this point that old Cairo lost its practical 
meaningfulness as a vital part of the city. ―Limited in space, relatively overcrowded, and 
structured according to a different principle of urban life, the old city offered neither a 
suitable ground for the new urbanism nor accommodations for a fresh influx of 
residents‖.162 The inevitable divisions that took place and were pursued thereafter, made 
the importance of the older quarters of Cairo only symbolic; a mere arena where the 
desire to restore and preserve the heritage of the city can take place, rather than an area 
that has a pragmatic role to play in the course of the new phase that was in the making at 
the time
163
.   
 In reality, these older quarters, Misr Al Qadima included, were in dire need of 
proper revamping and improvement rather than negligence. The features of this 
deterioration could be described as follows:  
Its streets were neglected, cleaning was haphazard, water supply was only 
partial, and the sewers were poor or insufficient. The deterioration of these 
quarters was exacerbated by the rapid increase in population whose 
density weighed heavily on the crumbling infrastructure and inadequate 
public services. Between 1882 and 1927, the population of the four 
districts that constituted the old city…grew from 122,411 to 259,535 an 
increase of 112 percent…Old Cairo [grew] from 22,518 to 49,495…This 
population was particularly poor…The old quarters were tending to 
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become a refuge for the most downtrodden and recently arrived segments 
of the population.
164
  
 
Therefore with this apparent segregation, the fortunes of the traditional quarters of Cairo 
appeared to be inversely proportional to the expansion and modernization of the newer 
sections of the city. The more attention and care the modern part receives, the more 
neglected and abandoned the older part becomes. 
Modes of Production and Informal Networks in 19th Century Cairo 
 There is indeed a particular importance for the modes of production of the guild 
members and craft workers who constituted the bulk of the labor force in Cairo‘s old 
(popular) quarters at the time of the inception of modern Cairo and continue to formulate 
the prime section of the working population of these quarters perhaps until today. A 
distinctive case here is the demise of the guild-system in 1911, which happened as a 
result of an ongoing tension between the state and the craftsmen and artisans, who 
considered the guilds to be a tool in the hands of the state, aiming at co-opting those 
segments of the community, rather than representing them. ―Where attempts to engage 
the state officially through formal and collective claim making failed, guild members and 
crafts workers often resorted to more illicit ―weapons of the weak‖, dodging taxes, 
subverting regulations, creating unofficial networks, and bribing officials. Crafts 
workers‘ mobilization played a significant role in bringing down their guilds‖165   
 Interestingly, the collapse of the guild system in the late 19th/ early 20th Century 
was accompanied with some sort of confrontation between the state and a category of 
popular figures of authority that are somehow similar to the Lesser Notables, the 
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typology of sociopolitical agents that this study attempts to scrutinize. At that particular 
juncture, the official discourse of the state had stopped recognizing and approving the 
local autonomies of sheikh-like activities in the trades, which were then considered as 
―backward‖, ―tyrannical‖, and ―malignant‖. As a result, these local figures had to evade 
the various forms of state-control that started appearing at the time. For the state, the 
prevalence of these sheikh-like figures of authority on the popular level was against the 
scheme of modernity that was adopted by the state-apparatus. 
Indeed such local figures were not sanctioned by state regulations, which 
they often sought to undermine or transform in one way or another. In 
addition, the crafts and services trade were undergoing rapid sociological 
change. The speedy growth of completely new trades such as cab driving 
and the attrition of others, the drift to countryside of textiles on the one 
hand, and significant rural-urban migration on the other, and the increased 
participation of women meant that many in the trades in the early 1900‘s 
had no established links to a prior tradition of shaikhly authority in a 
trade.
166
  
 
Thus, with the induction of the modern (arguably authoritarian) state and the subsequent 
resilient ―informal-ism‖ that was developed on the part of the guild activists in order to 
offset the attempts of the state to overtake their guilds, a relatively novel scope of 
socioeconomic and political relations was in the making between the state and those 
lesser notabilities.  
Cairo in the Postwar Period       
By the post World War II period (1945 onwards), a clear-cut divide was firmly 
established between the modern and the pre-modern sections of the city, with a plethora 
of modern industrial technologies of transportation and communication all introduced and 
based in the newly developed quarters, leaving the older parts lagging behind in terms of 
infrastructure and technology. Along with the gradual segregation of the city, a 
                                                 
166
 Ibid, p.157 
Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter III 
98 
 
residential rift that is based on income level, job occupation and social class was also on 
the rise. ―In any city, the precise location of low-income settlement will depend on the 
location of jobs and also the residential preferences of the affluent, since the latter can 
usually preempt any location they choose. In both respects, trends in Cairo seem to be 
broadly exemplary‖.167  Indeed Misr Al Qadima district belongs to the category of the 
older quarters, where low-income housing is prevalent. Expanding on the already existing 
potential of the area as a household of craftsmen and skilled and unskilled labor, due to 
the historic skin tannery workshops and the other crafts that were homegrown in Misr Al 
Qadima for centuries, the district considerably grew into one of the main housing 
locations for occupational groups of manual labor. In this regard, Misr Al Qadima is no 
exception when compared to the rest of Cairo‘s districts which have all witnessed a clear 
trend of residential segregation that is based on socioeconomic standings. Looking at the 
statistical data below, this point is actually reaffirmed. 
 
Table # 3.a: Residential Segregation of Occupation Groups in the Cairo 
Urban Region, 1960-1986 (15 years and above)
168
     
Occupation Groups 1960 1986 1960-86(change) 
Skilled & Unskilled Labor 0.258 0.262 0.004 
Administrative & Managerial 0.401 0.444 0.043 
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     While containing the largest enduring remnants of any medieval Middle Eastern city, 
today Misr Al Qadima, alongside the other sections of the old city, is actually being 
dwarfed by the massive urban conglomerate that now encircles it on all sides. ―The 
population has declined, not only because residences have crumbled from age, but also 
because they are being destroyed by natural events (the recent earthquake) and the works 
of man (new highways and tunnels [and] new colonies of informal settlements‖169. 
 
Misr Al Qadima Today: Socioeconomic and Political Indicators 
 
Misr Al Qadima The neighborhood: Misr Qadima proper and `Ain Al Sirra  
This section aims at dissecting the contemporary demographic profile of Misr Al 
Qadima. In doing so, one notes that this area suffers from social disparities which render 
it on the lower echelons of Cairo‘s various districts, in terms of income distribution and 
education. Furthermore, a plethora of other socioeconomic and political features stand 
out, making this area a fertile ground for the flourishing of the sort of the socioeconomic 
and political agency that is typically filled by what is referred to as the ―lesser notables‖ 
in the context of this research.  
 Today the area that is referred to as ―Misr Al Qadima‖ is mainly an aggregation 
of two chief sections upon which the 400,000 inhabitants of Misr Al Qadima are almost 
equally distributed. First, there is the older part of this district (Misr Al Qadima proper), 
which consists of the old popular quarter that has been there for hundreds of years. Most 
of the buildings in the neighborhood are either ancient constructional establishments, 
some of which were actually consolidated by the state as monumental buildings, forcing 
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the inhabitants to relocate their residence, or relatively newer buildings made of red brick 
and other basic materials; and those were built on the remnants of the older/historical 
constructional sites over various periods in the timeline of the popular quarter. Overall, 
there is scarcely any constructional activity that has taken place in the old quarter since 
the onset of the 20
th
 Century. A lot of the streets are quite narrow and somehow irregular 
in design, making the mobility of modern vehicles impractical in various parts of the 
quarter.
170
  
We do not have at hand an empirical study relating to the historical origin of the 
inhabitants of the old quarter. However, on aggregate and depending on interviews with a 
multitude of locals that reside within that quarter, it could be argued that the residents of 
this part of Misr Al Qadima are comparatively homogenous; what Cairenes refer to as 
―awlad al balad‖ or people that trace their origin to the same neighborhood within which 
they reside, considering themselves to be the original inhabitants of Cairo. This first hand 
observation is indeed reemphasized as one notes that the kind of rural/urban migration 
that swapped a wide variety of popular quarters in Cairo was not actually that apparent in 
Misr Al Qadima proper. Some of the chief professions that still flourish in the area, such 
as skin tannery for example, have been there for hundreds of years and a sizable portion 
of the population is involved in this industry or the commercial activities relating to it, 
one way or another.
171
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 On the other hand, `Ain Al Sirra, the second main constituent of Misr Al Qadima 
which is now home for more than 150,000 inhabitants, tells a somewhat different tale. 
This neighborhood was established in the late 1950‘s in the scope of the Nasserite 
socialist project at the time, which targeted the enhancement of the living condition of the 
low/middle income level groups, in order to provide such segments with state-subsidized 
housing. There were initially 140 blocks of residential units, with an average of 60 
apartment buildings in each block. In the late 1960‘s additional blocks were also 
constructed to supply housing for the growing population of the area.
172
  
Accordingly, since its inception, `Ain Al Sirra was characterized with a relatively 
heterogeneous population, in terms of geographical, social and professional backgrounds. 
Along with the sizable portion of rural migrants that settled in the area coming from 
various provinces, especially from Upper Egypt, this area was also home for a plethora of 
socioeconomic segments, including, working class residents, petty bourgeoisie segments 
of small to medium size merchants, as well as middle class professionals, such as school 
teachers and government employees. The 1960‘s witnessed the heydays of the 
neighborhood due to the relative social mobility granted to the various segments of the 
society at the time with the widespread subsidization of education and the tendency of the 
state to guarantee employment to young university graduates, whether within the ranks of 
the government or in the public sector. Furthermore, the Nasserite welfare state also 
provided popular neighborhoods with cooperative outlets along with a set of other 
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government agencies, which supplied the neighborhood with the basic goods and services 
at subsidized rates.
173
           
 However, with the adoption of infitah policies from 1974 onwards, the entire 
neighborhood was subject to dire conditions, in line with most of Cairo‘s popular quarters 
at that period. State subsidies were gradually withdrawn and, in short, the preferential 
treatment that was given to `Ain Al Sira was virtually abolished. One of the immediate 
consequences to the relative withdrawal of the state from the polity of the neighborhood, 
was the attempts made by a lot of the residents to re-design and expand their own houses, 
in order to suffice for the increasing growth in population accompanied with the relative 
shrinking in income and the massive surge in the prices of new housing in the late 
1970‘s. From the late 1970‘s onwards, the manifestations of state withdrawal from the 
affairs of `Ain Al Sira widened to include ongoing deteriorations in the infrastructure of 
the neighborhood (basic utilities, sanitation, roads…etc), an increasing number of 
irregularities exercised by the residents in absence of state regulation, and a general 
sentiment of distrust and rejection towards the state among the inhabitants of the area. In 
practical terms, the state has let them down.
174
 On aggregate, a wide array of alterations 
in the socioeconomic and political features of the neighborhood came about as 
byproducts of the 1970s‘s open door then the 1990‘s liberalization policies, which will be 
discerned in more detail in the upcoming section. 
Socioeconomic and Political Indicators 
A recent study conducted on the residents of Misr Al Qadima revealed that 
roughly two thirds of its population lived under the poverty line. The percentage of those 
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living under 1 dollar a day was almost 60% of the total population. Approximately 30 % 
of the people of Misr Al Qadima live on 1-2 dollars a day, leaving only 10% of the 
inhabitants of the area with an average income that exceeds 2 dollars a day.
175
 Looking at 
the rates of education and illiteracy, we observe that, on aggregate, the rate of illiteracy is 
almost 29 % among those that are 10 years and above, which is a significantly higher rate 
than the overall average for the Governorate of Cairo which stood at 19.3 % for the same 
portion of the population. This relatively humble rate will be rather reflected later on as 
we dissect the level of political awareness of the ―formal‖ political institutions in the 
upcoming section. Unemployment rate also reached 16.7 % of the total population (15 
years and above) which is again fairly higher than the average unemployment rate within 
the same age group for the entirety of Cairo which was 10.78%. 
Table # 3.b: Literacy and Education in Misr Al Qadima area (10 years and above)
176
 
Illiterate Literate but 
no 
qualification 
Graduate 
of 
elementary 
or middle 
school 
High 
School 
Certificate 
University 
Degree 
Graduate 
Degree 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
52,411 28.97 17,540 9.7 33,500 18.5 43,300 24 32,706 18.1 1,315 0.73 180,903 100 
 
 
Table # 3.c: Literacy and Education in all of Cairo (10 years and above)
177
 
Illiterate Literate but no 
qualification 
Graduate of 
elementary or 
middle school 
High School 
Certificate 
University 
Degree 
Graduate 
Degree 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1,085745 19.31 501,437 8.92 1,128250 20.01 1,738100 30.9 1,126187 20.03 41,091 0.73 5,623654 100 
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Table # 3.d: Unemployment in Misr Al Qadima and all of Cairo (15 years and 
above: working age population)
178
 
Location Population Formal Labor 
Force 
Employed 
 
Unemployed Unemployment rate 
Misr Al 
Qadima 
162,697 70,523 60,745 34,778 19.7 % 
Cairo 5,034481 2,223992 1,984,231 504,061 10.78 % 
 
In terms of the distribution of labor over the various sectors of economic 
activities, the figures of a relatively sizable informal sector more or less coincided with 
the average rates for the Governorate of Cairo as a whole. In Misr Al Qadima the portion 
of the labor force belonging to the informal sector constituted an estimated 40 % of the 
total labor force. Although 97,569 of those aged 15 years and above were labeled as 
―unattached‖, or not belonging to a formal categorization of economic sectors or job 
typologies, only 34,778 of them were considered to be unemployed, which leaves us with 
more than 60,000 people employed in the category of the informal sector. In the course of 
this research the informal employment shall be defined, basically, as any employment 
that is not covered by either a legal contract or social insurance.
179
 Indeed the 
aforementioned figure does not vary a great deal from the overall average for the 
informal sector laborers within Cairo which was circa 50 % of the overall population of 
employed labor.
180
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In a recent study analyzing the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS 06), a 
follow-up survey to the Egypt Labor Market Survey of 1998 (ELMS 98) which was 
carried out in November-December 1998 by the Economic Research Forum (ERF), it was 
noted that the size of the informal economy in Egypt is on the rise relative to its formal 
counterpart.  ―Concurrent with the decline of employment opportunities in the public 
sector, the trend toward informalisation of the labor market, which begun in the 1990s, is 
continuing unabated. By 2006, 61 percent of all employment was informal, up from 57 
percent in 1998. Moreover, 75 percent of new entrants who entered the labor market in 
the first five years of this decade were entering into informal work.‖181 
Table # 3.e: Employment in Economic activity by sector in Misr Al Qadima 
182
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182
 Source: Table #7, ―Labor Force in the Cairo Governorate‖, 2006 National Census of Egypt, Central 
Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), Cairo, 2007. The following table represents the 
keys for the economic activities by sector; 
A Agriculture 
B Mining 
C Middle & Complementary Industries 
D Electricity & Gas 
E Water Supplies, Sanitation, & Recycling 
F Building & Construction 
G Wholesale & Retail Trading 
H Storage & Transportation 
I Food & Beverage Catering 
J Information & Communication 
K Insurance & Financial Intermediaries 
L Real Estate 
M Specialist Scientific & Technical Services  
N Administrative Services 
O Civil Defense & Public Services 
P Education 
Q Health 
R Arts & Entertainment 
S other services 
T Private housekeeping services 
U International Agencies & Organizations, Embassies…etc 
V Economic activities that are formal yet not fully categorized 
W Unspecified 
X Total 
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Economic 
Activity 
by sector 
Population 
Employed 
Economic 
Activity 
by sector 
Population 
Employed 
Economic 
Activity 
by sector 
Population 
Employed 
Economic 
Activity 
by sector 
Population 
Employed 
A 197 G 11,261 M  2,049 S 4,683 
B 67 H 4,519 N 702 T 745 
C 11,569 I 1,895 O 5,222 U 34 
D 388 J 1,354 P 3,802 V 1,245 
E 263 K 1,542 Q 2,431 W 1,358 
F 9,416 L 53 R 333 X 65,128 
Total Unattached 97,569 Grand Total 162,697 
 
Table # 3.f: Employment in Economic Activity by sector in all of Cairo
183
 
 
 
 
Table # 3.g: Population by desegregation of Jobs in Misr Al Qadima 
184
 
I II III IV V VI Total 
VII VIII IX Unspecified Total Unattached 
3,817 12,119 5,178 2,850 9,557 102  
18,105 5,826 6,127 1,447 65,128 97,569 162,697 
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The following table represents the key for the typology of jobs; 
I Legislators & Senior Administrators 
II Specialists of certain scientific skills  
III Technicians & Specialist Aides 
IV Writers 
V Employees in services, shops, and supermarkets 
VI Skilled labor in agriculture and hunting 
VII Artisans 
VIII Skilled labor in factories and medium and small industries 
IX Ordinary (unskilled) & Wage labor 
 
Economic 
Activity 
by sector 
Population 
Employed 
Economic 
Activity 
by sector 
Population 
Employed 
Economic 
Activity 
by sector 
Population 
Employed 
Economic 
Activity 
by sector 
Population 
Employed 
A 8,212 G 419,759 M  83,571 S 70,979 
B 2,484 H 153,309 N 26,965 T 29,512 
C 306,232 I 52,083 O 189,807 U 1,384 
D 22,157 J 46,221 P 164,602 V 78,867 
E 12,829 K 41,373 Q 65,778 W 49,208 
F 191,899 L 2,082 R 11,705 X 2,031,018 
Total Unattached 3,003463 Grand Total 5,034481 
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Table # 3.h: Population by desegregation of Jobs in all of Cairo 
I II III IV V VI Total 
VII VIII IX Unspecified Total Unattached 
154,627 483,906 225,218 127,685 324,461 5,611  
360,358 178,646 160,085 55,421 2,031018 3,003463 5,034481 
 
With regard to the economic activities and the typologies of jobs that flourish 
within Misr Al Qadima, one observes that sectors C (Middle and Complementary 
Industries), G (Wholesale and Retail Trading) and F (Building and Construction) were 
the prime economic sectors, absorbing more than 32,000 laborers (approximately 44 % of 
the labor force within the formal sector) combined. The exact same sectors also occupy 
the first three slots in terms of labor population in the Governorate of Cairo as a whole, 
with an approximation of 45 % of the aggregate labor belonging to the formal sector. 
This reflects the relative growth of these sectors of economic activities nationwide as a 
result of the Open Door then liberalization policies of the 1970‘s and the 1990‘s, which 
meant that an expansion in intermediary economic activities (construction contracting, 
wholesale and retail trading…etc) was well in place to accompany the overriding 
macroeconomic features of that phase.
185
  
For example, within the context of the building and construction sectors, a firm 
expansion in scope and magnitude was quite inevitable with the surge in construction 
activities in mostly all of Egypt with the rise of infitah and during the post October 1973 
war phase.
186
 With that came a sizable shortage in the supply of the workers and 
contractors within that sector due to the increase in skilled labor migration to the Gulf 
                                                 
185
 Chapters I and II of this research dealt extensively with the concept of inifitah and its effect on the 
socioeconomic class stratification and social mobility. 
186
Ragui Assaad (2007). ―Labor Supply, Employment, and Unemployment in the Egyptian Economy‖ 
Working Paper 0701, Cairo: Economic Research Forum. Here, Assaad cites that in between 1988-2006, the 
construction sector also grew faster than average at a rate of 5.9 percent per annum, to capture an 8 percent 
share of total employment in 2006 
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States and the increasing demand on this type of labor in the post infitah era. The issue 
was quite grave to the extent that the Egyptian government had to sponsor the 
establishment of the Training Organization of Ministry of Housing and Construction 
(TOMOHAR) in 1975 to train and supply entrants to the construction sector.
187
        
Fouad Soltan, Egypt‘s Minister of Tourism at the juncture of ERSAP and one of 
the key advocates of the liberalization policies clearly states that the Open Door policy 
contributed greatly to the: ―rise in commercial activities at the expense of productive 
ones. It is not the private sector that is responsible for this tendency, but the government 
that failed to follow a correct and clear economic policy able of encouraging productive 
activity‖188. On aggregate, the post infitah years were characterized by the increase of 
financial and commercial activities, especially importation, at the expense of industrial 
activities. ―Starting from 1974, structural change in the Egyptian economy enhanced the 
growth of the non-traded goods and services sector of the economy at the expense of the 
traded commodity sector‖189. Within the milieu of job typologies, artisans and employees 
in services, shops, and supermarkets roughly accounted for 25 % of the total labor force 
within the formal sector in Misr Al Qadima, again signifying the importance of these 
typologies in this municipality.  
Apart from the previously estimated 40-45% of the labor force within the 
informal sector, an accurate indication of the size and influence of this sector remains a 
vastly dubious process. Yet, in spite of the lack of accurate data pertaining to the informal 
sector and henceforth the difficulty in analyzing it as an economic sector, the estimate of 
                                                 
187
 Ragui Assaad (1993). ―Formal & Informal Institutions in the Labor Market with Application to the 
Construction Sector in Egypt‖ World Development. Vol.21. No. 6. p. 925-39. 
188
 Samer Soliman (1998). State & Industrial Capitalism in Egypt. Cairo Papers in Social Science. Vol. 21, 
No. 2. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. 
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its sheer size in Misr Al Qadima reflects its immense role in its polity, as will be 
displayed later in the course of the socioeconomic attributions of the lesser notabilities. 
Indeed the considerable scope of the informal sector carries noteworthy implications for 
the popular quarters of Cairo, Misr Al Qadima included. ―By its nature the informal 
sector is characterized by ease of entry and low productivity. The first feature explains 
why this sector has accounted for the bulk of job creation in the recent past. On the other 
hand, the low productivity implies relatively lower wages; compared to the formal 
sector…The recently observed phenomenon of increasing urban poverty can be explained 
in terms of such structure‖.190 Therefore, despite the fact that the continuously growing 
informal sector is in reality absorbing a sizable segment of the labor force, the 
meaningfulness of its role in alleviating poverty remains quite questionable. More often 
than not, the informal sector seems like the easy way out for the unskilled and the 
uneducated labor, and, apparently, the state does not often bother with the sort of training 
received or skills acquired by those that enter the informal sector as they are seemingly 
employed and generate income, however minimal.  
Misr Al Qadima is no exception to the aforementioned, and despite the shortage 
of verifiable data on the growth of the informal sector in this area over the past years, the 
incremental expansion of this sector is practically observable. With the adoption of 
ERSAP in 1990‘s and the ongoing privatization and subsequent contraction of 
                                                 
190
 Ali A.G. and A. Elbadawi (2002). ―Poverty and The Labor Market in The Arab World‖ In Employment 
Creation & Social Protection in The Middle East & North Africa. ed. Heba Handoussa and Zafiris 
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government and public sector employment,
191
 a sizable portion of the labor force in the 
area was actually forced to either retire completely or join the informal sector: 
Employment growth in the civil service has slowed dramatically and much 
of the burden of employment creation has shifted to the private 
sector…The public sector[‘s share of total employment] has contracted 
significantly in relative terms, from 39 percent in 1998 to 30 percent in 
2006. In fact, the public enterprise has continued a trend of absolute 
decline; at a rate of 0.2 percent per annum…Private sector employment 
has been growing in excess of 7 percent per annum, with the most 
dynamic growth being observed in informal regular wage employment and 
employment in household enterprise.
192
 
 
Indeed in Misr Al Qadima, the accounts of the inhabitants tell dozens of stories about a 
wide variety of candy and cigarette kiosks, street vendors, and even sometimes house 
maintenance boutiques, that all operate without license or government approval and 
which have all been increasingly observable only over the past decade or so.                           
When looking at the internal migration rates, one also finds that Misr Al Qadima 
has a relatively high rate of internal migration to other districts in Cairo and in Egypt, 
when compared to other districts within Cairo. In 2006 the average rate of the labor force 
relocated from within Misr Al Qadima was 20 % of the total labor force, which is 
considerably higher than other districts within Cairo (The overall rate of internal labor 
force relocation within the entire governorate stood at 15 % of the total labor force).
193
 A 
logical justification for that relatively higher rate of internal migration would of course 
relate to the scarcity of employment opportunities within the area and the resultant 
tendency of the labor force to move to other areas looking for jobs.   
                                                 
191
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Market Outcomes Under Structural Adjustment: Evidence From Egypt‖. World Development. Vol. 33, No 
3. p.438.  
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Working Paper 0701. Cairo: Economic Research Forum. 
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The abovementioned figures of internal migration are in fact applicable to those 
that are 15 years of age and above. Looking at the previous data for this portion of the 
population in Misr Al Qadima district, compared to the average of the Cairo Governorate 
as a whole, we will find that, in Misr Al Qadima, the rate of internal migration stands 
roughly at 11.1% which is lower than an approximate 16% in the whole of Cairo. 
However, those that left Misr Qadima due to permanent labor migration constitute an 
approximate 30 % of all of those that migrated out of the boundaries of the district for 
various reasons (study, marriage/divorce…etc.) which is a higher rate than the average 
for Cairo for the same segment, which only stood almost at 23% of the total number of 
those migrating out of Cairo.
194
   
Despite the lack of accurate data, here it is noteworthy to mention that Misr Al 
Qadima has also witnessed a sizable a rate of immigration to the area throughout various 
phases in its modern history. The main bulk of immigrants to the area have settled in `Ain 
Al Sira, the newer section of Misr Al Qadima, in the height of the wave of rural/urban 
migration that targeted Cairo in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s. For the most part, immigrants to 
the area came from the Sa`id (Upper Egypt) and ended up establishing strong ties of 
clanship and solidarity among the members of their respective families. The impact of 
this scope of solidarity will be further portrayed and scrutinized in the context of chapters 
IV and V, as the researcher attempts to scrutinize the lesser notabilities of Misr Al 
Qadima.
195
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Political Indicators: Contextualizing the Polity of Misr Al Qadima 
 As one delves into the intricate details of the polity of Misr Al Qadima, an 
overview of the profile of political awareness and participation in the area is indeed vital. 
The area that is known today as Misr Al Qadima is in fact an amalgamation of two main 
sections; the first is the old (historical) quarter of Old Cairo that has been erect for 
hundreds of years as mentioned earlier. The second and relatively more recent part (`Ain 
Al Sira) was constructed during the reign of Nasser in the late 1950‘s in the context of the 
trend of building al masaken sha`beya or the popular neighborhoods, which aimed, at the 
time, to provide affordable state-subsidized housing for the lower and lower-middle 
classes. With the gradual withering away of the social welfare system initially introduced 
by the Nasser regime with the advent of Sadat and the infitah policies of the 1974, the 
neighborhood in its entirety started to deteriorate considerably in terms of services and 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the subsidies that were granted by the state to the residents, 
in order to wave the rent and the other utility bills paid by the inhabitants, were cancelled 
by the mid 1970‘s. 
 Consequently, two main features colored the socio-economic structure of Misr Al 
Qadima, and many other popular quarters in Cairo at the time. First, a sizable wave of 
migration of youth to the GCC states was underway, coinciding with the oil boom of the 
1970‘s, which led to a an apparent drain in all kinds of skilled labor in the area, and of 
course in a lot of other areas of Cairo at the time. The surge in this trend was so high that, 
for example, in one of the blocks (small apartment buildings), seven out of the ten young 
men living in the building all eventually travelled to the GCC
196
.        
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Second, and despite the nominal stature that the educated (university graduates) of 
the area upheld as the ―intellectual‖ grouping, the scarcity of the skilled labor in the 
aftermath of the wave of the GCC migration, actually made this clique of laborers; 
electricians, plumbers, and construction workers…etc the de facto elite (notables) of the 
community. And, gradually, it seemed that some alteration in the value-system of a large 
portion of the people of the area was a happening reality with regard to the importance of 
profit-making as a prime litmus test in judging the credibility and stature of the person. 
The word ―kasseeb‖ (a person that is talented in making profit quickly) became almost 
equivalent to doctor or professor.
197
  
These features have indeed influenced the scheme of political participation in the 
area. In the 1980‘s the state had already initiated a façade of democracy by allowing three 
parties to operate, most powerful of which was indeed the state-sponsored NDP. By and 
large, the people of the area, who have been historically politicized since the times of 
Nasser (The actual patron that practically housed those people in Misr Al Qadima), were 
naturally sympathetic with the left-leaning Tagamou` party, which was the party that 
somehow championed the socialist and populist policies that the people of a district like 
Misr Al Qadima would support. Another viable venue for activism and participation also 
was Gam`eyat Tanmiat al-mogtama` (Community Development Society), a multifaceted 
service center that was run by volunteer activists –from various political backgrounds- 
and which provided the neighborhood with a wide variety of health and educational 
services. However, since 1980‘s and onwards, the influence of the secular and leftist 
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political forces started giving way to the various Islamist groups that were clearly on the 
rise since then.
198
  
Despite some of the humble efforts that the leftist and secular activists are still 
attempting to carry out through the Community Development Society and other similar 
service centers, the playground for political action has been massively controlled by the 
Islamists with some competition from the NDP. The amount of resources and networks 
channeled and orchestrated by these two factions and the considerable power and 
influence that they subsequently posses makes it practically impossible for any other 
party or group of activists to stand in their face. In the context of the upcoming chapters, 
there shall be a thorough look into the machinations of the political Islamists and the 
NDP in Misr Al Qadima.             
 
Misr Al Qadima Today  
A study carried out on a random sample of approximately 1500 inhabitants aged 
18 years and above, from varying age groups and socioeconomic classes, sheds some 
light on the political realities of Misr Al Qadima. According to this study 55% of those 
surveyed perceived themselves as being politically uninterested, while only 13.3% had 
what was described by the study as a ―relatively high level of political awareness‖, 
compared to 32.1% in the middle range of political awareness and 39.3% with a 
relatively low level of political awareness. Roughly 15% of the surveyed had very little 
or no political awareness at all.
199
 Amending the Constitution came first as the prime 
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issue of political reform with 27.5% considering it so, and after it came the dilemma of 
the low level of political participation which was considered by 9% of the respondents as 
the chief political challenge facing the country today, then came the political turmoil in 
the Middle East and the lack of democracy with 8 and 6.5% respectively. Only 6% 
identified political corruption as being the chief political challenge confronting the area 
and the country as a whole.
200
  
Concerning formal political participation, 35% didn‘t participate politically 
whatsoever, and 64.2% had some sort of minimal political participation. Only 17% of the 
sample held valid voting cards and participated in the 2007 parliamentary elections, 
whilst 2% had some sort of association or membership in a political party or 
organization. The main motivation driving the majority of the respondents to join 
political entities was, primarily, having friends and relatives in the political party; this 
being the rationale cited by 20.5% of the political parties‘ members. Among the other 
reasons cited for joining political parties and organizations, was the expected benefit and 
services that are likely to be provided to the prospective member. Here, it is also 
noteworthy that over 25% of all those enrolled in parties belonged to the ruling National 
Democratic Party (NDP), with the rest of the respondent members scattered among other 
political parties.
201
                 
 Political bribery was cited by a sizable portion of the respondents as a reality 
happening in the Misr Al Qadima district. While 45% of the residents reckoned that the 
voters usually go for the candidate that pays more for their votes, and 44.4% considered 
                                                                                                                                                 
international level, in addition to a questionnaire on the main political institutions on the governorate and 
the country level (The Municipal Councils, The Parliament, The Cabinet…etc).   
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the ability of the candidate to provide services to the people of the area as the main 
rationale for voters selecting their prospective representatives in the municipal and 
judicial councils.
202
    
Importantly, the aforementioned study reveals also that there is a correlation 
between the demography of Misr Qadima, in terms of housing, income level, degree of 
education…etc, and the level of political awareness and participation of its people. In 
Misr Al Qadima, on aggregate, political participation and awareness is less among the 
female population, the uneducated, the elderly, and the low-income earners.
203
 
Table # 3.i: Participation in civil society organizations in Misr Al Qadima 
PercentageActivity 
0.9 %Membership in NGOs
5.7 %Membership in unions and syndicates
2 %Membership in political parties
 
Table # 3.j: Political Participation by Gender 
Level of Political 
Participation 
Percentage among 
the Male population 
Percentage among the 
Female population 
Total Percentage 
Negligible or non-
existent 
29.4 % 44.4 % 35.3 % 
Weak 70 % 55.1 % 64.2 % 
Average 0.6 % 0.5 % 0.55 % 
 
Table # 3.k: Components indicating the level of political awareness and the 
percentage of awareness of each component among the surveyed population 
Component  Percentage 
Name of the Speaker of the Parliament 62.1 % 
Name of the Prime Minister 54.2 % 
No. of Members of Parliament 14.9 % 
Main opposition in Parliament 20 % 
Names of the district deputies in 
Parliament 
44 % 
Definition of the Constitution 7.5 % 
Role of the Local Municipal Council 5.7 % 
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A researcher that was involved in the conduction of the cited report stated, after 
some sizable work on the area of Misr Qadima, that perhaps the most important outcome 
of the project that led up to this report was establishing an indicator, a coefficient if you 
will, for measuring the levels of political awareness and participation.
204
 It was quite 
novel for such an indicator to be generated and applied on a popular quarter in Cairo, and 
thus could be considered as the most important achievement that was reached working on 
the Misr Qadima area. The methodology that was followed depended on targeting 
random samples from different socio-economic classes and then addressing the survey 
questions that aim at measuring their level of political awareness and participation to 
them. Another interesting finding, also, was the directly proportional relationship that 
was noted between the level of income and education and the degree of political 
awareness.  
When it comes to political participation, common wisdom would suggest that, on 
aggregate, in a country like Egypt political participation –which is mainly defined by 
partaking in the electoral voting process- is primarily the domain of the lesser socio-
economic classes, owing to their dire conditions and the expected benefits which they 
could reap as a result of their participation. By the same token, the relationship between a 
relatively higher degree of awareness/socioeconomic class and the level of political 
participation is not necessarily directly proportional. This could be mainly attributed to 
the skepticism that such comparatively higher classes would expectedly hold towards the 
meaningfulness of political participation as an effective tool of pivoting change in the 
political system. This observation is still valid, yet even within the lower and lower-
middle classes, there is a difference between varying subclasses, that all lie under the 
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umbrella of the lower and lower-middle classes, in terms of levels of political awareness 
and participation. ―If we say that, in the majority of the popular quarters of Cairo, 
political participation, accounted for in this case by the willingness and ability to take 
part in the voting process, is primarily concentrated in the lower and lower-middle 
classes, then it is the comparatively more educated and relatively economically well off 
within these classes that are more likely to be politically aware‖.205 In Misr Qadima, the 
results of the aforementioned study appear to support this claim.            
  Concerning the political affiliation of the people of Misr Al Qadima, and whether 
there is dominance, for instance, for the NDP affiliates over their MB counterparts, from 
observation and close scrutiny one can safely assume that there is sound and often 
competent presence for the NDP as well as the MB and other Islamist groups. The MB 
and the other Islamists enjoy a comparatively sound presence in the poorer areas. 
Essentially, the political Islamists, and in particular the MB, are more active and efficient 
in the areas where the mosques of Al Jamm`eya Al Sharr`eya operate. As shall be 
displayed Chapter IV, there is a close association between the two entities. Although, 
officially, Al Jamm`eya Al Sharr`eya is supposed to be an apolitical service-oriented 
NGO, in reality this is not the case. However, on the level of the official discourse, the 
NGO ensures that it does not publicize the moral and material support that it actually 
provides to the MB cadres.
206
 Within Misr Al Qadima, the Dar Essalam district, known to 
be rather rural/ poor is characterized with more features of political Islam activism, as 
opposed, for instance, to Misr Qadima proper which is relatively more urbanized and 
better off economically. With the increasing deterioration of services provided by the 
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state and its party (NDP), there is a fertile ground for such sociopolitical forces to 
intervene and play the role that the state is normally expected to fulfill, as shall be 
displayed in chapters IV and V. 
Concluding: The Polity of Lesser Notables 
The findings mentioned above indicate that political participation and awareness 
of the official venues for political practice sanctioned by the state are arguably limited in 
Misr Al Qadima. With a state that is increasingly absent from the everyday affairs of the 
inhabitants and, moreover, often perceived with distrust and disappointment on the part 
of the populace of Misr Al Qadima, political participation on the terms of the state is a 
highly unlikely occurrence. Instead, understanding political participation in the wider 
scope of resisting or rejecting the status quo imposed by the state and working towards 
changing the everyday realities as portrayed in Chapter I, one might in fact find that the 
residents of Misr Al Qadima are politically engaged, as will be shown in the upcoming 
chapters. As displayed earlier and in the milieu of Chapter I, patron-client networks of 
support are, therefore, one other form of disseminating resources and the residents of 
Misr Al Qadima are quite aware of that and tend to seek the relevant intermediaries that 
are capable of delivering the necessary resources best. This scope of patron-client 
networks has been arguably reemphasized with the state withdrawal catapulted with 
infitah and then the neo-liberal policies of the 1990‘s ERSAP.  
The logical intermediaries of this patron-client stratagem in Misr Al Qadima, 
along with a multitude of other popular quarters in Cairo, are the Lesser Notables. This 
intermediary role carries with it also a sort of sociopolitical agency that can not go 
unnoticed. If the state is not willing to or capable of reaching the populace directly, then 
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the intermediaries are the logical solution for such a linkage to be established, which 
makes them the fulfillers of highly important sociopolitical and economic roles. In this 
arena of political patronage, Political Islamists, particularly the MB, have had a 
considerably successful record of patron-client networking, and this will be dealt with 
extensively in the course of Chapter IV.    
Overall, the aforementioned also shows that, in Misr Qadima, there is fertile 
ground for the flourishing of sociopolitical intermediaries. This is a key factor in order 
for the sort of political agency that is maintained by the lesser notabilities to be 
consolidated. The rise in the political role of the lesser notabilities in Cairo‘s popular 
quarters is noteworthy:   
Those lesser notables have existed in these [popular] areas for quite 
sometime…There are similarities of continuing linkage between them and 
the traditional figures of authority in the Egyptian harra, such as the 
futuwwa and ibn al-balad. As we see now, the state is gradually 
withdrawing and such figures are reappearing on the political scene to fill 
some political vacuum. In the aftermath of the withdrawal of the state 
from the arena of administering the affairs of the popular polity, it is rather 
logical that such figures would emerge to represent their communities 
politically, even if it‘s done informally and via customary practices.207  
  
This chapter aimed at dissecting some of the socioeconomic and political 
features of the Misr Qadima polity. The socioeconomic indicators reflect that the role of 
the state as the main guarantor of services, employment and subsidies is increasingly 
shrinking. Additionally, the process of political participation in the formal, state-
sanctioned, venues of political action shows that the overwhelming majority of the 
people of the area are not actually involved or perhaps even interested in such a process. 
These factors combined mean that the state is becoming increasingly absent from the 
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daily affairs of the populace. As a result, it will be only logical for various non-state 
individual and organizational actors to claim the socioeconomic and political roles that 
the state has abandoned, as will be dissected in chapters IV and V. 
The upcoming chapter tackles the role of the Islamic Social Institutions (ISIs) in 
fulfilling some of the functionalities that had been previously maintained by the state 
and the linkages these ISIs have with the Muslim Brotherhood in the popular quarter of 
Misr Al Qadima. By and large, the allegiances that are in the making between the lesser 
notabilities and political organizations, such as the MB, only show that the political 
agency of those lesser intermediaries is indeed a determining factor that plays an 
important role in drawing the political map of the popular polities of Cairo in the 
contemporary period.       
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Map 3.b: Districts of Greater Cairo
208
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 This is a detailed map of modern Cairo and its different neighborhoods and districts. The Misr Al 
Qadima district, which lies on the Southeastern banks of the Nile, also includes the Manial island. Source: 
Cairo City Key: Maps & Street Index of Greater Cairo. Elias Modern Press, Cairo, 2001.     
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Map 3.c: Misr Al Qadima today
209
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 Misr Al Qadima today in detail with its streets and various sub-neighborhoods illustrated. Source: Ibid. 
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Picture 3.a: Cairo, channel between Manial (Roda Island) and Old Cairo, Egypt 
 
 
Picture 3.b: Streets of `Ain Al Sirra 
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Picture 3.c: Streets of `Ain Al Sirra 
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Chapter IV: The Muslim Brotherhood, The Jamme`yya Al Shar`eyya and Networks 
of Support in Misr Al Qadima: The Role of Lesser Notables 
 
Overview of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo’s popular polities 
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has been a key player in the Egyptian polity with 
various degrees of influence and success ever since its foundation in the 1920‘s. Along its 
comparatively vast history, the MB maintained a fluctuating relationship with the 
different political regimes that governed the country throughout these eight decades or so. 
Out of this multiplicity of regimes, the Mubarak regime, particularly in the post 9/11 
phase, seems to have adopted a relatively pragmatic approach in dealing with the MB; an 
approach that mainly depends on targeting the financial and administrative networks of 
the group and imprisoning the leading cadres that facilitate the operation of these 
networks.
210
 Whether such a tactic was fruitful or not in offsetting the elevating prowess 
of the MB remains a debatable issue as it is probably too early to judge if the state has 
been actually successful in tracing and drying up the bulk of financial and administrative 
resources of the Brotherhood. Yet the interesting issue here is the fact that the state has 
acknowledged that the threat that is posed by the interlinked web of patron-client bonds 
incepted and efficiently maintained by the MB is quite grave to the extent that it required 
its enforced expulsion from within the Egyptian polity. This chapter aims at offering a 
portrayal of the mechanisms and structure of patronage politics of the MB in Egypt. In 
doing so it focuses on the manifestations of this patron-client stratagem on the level of 
state-society relations and the role that is played by the Lesser Notables in such a 
structure, with a special focus on the case of Misr Al Qadima.          
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The Muslim Brotherhood: An overview 
In 1929, Hassan Al Banna, an Islamic scholar who was working as a school 
teacher at the time, founded the Muslim Brotherhood in the town of Ismailia, on the 
banks of the Suez Canal. From its onset, the MB was in essence a grassroots movement 
that aimed at addressing the masses; the less endowed social classes that, by nature, 
represented the majority of the Egyptian population. Throughout the 1930s: 
The Society began to put into practice, an Islamic ideology that was 
unusual in several respects. It was, first of all, an ideology of 
disenfranchised classes. In a country where most political movements 
(including liberal and modernist ones) were products of the landed 
aristocracy and the urban elite, the Brotherhood became the voice of the 
educated middle and lower middle classes (and to a lesser extent of 
workers and peasants) and the means by which they demanded political 
participation. Throughout the decade, the Society placed increasing 
emphasis on social justice; closing the gap between the classes (and thus 
restoring the egalitarianism of the early Muslims) became one of its main 
objectives.
211
 
 
In fact, Hassan Al Banna echoed an ongoing dissatisfaction of the upper class and the 
class system in its entirety. In his own words, ―According to Islam everyone is equal... 
Thus, we see that Islam does not approve of the class system.‖212  
The Muslim Brotherhood was a predominantly reformist grassroots movement, 
with the main objective of infiltrating the Egyptian society from within via establishing 
an expansive set of networks among the various echelons of the community. For Al 
Banna and the chief founders of the group, only when this infiltration expands and gets 
properly consolidated within the society, the establishment of the Islamic state could be 
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 ―History of The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt‖. The Official Website of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Available at: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Home.asp?zPage=Systems&System=PressR&Press=Show& 
Lang= E&ID=4183. Web. 17 Oct. 2008  
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fully actualized.
213
 Historically, the structure of the MB reflected a somehow egalitarian 
system that was more in favor of the middle and the lower classes, as opposed to the 
mainly elitist political parties that were mostly dominant in the pre-1952 era. In essence, 
the structure of the MB that was set at the time had remained more or less the same until 
today. The chief governing body of the group, the 12-member Guidance Bureau, was, 
and still is, the de facto Executive Board of the MB with the General Guide at its apex. 
The Shura (consultation) council was also set, comprised of 90 members and mandated 
with the task of electing the 12 members of the Guidance Bureau and voting on the prime 
policies and decisions upheld by the Brotherhood. All over the country, the reservoir of 
the cadres that feed into the Shura Council and the Guidance Bureau came from the 
―local branches [which] were organized into districts [and] whose administration had a 
large measure of autonomy…The Society's structure remained decentralized, so that 
branches could continue to operate if the police arrested leading members‖214. 
During the post World War II era, the Brotherhood grew massively. It continued 
to expand the scope and magnitude of its social welfare activities to the Egyptian 
community, ―setting up hospitals, clinics and pharmacies, schools offering technical and 
academic courses for boys, girls and adults; and small factories to help remedy post-war 
unemployment.‖215 
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The Brotherhood post 1952 
 In the period following 1952, the relationship between the MB and the new 
regime was a fluctuating one. In the first few years there was a loose alliance in the 
making between the military regime and the MB as it was quite obvious that the regime 
needed some foundational basis of grassroots popularity to consolidate its rule. And of 
course the MB was the best candidate for the role, especially in the aftermath of the 
demise of the popularity and appeal that the liberal and the modernist parties used to have 
on the street level. This demise followed the failure of the secular/liberal project, led by 
Al Wafd Party, in the face of colonial hegemony, namely the British occupation and the 
newly established Zionist state in 1948.
216
   
 However the honeymoon between the regime and the MB did not last for more 
than a few years, after which Nasser had realized that the MB poses an existential threat 
to his rule which had to be eradicated. In 1955 the Nasser regime initiated a brutal wave 
of attacks on the MB that targeted, not only the main cadres of the movement by massive 
arrests, trials, and executions, but also the foundational infrastructure of the MB via the 
nationalization of the bulk of Islamic Social Institutions (ISIs) that the group had 
developed over nearly three decades of intensive mobilization. In fact, the Nasser regime 
adopted an array of policies that aimed at tightening the grip of the state over the 
activities of ISIs, and which ranged from issuing specific laws that put the funding of 
these Islamic institutions under firm state monitoring and supervision to banning entire 
organizations from upholding their activities, as was the case of Al Jamm`eyya Al 
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Shar`eyya (JS) in 1966
217
. For instance, in 1964, the state issued the NGO law # 32 which 
mandated all civil society organizations to obtain the approval of the state regarding their 
sources of funding, and prior to carrying out any fundraising activities. The law was 
interpreted as an attempt to stifle the ISIs in particular, given the growing concern that the 
regime had developed pertaining to their growing budgets at that juncture. Ultimately, the 
policy was indeed effective and a lot of bureaucratic obstacles were put in the face of 
most ISIs; halting down the ability of an organization such as Al Jamm`eyya Al Shar`eyya 
to maintain the same level of services it used to provide prior to the issuance of the law. 
With Al Jamm`eyya Al Shar`eyya in particular, the Nasser regime went as far as 
dissolving the board of the entire organization and banning it from pursuing its activities 
for a few months in 1966, before allowing it back with a newly appointed chairman, 
General Abdelrahim Amin, a regime appointee and, in effect, a watchdog for the Nasser 
regime over the activities of the organization.
218
             
Moreover, with the introduction of the agricultural reform policies and the 
expansion in the welfare state system of the Nasser regime, the state had met 
considerable successes in co-opting a plethora of social segments within the middle and 
the lower middle classes, eventually offsetting the gap that was previously filled by the 
MB activities.
219
 Nonetheless, the relative success of the state in counteracting the MB 
was proven to be temporary, for with the advent of the Sadat regime and the open door 
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policies of 1974, the MB came to the forefront of the Egyptian polity yet again as the 
prime sociopolitical movement.                  
Sadat and the revival of the MB   
 Indeed there was a multitude of factors that nurtured the resurgence of the MB as 
a viable sociopolitical force in 1970‘s. First off, there was the failure of the Arab Socialist 
project of Nasser, which was catapulted with the 1967 defeat. Also, on pragmatic and 
politico-economic terms, the Egyptian state had only met minimal success in attaining its 
developmental goals with the demise of Nasser.
220
 Apparently, in the aftermath of the 
massive bloat that the state has gone through during the Nasser years, the cooptation and 
the social contract of the welfare state with the middle/lower middle classes was not in 
place anymore. With that came the advent of Sadat‘s infitah (open door) policies in 1974 
and his accompanying determination to empower the Islamist sociopolitical forces within 
the Egyptian polity in order to offset the threat that the leftist student movement and the 
socialist Nasserites posed to his rule. The result was a wide resurgence in the scope and 
magnitude of the MB activities, this time under the sponsorship of the Sadat regime.
221
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The resurgence of the MB’s networks of resources: The patron-client stratagem 
There were primarily three chief sectors that formulated the backbone of the 
MB‘s resurgence in 1970s; the communal mosques (which lie outside the jurisdiction of 
the state),
222
 the ISIs which operated on the services, cultural, educational and health 
realms, and the capitalist Islamist institutions (corporations, print shops…etc). By the 
mid-1990s, tens of thousands of mosques were operating under the direct sponsorship of 
the MB and other Islamist groups. The wide scope of these mosques and their 
geographical distribution over mostly all of Egypt enabled the MB to vitalize its welfare 
system and widen its social base extensively. Additionally, by the year 2000, there was 
over 5000 ISIs operating under the umbrella of the MB. A few of these social institutions 
provided the basic seemingly apolitical services of teaching Koran and organizing Hajj 
trips, yet the majority of them focused their activities within the services sectors, 
establishing clinics, educational facilities and vocational training centers, with particular 
emphasis on concentrating these activities in Cairo‘s popular quarters.223 Often, ―the 
criteria for enjoying the opportunities and benefits in Islamic social welfare institutions is 
adherence to Islam (including the codes of social and family morality) also [operating 
within] networks of patronage and clientship, communal membership and loyalty, and 
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possibly political allegiance.‖224 Some of these ISIs, such as the Jamme`yya Al 
Shar`eyya, which will be dealt with in further detail later in this chapter, functioned on a 
nationwide scale with an overall membership that surpassed 2 million members in 
2005.
225
  
 The sustainability of the funding and the overarching web of patron-client 
networks maintained by the MB play an important role in consolidating the prowess of 
the MB, especially in the poorer/popular quarters of Cairo. This was ensured via the 
utilization of the zakat funds that were channeled through mosques and the extensive 
endowments coming from Islamic banks and corporations, which are mainly owned by 
businessmen that are MB affiliates and sympathizers. This cycle of funding is further 
enhanced via the reinvestment of the profits of these Islamic ventures in low-cost services 
in the arena of education and health and other fundraising activities in the realm of 
religious books and audio/visual produces.
226
 Logically speaking, ―the social dimension 
of these acts of charity allows for the development of bonds and ties between givers and 
recipients, in some cases taking the form of relations of patronage and clientelism‖.227  
A vivid example of one of the most prominent Islamist ventures utilized by the 
MB here is the small/medium sized Islamist publishing houses, which played an immense 
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role in the revival of the Islamic rhetoric. Those houses also operated a recruitment 
facility that guaranteed a continuous breed of cadres that benefited from, and helped 
publicize for the ideological spectrum of the MB.
228
 Overall, the Islamist scope of patron-
client networks was predominantly decentralized and entrenched within the societal 
structure of the community which made it virtually impractical for it to be uprooted or 
even contained by the regime.  
 
The 1974 infitah: The socioeconomic context of the MB resurgence 
The infitah (Open Door) policy was an economic liberalization program that 
began with optimism in the early 1970s. Bromley and Bush state: 
Sadat's strategy was to harness Arab capital, western technology and 
Egyptian resources by removing Nasser's statist shackles which were seen 
to have restricted growth and initiative. Yet during this initiative, fees 
from the Suez Canal, oil sales and remittances accounted for more than 
three-quarters of current account receipts and more than 40 cent of GDP 
by the mid-1980s, compared with just 6 per cent in 1974. Per capita 
income doubled during the oil boom years between 1974-1985 from 
US$334 in 1974 to US$700 in 1984. The economy was therefore acutely 
vulnerable to external shocks, and in order to sustain high growth rates 
after the mid-1980s, Egypt accumulated massive balance of payments 
deficits and a huge foreign debt. The balance of payments deficit reached 
US$5.3bn in 1986, equal to 15 per cent of GDP, and the budget deficit 
reached US$8.8bn, some 23 per cent of GDP.
229
 
 
As a result, by the end of the 1970s, the Egyptian state was at a dire economic juncture 
that was reflected in its inability to pay off the services of an accumulating foreign debt. 
Tables 4.a and 5.a show aspects of the financial crisis that the state was heading at in the 
early 1980s.
230
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 Table 4.a: Egypt's external debt ($ millions)
231
  
  
Year 1971 1973 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Total 
Outstanding 
2,319.4 2,912.9 7,254 8,780.9 12,607 14,311.6 16,037.2 17,385.7 
 
 
Table 4.b: Balance of Trade, 1974-79 ($ millions)
232
 
       Year 
Merchandise 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Export 1671   1566   1609 1992   1984   2512  
Import 3467 4321 4288 4513 5283 6675 
Net (1796) (2755) (2679) (2521) (3299) (4163) 
 
Aggregately, as cited earlier in various sections of this study, this socioeconomic 
context of the state post 1974, characterized with an incremental erosion in its ability to 
allocate resources and provide services to the society, posed a very favorable 
environment for the establishment and further growth and consolidation of the MB 
cooptation strategies, especially among the lower middle/lower socioeconomic classes. 
Empirical evidence displays that, for instance, whereas the labor force has witnessed an 
aggregate increase of 2.2 percent between 1976 and 1986, the increase in the number of 
university graduates was circa 7.5 percent in the same period. Yet those fresh graduates 
could not be contained within the public and governmental sector anymore, as was the 
case during the Nasser phase. The logical outcome was a massive surge in the rate of 
unemployment from 2.1 percent in 1969 to 7.7 percent in 1976, and ultimately 12.2 
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percent and 14.4 percent in 1985 and 1996 respectively. In 1996, university graduates 
constituted more than 25 percent of the total unemployed population. Of course this 
virtual army of unemployed university graduates constituted a potential reservoir for the 
cooptation of the MB. The following table shows the exponential increase in the numbers 
of university graduates between 1964 and 1984.
233
  
Table 4.c: Increase in University Graduates
234
 
Year Total Number of University 
Graduates Nationwide 
Percentage of Growth 
1964/65 16,268 100% (base year) 
1974/5 41,916 257.6% 
1984/5 115,744 711% 
 
The rise of the Lesser Notable cadres in the popular polities of Cairo 
In the milieu of the low-income communities, infitah policies also facilitated the 
ascent of a socioeconomic class described by Alan Richards as ―nouveaux riche 
comprador elements‖; a class that ―has both benefited from the (partial) economic 
liberalization and encouraged the regime to continue to liberalize.‖235 As mentioned 
earlier in the course of this writing, the ascent of this class in the Egyptian society was 
virtually associated with the adoption of infitah due to the sort of economic opportunities 
that infitah made available, primarily the speculative/commercial activities that such 
nouveaux riche elements thrived upon. This nouveaux riche typology indeed constitutes 
the reservoir from which the lesser sociopolitical notabilities rise to prominence in the 
popular communities. In actuality, scrutinizing the tactics of the MB in Cairo‘s popular 
quarters, where the ground is quite fertile for the sort of cooptation nurtured by the 
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Brotherhood to take place; sheds some light on the success of the movement in 
consolidating its power base within the Cairene polity, primarily via co-opting relatively 
large segments of this abovementioned socioeconomic class.  
As reviewed prior in the case of Misr Al Qadima, in a variety of Cairo‘s popular 
quarters the social fabric is somehow heterogeneous, with sizable segments of petty 
bourgeoisie, professional lower/lower middle classes as well as rural-urban migrants. 
Most of these segments share the suffering from burdensome economic conditions, where 
unemployment prevails and adequate health and educational services are considered a 
rare commodity. In such a context, the conditions for the proliferation of the da`wa 
(connoting the publicity of the value system of the MB and the parallel recruitment of 
cadres that are capable of disseminating the networks pertaining) and the consolidation of 
the social welfare system (establishing an alternative scheme of social institutions vis-à-
vis the modern/secular state) become quite favorable indeed. As asserted by Clark: 
The Islamist project, therefore, is an attempt to create a seemingly 
seamless web of religion, politics, charity, and all forms of activism. All of 
these realms should reinforce one another and promote public virtue and 
personal piety. In this invention of tradition, the concept of da`wa 
becomes central. Beyond simply proselytizing or preaching (as 
traditionally defined), da`wa becomes the very act of ―activating‖ Islam 
through deed in all spheres of life... ISIs form just one part of a larger 
network of Islamist institutions; the intention of which is to activate or 
apply Islam to all spheres of life. Working or volunteering for or donating 
to an ISI as a form of activist da`wa is an important component of Islamist 
identity.
236
          
 
Henceforth, the role of the do`at (the cadres responsible for undertaking the proliferation 
of da`wa) is quite central as it fulfils the essential function of creating viable networks of 
members and sympathizers.  
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In order for such cadres to actualize their role proper, they often have to have 
certain qualities that enable them to disseminate the da`wa among the communities 
within which they duel. In fact, the profile of a sizable portion of these cadres fits the 
typology of the Lesser Notable that was introduced earlier in the course of chapters I and 
II. Their educational background is largely irrelevant, as long as they are well versed in 
the foundations of Koran and Hadith, which enables them to portray an image of piety 
and moral goodness that typically endow them the title of Hajj. Additionally, their 
possession of material resources and networks within the community, primarily 
depending on the infiltration of familial ties and the kind of commercial activities they 
are involved in, is also quite pivotal as it facilitates the consolidation of the 
socioeconomic stature maintained by these Lesser Notables within various echelons of 
the popular polity.
237
    
 The machinations via which the da`wa operates also tell a great deal about the 
extent of its entrenchment within the Egyptian polity, especially in the popular quarters. 
By and large, there are three main interrelated categories of da`wa. First, there is the 
individual scheme of action. The do`at are regularly present in the mosques before and 
after the prayers, usually leading the prayers by virtue of being well versed in Koran and 
Hadith, as well as the centers that offer social welfare and services, which grants such 
cadres a natural opportunity to communicate with a variety of segments from the 
population on a personal level. After the cadres identify the potential recruits, they work 
on winning them over by empowering them and advising them to start playing a role in 
the observation of the Islamic codes of morality on the level of the nuclear family and in 
the workplace and then on the level of the neighborhood as a whole. The complete 
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crystallization of the new cadre takes place when he/she is ascribed to the 
conceptualizations of the MB concerning the linkage between religion and politics and 
the essentiality of political action to attain the objectives of the Brotherhood. The second 
main category of da`wa is the public domain which involves a larger level of 
participation and the utilization of public venues, such as mosques and awareness centers, 
to call for and popularize the values, principles and objectives of the Islamist project.
238
 
Then, there is also the published domain of printed material, which makes good use of 
the plethora of publishing houses and print shops associated with the MB, playing a 
crucial role also in spreading the values and ideas of the Islamist project in a simplified 
manner and predominantly through small booklets that are easy to print and read.
239
           
 Thus the Islamist project of the MB is, in essence, an attempt to reshape the 
boundaries of state-society relations:   
An essential aspect of Islamist identity therefore is the creation of 
alternative institutions to those of the state. ISIs are not only alternative 
institutions to state institutions but represent the foundations of an 
alternative society. They stand in direct contrast to secular states that 
appear to have lost their concern for the poor. By offering successful 
social welfare services in the name of Islam to their fellow citizens that 
their respective states seem unwilling or unable to do, ISIs represent an 
ideological and practical alternative to the present system. As institutions, 
ISIs are more than just representative of a populist ideology; they are that 
ideology put into practice and central to the Islamist vision of a new 
society and Islamist identity.
240
 
 
Indeed the Islamist project of the MB has been quite successful in cultivating an amalgam 
of networks that has, in many cases, filled the vacuum left by the secular state. Later in 
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239
 Sameh Naguib (2005) Al Ikhwan Al Moslemoun: Roe’ya Ishtirakeyya. Cairo: Center for Socialist 
Studies. p.92-3 and interviews with MB cadres, Cairo, June 2009 
240
 Janine Clark (2004) ―Social Movement Theory & Patron-Clientelism: Islamic Social Institutions and 
The Middle Class in Jordan, Egypt and Yemen‖. Comparative Political Studies. Vol.37. No.8. p.949 
Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter IV 
140 
 
this chapter, more light shall be shed on the role of ISIs and the linkages they maintain 
with the Brotherhood via the case study of Al Jamm`eyya Al Shar`eyya. 
  
Socioeconomic background of MB cadres: the professional middle class and the 
syndicates 
As cited earlier, since its outset, the MB has been sought as a social movement 
aiming at attaining change within the society in a bottom-up approach, infiltrating the 
popular echelons of the Egyptian community and mobilizing the masses on the grassroots 
level, along the process. However when looking at the operative cadres of the MB, one 
finds that, almost predominantly, the key-players in the MB have always been, one way 
or another, associated with the professional/technocratic middle class. The founding 
father himself, Al Banna, was a school teacher and most of the members of the Guidance 
Bureau in the pre-1952 era also came from various technocratic backgrounds. In the 
Nasser phase, most of the active cadres of the MB came from similar professional middle 
class backgrounds, being engineers, physicians, teachers…etc.  
Today, the strong societal and political footholds of the MB rest within the 
professional middle class. The paramount dominance and mobilization that the MB has 
on this level can be portrayed, for instance, on the level of the professional syndicates and 
associations. The boards of the doctors‘ syndicate, the engineers‘ syndicate, and the 
lawyers‘ syndicate, among other professional syndicates, have all been run and 
administered by MB cadre that won their seats in considerably free elections, since 1992. 
This does not necessarily reflect that the majority of Egypt‘s professional middle class 
are MB adherents and supporters but rather that the MB has been quite savvy and 
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successful in mobilizing support among these circles, organizing their activities and 
pivoting their candidates in the electoral circles of the syndicates quite prudently.
241
 
 Also from the state‘s viewpoint, the realm of the syndicates could be relatively 
less confrontational and challenging to the political regime than, say; the realm of 
parliamentary elections. Therefore allowing the MB to operate in the syndicates seemed 
like an affordable appeasing cost that could be used at times as a bargaining tool with the 
MB, in return for the Society reducing its outright political mobilization in the public 
domain
242
 and, subsequently, the predominance of the MB in the context of the 
professional syndicates peaked in the early 1990s. In 1992, out of the 61 Board Members 
were elected to the Engineers‘ Syndicate; 45 members belonged to the MB. The 
following table shows the gradual progression of the MB candidates in the Doctors‘ 
Syndicates elections in the period between 1985 and 1992: 
Table 4.d: The MB‘s electoral votes in the Doctors‘ Syndicate (1985-1992)243 
Year Total number of 
members registered 
in Doctors‘ 
Syndicate 
Total number of 
members that voted 
in elections 
Total number of 
members that voted 
for the MB 
candidates 
1985 60,000 12,600 5000 (40% of total 
votes) 
1992 90,000 21,000 15,000 (71% of total 
votes) 
 
Overall, and despite the increasing limitations and restrictions exercised by the regime 
against the cadres of the MB in the ranks of the professional syndicates, such cadres still 
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constitute the most viable and well-organized blocs in mostly all of the professional 
syndicates.  
As a result of the incremental domination of the MB and affiliated Islamist cadres 
over the professional syndicates, the state eventually placed the country‘s two biggest 
professional syndicates, the Doctors‘ and the Engineers‘ syndicates, under judicial 
guardianship with the pretext of the two syndicates advocating the political cause of a 
banned political organization; the MB. Subsequently, the resilient MB presence again 
reemerged within the branch syndicates, those subsidiary syndicates that operate on the 
level of governorates, and which are sill considered as strong footholds for the MB to 
date.
244
    
In addition to focusing its efforts on dominating the professional associations as 
shown in the case of the syndicates, the MB has also been adamant on infiltrating the 
popular polities of Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt, which is a basic constituent in the 
mission and vision of the group as stated earlier. In doing so, the intermediary agents, 
represented by various categories of Lesser Notables and other sociopolitical forces, have 
played an instrumental role. Whereas the educated and the professionals have 
predominantly constituted the reservoir of policy and decision-making circles of the MB, 
the grassroots basis have also been crucial in spreading the da`wa and services of the MB 
on the popular level. This dichotomy is displayed, for example, when one compares 
between some of the MB‘s most influential operative cadres, such as the 88 MB MPs 
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elected in 2005, on the one hand, and other notable cadres such as Al Swerky, Hassan 
Malek, and Khairat Al Shater
245
 all of whom are merchants and businessmen or, put 
differently, belong to the category of those that are referred to in the context of this 
writing as ‗Lesser Notables‘, on the other.  
Whereas the first group mostly belongs to the professional middle class, the 
second shares the characteristics of the popular Lesser Notables with a humble 
educational background, a strong network of familial/clan ties within their popular 
polities, and, quite often, sound commercial activities and wealth that enables them to 
dispense various resources and services among respective incumbents. Sometimes also 
the boundaries between these two categories become somehow blurry and indeed a few 
prominent cadres in the ranks of the MB posses some features of this lesser notability 
persona, despite their professional middle class background. 
The MB MPs   
In addition to possessing this diverse technocratic background, the majority of the 
MPs of the MB could also be considered as active and influential cadres on the popular 
level in their constituencies. In fact, If we look at the organizational affiliation that the 
current 88 MB parliamentarians have with the MB, one finds that they come from two 
main sectors, first, the da`wa (religious awareness) and, second, the social services 
sector. These two prime affiliations are deeply tied with the communities these figures 
operate within. The first scheme, da`wa, is comprised of social religious leaderships that 
spread religious awareness to the populace in the alleys of the popular neighborhoods and 
villages. By doing so, they are closely tied with these communities and in fact represent a 
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kind of popular leadership. They lead the people in prayers, present the Friday sermons, 
and provide the needy with monthly allowances from the local mosques…etc.246 The 
second sector of social servicers are those that are affiliated with the ber (charity) 
committee in the MB, and those are operative cadres that work with and facilitate an 
amalgamation of social organizations and networks that provide an array of services, in 
pretty much all walks of life, to those in need.
247
 
In the parliament, the diverse professional background of the MPs gives the MB a 
profound edge as a political bloc. ―The Brotherhood has historically drawn many of its 
members from the professions. [This] gives the bloc in-house specialists to rely upon 
when Parliament takes up technical issues. Brotherhood MPs include, among others, 
doctors, dentists, engineers, lawyers, scientists, academics and legal experts.‖ According 
to one MB parliamentarian, ―As 88, we have specialists from all fields and we are better 
able to support one another and facilitate cooperation.‖248 Yet, having such a professional 
middle class background, this group of MB parliamentarians still possesses attributes of 
popular leadership and sound connectedness with their grassroots basis as well. Those 
MPs come from two prime backgrounds; either da`wa or the social services sector and in 
both cases they do live and work in their constituencies, which only reinforces their role 
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as popular leaders and communal pro-activists. The following table displays the 
occupational backgrounds of the (2005-2010) MB parliamentarians: 
Table 4.e: Professional occupations of the 88 MB MPs of the 2005 Parliament 
249
 
Profession Number of MPs Percentage out of the MB 
bloc 
Workers 9 10% 
Preachers and Imams 8 9% 
Doctors and Pharmacists 8 9% 
Agricultural Engineers 2 2% 
Lawyers 6 7% 
Engineers 12 14% 
Accountants 6 7% 
Businessmen 2 2% 
Teachers 7 8% 
University Professors 11 13% 
State Employees 17 19% 
Total 88 100% 
 
 
Socioeconomic class stratification and ideologies within MB: Pragmatists vs. 
conservatives 
Hence the socioeconomic background of MB members sets to a great extent the 
kind of role that they are ascribed to play in the ranks of the organization. Yet, other 
factors also, such as the generation and the rural/urban divide, help in defining the sort of 
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mandate and sometimes even the line of thought upon which the MB members are 
classified. By and large, two main political orientations do exist within the MB: 
The pragmatists are more willing to negotiate with the Egyptian state, so 
as to be ready to take advantage of cracks in the authoritarian order. It is 
this group of activists who engineered the takeover of most of the 
professional syndicates and served in parliamentary coalitions with the 
Wafd and Labor Parties during the 1980s…They are ideologically flexible 
and open to compromise [and] frame their positions on the basis of 
political and civil rights; notions of rule of law, rather than moral or 
religious rectitude, drive their thinking and strategy. The other leading 
trend—more ideologically rigid—also has membership in the various 
departments, and on the Shura Council and Guidance Office. They tend to 
view politics as a byproduct of the outreach mission, which one performs 
by being a consummate Muslim to convert citizens to an Islamic 
lifestyle.
250
  
  
Most observers would second the reckoning that the latter group- the conservatives- is in 
fact the driving force behind the bulk of tactics and policies adopted by the MB and that 
it has been further empowered especially with the recent regime attacks. The factors that 
help shape the political orientation of the MB members are primarily the geographical 
(rural/urban) origin as well as the generation (age-group) of the cadre.  
Generally, the older generations of the MB seem to be more conservative than the 
younger ones. Nonetheless, even within the younger generations, those that originate 
from the countryside seem to be aligning more to the conservative line in their 
sociopolitical views and policies.  Essam El `Erian, the prominent MB cadre and head of 
the Political Bureau of the group, notes, ―Most newcomers to the Guidance Office in the 
past decade have come from the provinces rather than cities. They have brought with 
them the stereotypical villager‘s ―traditional‖ values: suspicion of the new, unquestioning 
loyalty to leadership and lack of critical thinking skills…The countryside is affecting the 
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Muslim Brotherhood more than the Muslim Brotherhood is affecting it.‖251 Of course 
another factor that adds up to the increasing prowess of the rural as opposed to the urban 
MB cadres is the fact that the regime has been paying much more attention to the urban 
centers of Cairo and Giza in terms of policing campaigns and repressive tactics than it 
has concerning the rural or less endowed areas, which gave the MB cadres in these 
relatively remote areas the opportunity to organize more freely as well as operate under 
less pressure. 
Thus, with this ongoing struggle for the soul of the MB, it seems that the 
conservatives are advancing further than the reformists in the milieu of the MB prime 
policy-making bodies; the 12-member Guidance Bureau and the 90-member Shura 
Council. The rural-urban divide appears to be a decisive factor in this process, where the 
influence of the countryside-originated, mostly conservative, cadres is on the rise in the 
face of the mainly urbanized and seemingly more liberal and pragmatic MB cadres. 
 
The financial arm of the MB’s Lesser Notables 
The consolidation of patron-client networks of services and resources has been a 
prime factor in the success of the MB as a political organization, particularly on the 
popular level. These networks are indeed quite infiltrative within several businesses and 
commercial activities as well as a plethora of ISIs, which makes the task of the state quite 
complicated, as it targets and attempts to cut through such networks. According to the 
patron-client model presented in Chapter I, political patronage is mainly carried out via a 
pyramidal relationship that rests on the dissemination of resources from the top cadres to 
subordinate incumbents until reaching the grass-roots level of the community. As shall be 
                                                 
251
 Ibid. 
Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter IV 
148 
 
displayed in this chapter, in the case of the MB, such patronage networks are 
predominantly orchestrated via individual cadres that also utilize the ISIs which are 
operational on the popular level in order to extend this distributional process to the 
popular communities. By and large, the regime has found it plausible to try to halt the 
activities of the individual cadres themselves rather than the ISIs within which they 
operate.   
In the early days of 2007, the Egyptian state launched a sizable campaign against 
the ―financial arm‖ of the Muslim Brotherhood all over Egypt, arresting hundreds of MB 
cadres that were allegedly linked to a variety of commercial ventures that funded the 
wide scope of activities of the Muslim Brotherhood.
252
 The scheme of the state‘s 
clampdown on the MB was mostly an attempt to secure the consolidation of NDP‘s 
power in the face of the Brotherhood. The list of the arrested cadres included chief MB 
figures such as Khairat Al Shatir and Hassan Malek:  
They were eventually charged with money laundering, financing banned 
political activity and trying to revive the Brotherhood‘s paramilitary 
wing. A month after the arrests, on January 28, Egypt‘s prosecutor-
general froze al-Shatir‘s assets, along with those of 29 others. Businesses 
owned by Brothers, including several publishing houses and 
import/export firms, a pharmaceuticals manufacturer and a construction 
company were closed, the merchandise confiscated. The frozen assets 
have been valued at tens of millions of dollars...Seizing the assets of 
major financiers such as Khairat al-Shatir might discourage others from 
funding the organization. The measures could also have been intended to 
drain the Brotherhood‘s campaign coffers before the June [municipal] 
elections.
253
  
 
By then, it was quite obvious for the ruling regime that the Islamist forces operating on 
various levels within the Egyptian polity have succeeded in posing themselves within the 
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already existing structure of the state system, building interconnected alliances and 
networks with state authorities and personnel along the way.  
The case of El Swerky, the famous merchant and owner of Al Tawhid Wal 
Noor
254
, and also a prominent MB affiliate, was yet another episode in the clampdown 
over the MB‘s lesser notables in the course of what the state media came to describe as 
the ―financial arm‖ of the MB. Al Swerky in fact belongs to the category of those that the 
MB can depend upon for endowing resources and services onto its adherents and 
supporters. However the state exercised some sort of a malevolent patronage upon him: 
letting him fall out of grace. When it was felt that he was increasingly threatening the 
popularity of other competing NDP figures with his growing influence in the popular 
district of Shobra, and amassing a sizable amount of wealth that supports the activities of 
the MB along the process, a law suit was virtually fabricated for him by the state and he 
was imprisoned.
255
 Perhaps this is a signifying difference between the two typologies of 
social bases enjoyed by the NDP and the MB, whereas the similar NDP affiliated figures 
possess a great deal of state patronage and protection, the MB suffers from the lack of 
this scheme of state protection which is sometimes used against them to offset their 
influence as we have seen in the case of Al Tawhid Wal Noor.  
 
 
                                                 
254
 Interviews with residents and MB affiliates, Shobra, Cairo, 2008; Al Tawhid Wal Noor is a series of 
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Resourcing the MB and the ISIs activities 
More often than not, the sources of funding for the MB and the affiliated ISIs, 
such as Al Jamme`yya Al Sharre`eyya (JS) which will be elaborated upon in the 
upcoming section, are quite diverse and they surpass the stratum of benevolent individual 
contributions. Islamic businesses (owned and operated by MB members and affiliates) do 
exist and they act as investment depositories as well as legitimization façades for the 
resources of the MB. These businesses which are usually operative as sizable firms of 
whole-retail trade, furniture and home appliances stores, clothes and garment 
factories…etc are mostly utilized by the MB in order to hire and expand the network of 
individual incumbents and financial resources in a legitimate fashion that is active under 
the legal codes that govern the market. In the course of the aforementioned 2007 state 
clampdown over the MB, some state apparatuses, such as the police and the General 
Prosecutor, have considered this to be an act of ‗money laundry‘ due to the illegal nature 
of the MB as a banned political organization and the direct links that the capital invested 
in most of these ventures has with the financial resources and contributions from key MB 
figures and personnel. And the cycle continues: the MB pumps in more money into these 
firms, which is subsequently invested and the revenues generated are then used to fund 
MB activities and so forth. According to state officials, the profit made by such firms is 
utilized to fund the various activities of the MB. Allegedly, the clampdown launched by 
state authorities against the so called ‗financial arm‘ of the MB aimed at drying up the 
resources circulated within such ventures.
256
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Here, an important query comes to mind: Does the financing of the MB and ISIs 
activities take place at the local (district) level or do the poorer areas receive support from 
elsewhere within the organization? In fact the MB and ISIs such as the JS enjoy a certain 
degree of decentralization that sometimes surpasses that of the NDP or the state-affiliated 
institutions. Whereas the JS enjoys a hierarchical structure that allows for the presence of 
a quasi-Board of Directors on the level of the district or the neighborhood, as shall be 
displayed below in detail, in the MB the decision-making process regarding the financial 
allocation and distribution of resources among the various regions/districts of Egypt rests 
mainly within the Guidance Bureau and the MB Shura Council. The implementation of 
such decisions is usually carried out by the Financial Committee, which is mainly 
comprised of a group of businessmen/merchants responsible for ensuring the proper 
allocation of such resources. The abovementioned arrested MB cadres, Khairat Al Shater 
and Hassan Malek, both belong to this committee.
257
 By virtue of its mandate, and also 
due to the aforementioned observation regarding the relative absence of the NDP and its 
affiliates from the low-income communities, mostly the urban popular and the rural areas, 
the MB tends to focus a sizable portion of its financial and administrative resources 
within such poorer/popular areas.   
Then another question also arises concerning the sources of funding of the MB 
and the ISIs and whether or not they are all domestic, as claimed by the majority of 
cadres and policymakers in these organizations. For example, the official books of the JS 
say that the Society‘s sources of income are all domestic, stemming from the 
endowments of the benevolent and wealthy sympathizing good doers and the 
                                                 
257
 Al Ahram. January 15
th
, 2007. Vol. 131. Issue 43869, Al Dastour. January 5
th
, 2007. p.16, and 
Interviews with MB affiliates, Cairo, July & August 2008   
Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter IV 
152 
 
membership subscriptions all over Egypt. However, there are claims that some sizable 
funding to the JS and other ISIs comes also from wealthy contributors in the Gulf 
countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.
258
 This is more observed in the case of the MB 
which, in particular in the heydays of its resurgence within the Egyptian polity in the 
1970s, depended to a great deal on the financial support of the cadres that lived, worked 
and had considerable investments in the GCC states, especially in Saudi Arabia.
259
 
 Perhaps the friendly relations between the political regimes in the two states-
Egypt and Saudi Arabia- would lead one to discard the possibility of this financial 
support happening on the level of Saudi state institutions for instance. However the close 
relationships between the ISIs in the two countries have been reported quite often. A case 
in a point here is the Islamic Solidarity Committee, an offshoot of the Egyptian Doctors‘ 
Syndicate with the mandate of organizing massive state-level campaigns to gather 
donations for the major Muslim crisis areas in the 1990s, mainly Bosnia, Afghanistan, 
and of course Palestine. The Committee had sound ties with a multiplicity of donors from 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States and was eventually dissolved by the Egyptian state in 
2000 due to the nature of its activities, which was perceived as a direct non-state threat to 
the sovereignty of the Egyptian state.
260
     
Overall, in its attempts to curb the MB, the Egyptian state seems to have selected 
the path of targeting the individual cadres of the MB as it is easier to justify and publicize 
on the grounds of claims of criminal or security/political threats. Yet the tale is quite 
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different when it comes to ISIs; those service-oriented NGOs that do provide a very wide 
range of services to the common people in the popular quarters of Cairo and elsewhere. 
In the upcoming section, this will be somewhat dissected further as we delve into an 
exemplar case of what could be described as Egypt‘s most powerful ISI; Al Jamm`eyya 
Al Sharr`eyya.  
 
Al Jamm`eyya Al Shar`eyya: Background and History 
 Al Jamme`yya Al Shar`eyya (JS) (which in Arabic means the Jurisprudence 
Society) is arguably Egypt‘s largest and most powerful ISI today. The array of activities 
that is sponsored by the JS includes a wide variety of services that range from building 
and renovating mosques and religious institutes to the sponsorship of orphans and aid and 
pension programs for the needy. The scale of the activities of JS is so massive to the 
extent that more than 261,000 children were enrolled in its orphan sponsorship program 
by the end of 2000. The sources of funding of the JS are predominantly local and, 
according to its own balance sheets, the Society does not receive funding from abroad.
261
 
These sources include, first, the annual membership fees of the members which are circa 
100 LE per member (In 2000 the total number of JS members surpassed 2 million across 
Egypt). Furthermore, other sources of funding also include the endowments, donations 
and the various types of waqf granted to the Society from the wealthy, in addition the 
support it receives from the government, as a recognized charitable organization.
262
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On aggregate, the JS has a powerful scope as well as extensive networks of 
funding that are superior to those of the NDP with most of its affiliated NGOs and 
personnel combined. This Society has over 120 items for expenditures of welfare; under 
item no. 12, for example, which is dedicated to orphanage sponsorship; the Society had 
specified a budget that surpasses that of the entirety of the Ministry of Social Affairs.  
These organizations work under the label of Islam, of which zakat is a main pillar. If we 
put in mind that the majority of the revenue of zakat which is, by and large, paid by every 
Muslim, regardless of his/her social or economic background, one finds that it is only 
sensible for such organizations to try to control these massive budgets.
263
 
Organizational structure 
 As illustrated in Figure 4.a, page 155, the hierarchical structure of the JS is quite 
elaborate and is characterized with a great degree of systemic institutionalization. The 
General Assembly is the inclusive entity in which all of the branches of the JS across 
Egypt are represented by three members, with one vote for each branch. The Assembly 
meets on annual basis and is typically mandated with tasks relating to the approval of the 
annual budget, the appointment of the General Treasurer and the election of the 
Executive Board. This Executive Board, on the other hand, is the de facto governing 
body of the JS. It is comprised of 15 members, who are usually nominated by the Senior 
Ulama Committee, and in fact the CEO of the Board has to be from the Senior Ulama 
Committee itself. The Executive Board is responsible for selecting the General Secretary 
from its members and monitoring and approving the bulk of the financial activities of the 
Society.  
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Illustration 4.a: The hierarchical structure of Al Jamm`eya Al Shar`eyya. 
Source: Nagwan F. Shiha (2003) The Accountability of NGOs Applied to Egypt: The Case of Al Jamm`eya 
Al Shar`eyya and Al Sa`id Cooperative for Education & Development (in Arabic). Cairo: Faculty of 
Economics & Political Science, Cairo University. 
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The chief committees illustrated in Figure 4.a are self explanatory, but a 
noteworthy observation here would be the fact that these committees are also present on 
the level of the branches as well. Perhaps, for the purpose of the study at hand, one of the 
most important committees is the da`wa committee, mandated with the gathering and 
channeling of funds. This committee is also considered as the hub where the do`at of the 
Society operate and where the cadres and new recruits of the Society breed.
264
 
 The socioeconomic background of the members of the JS varies in accordance 
with their occupation within the hierarchy and the role they are ascribed to play in the 
context of the JS. For instance, looking at the Executive Board that was operational in the 
mid-1990s, one finds the 15 members of the board were mainly an amalgamation of 
Azharites (religious scholars from Azhar University) and small-medium size merchants. 
Whereas the presence of the Azharites is indeed crucial in order to provide the board with 
the expertise in the realm of religious guidance, the merchants and the businessmen are 
mainly responsible for supervising the financial affairs and the allocation of resources 
relating to the social welfare activities of the Society.
265
   
In spite of the massive scale upon which the JS operates, the degree of awareness 
and dedication of its members still seem to be relatively high. In a cross sectional analysis 
that was carried out on a random sample of the members of the JS, it was shown that, 
despite the relatively mediocre educational background those members possessed (almost 
35 percent barely had a high-school certificate), the majority of them had a clear vision of 
the goals and objectives of the society and were capable of identifying the aspired targets 
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that they are expected to achieve in terms of accomplishing tasks and recruitment of new 
cadres. On aggregate, the degree of accountability of the Society as a whole, in terms of 
the consistency of the General Assembly and Executive Board meetings and meeting the 
government‘s deadlines of submission of monitoring and evaluation reports and financial 
audits was quite high when compared to other local organizations working in the realm of 
social services. Also, the fact that the JS depends mainly on local sources of funding as 
opposed to the majority of the civil society organizations that primarily rest on foreign 
donations in undertaking their activities, makes the JS one of the most autonomous civil 
society organizations in Egypt.
266
   
 
The political role of the JS and the relationship with the MB    
 Since its establishment, the JS was, according to its own charter, an apolitical 
civic organization that aims at spreading Islamic awareness and providing social and 
economic services to the lower echelons of the community; the needy and the deprived 
segments of the society. However, in practical terms the picture is somehow different. 
Looking at the typology of activities undertaken by the JS, particularly in the realm of 
social welfare as pointed out earlier, one notes that the scope of services provided by the 
JS substitutes a plethora of roles that are supposed to be fulfilled by the state. And with 
the resurgence of the MB in the 1970s, there has been a growing relationship of 
cooperation and synchronization between the JS and the activities of the MB. In addition 
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to the pragmatic affiliation that was between the MB and the JS, the ideological spectrum 
of the Society also went parallel with the goals and objectives of the MB.
267
  
For example, in the period between 1975 and 1978, Al E`tessam, the monthly 
periodical and the mouthpiece of the Society, called repeatedly for the right of the MB to 
be allowed back into the political arena as a recognized political force. The same 
periodical also led a vigorous attack on the regime in 1985, adopting the discourse of 
Mamoun Al Hodaiby, the General Guide of the Society at the time, by describing it as the 
right path when he refers to the government as a minority rule entity that captured rule by 
terrorism and forgery. In the same milieu, Al E`tessam also nominated the MB as the best 
alternative to the ruling party, in the light of the regime‘s irregularities against the MB 
candidates in the municipal elections of the same year.
268
 Eventually, in 1990, the 
Mubarak regime dissolved the board of the JS due to its close ties with the MB. At that 
juncture, most of the members of the board were either fully fledged MB members or 
sympathizers. This confrontation forced the JS to tone down its affiliation with the MB, 
making it less pronounced, however, in practice, the linkages between the JS and the MB 
still prevail until today.
269
 
Thus, the affiliation between the JS and the MB takes place on two main levels, 
first, on the ideological realm where one notes that the discourse of the Society on the 
macro-socioeconomic and political issues, as well as the micro-level daily affairs 
spectrum, corresponds largely with that of the MB. Here the example of Al E`tessam 
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periodical stands out, where the publication voiced out the discourse of, not only the JS, 
but also that of the MB. More importantly however, on the pragmatic level, the 
interrelated scope of activities goes far beyond a mere resemblance of projects. For the 
most part, congruent membership in the two organizations is a recurrent case and it takes 
place on all echelons of the JS, as we have seen prior with the case of the board. On the 
lower echelons of the JS, this congruency of membership between the MB and the JS is a 
happening reality as well. For example, The Orphanage Sponsorship Program, the JS‘s 
biggest social project to date, is mainly funded by MB members and affiliates. 
Additionally, most of the health care and educational centers that are run by the Society 
almost strictly employ MB members and affiliates, in order to ensure the congruency in 
the line of thought and action.
270
 In the upcoming section, more light shall be shed on the 
political role of the JS as we delve into the case of Misr Al Qadima.       
 
Political Islam in Misr Al Qadima: The MB and The JS 
The case of the JS in Misr Al Qadima draws some relevant findings concerning 
the political role of this society in Cairo‘s popular quarters. As mentioned earlier, the 
development of the JS in Misr Al Qadima coincides to a large degree with the role that it 
plays on the macro-level in a variety of Cairo‘s popular quarters. The branch of the JS 
was established in Misr Al Qadima in the early 1970s, coinciding with the resurgence of 
the ISIs post Nasser, and it gradually grew in terms of scope and magnitude of services, 
in line with the incremental withdrawal of the state from the arena of social welfare. 
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Initially, the JS branch focused its efforts on building new small mosques and renovating 
old ones. In addition to the regular prayers, these mosques were also utilized in social 
welfare activities such as, providing aid to the poorer families, organizing private tuition 
sessions to students outside the time of the prayers and eventually the Society also 
succeeded in constructing a new kindergarten for the families of the area. Then in 1979, 
the presence of the JS in the area was boosted tremendously when the MB candidate, Hajj 
Hassan Al Gamal, became the Misr Al Qadima MP in the Parliament. Al Gamal‘s role in 
pivoting the scope and magnitude of the JS branch was instrumental, and he (backed by 
the MB of course) supplied the mosques and youth belonging to the JS with copious 
financial and moral support. For the MB, this constituency was immensely important as it 
represented a strong electoral and political foothold for the Brotherhood which, after all, 
is still considered as the political melting pot which is supported by the majority of the 
Islamist forces in the area.
271
   
 The spectrum of services and activities provided by the JS in Misr Al Qadima 
kept progressing at a steady pace, coinciding with the consolidation and continuous 
growth of political Islamism across Egypt, and by the mid 1990s the Society was, by and 
large, the biggest, richest and most resourceful social welfare institution in the entire 
quarter. In addition to the aforementioned basic services that it initiated its activities in 
the area with, the JS now sponsors a vocational training center for the youth of the area 
and organizes, on regular basis, a variety of small markets and conventions for selling the 
products manufactured by the JS members and affiliates. The association between the 
cadres working in the JS and the MB is a known fact now in the area and at times of 
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elections, most recently in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the resources, networks, and 
personnel of the Society are usually mobilized to support the MB candidates. Mostly by 
virtue of being MB affiliates and sympathizers, and due to the supposed state-imposed 
apolitical nature of the JS, the mobilization of these JS cadres and the resources in their 
acquisition often appears to be voluntary and based on individual initiative. The venues 
of JS personnel support to the MB include: utilizing JS offices to organize campaigning 
activities, distributing and hanging campaigning material and posters, and publicizing for 
MB candidates among networks of families, friends and personal contacts in the area.
272
 
   
Jamm`eyya Shar`eyya in Misr Al Qadima: Hajj Mohamed: the Lesser Notable in 
action? 
In accordance with the abovementioned, a field visit to the JS headquarters in 
Misr Al Qadima was crucial. In fact, the building of the JS in Misr Qadima is very hard 
to miss. On the main road connecting between `Ain Sirra and Manial, the signposts of the 
JS stand out signifying the paramount location of its headquarters. At first, it is somehow 
unclear whether the entry to the office of the Society is the same to that of the Mosque, 
but then, as the housekeeper of the Mosque ensures that the visitors would take their 
shoes off upon entering the premise, it shows that the office of the JS is literally located 
inside the mosque.
273
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The writer introduced himself as a researcher who is investigating the activities of the social organizations 
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Hajj Mohamed is the person in charge of the JS office is Misr Al Qadima. From 
the first instance, one notes some resemblance between Hajj Mohamed‘s profile and that 
of the Lesser Notable. He introduced himself as a leather merchant and a son of the area, 
in which he spent all of his life. Later on in the discussion, Hajj Mohamed clarified that 
he thinks that the educational background of the person is irrelevant if he wants to join 
the ranks of the JS as long as he holds a good reputation in the area and possesses piety 
and moral goodness. In essence, Hajj Mohamed was somewhat referring to people like 
himself, as he only holds a high school diploma, yet by piety and charitable activities he 
was able to hold this position at the apex of the JS in the area.
274
 
From the onset, Hajj Mohamed assured that the Society is mainly a charitable 
organization. He said that there is no other entity that provides such a scope of services to 
the people of the area, and asserted the fact that the JS is entirely self-funded, which adds 
up to its autonomy.
275
 The program of action of the Society is divided into three main 
sectors: the awareness (da`wa) sector, the aid sector, and the activities sector. 
I- Awareness          
The da`wa aspect lies at the heart of the goals and objectives of the Society, 
according to Hajj Mohamed. Raising the religious awareness of the people of the area is 
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of paramount importance, and this is achieved via regular lectures by key figures of 
religion, Quran lessons all year round, discount trips for `umra and hajj, an enhanced 
library of religion that is open to the public and a periodical journal that is published by 
the Society, Al Tibyan, apparently the successor of Al E`tessam periodical cited earlier.
276
 
II-Aid 
The aid program orchestrated by the Society is probably the strongest and most 
viable means by which the JS can extend its services to the populace. Under this 
program, The kafala projects that aim at sponsoring the orphans, widows and female 
divorced members of the community and the patients in need, are quite extensive and 
usually provide those segments of the society with their financial needs in the form of 
grants. In most of the cases, a monthly stipend is also maintained in order to assist those 
people in meeting their financial commitments and, in case of senior citizens, a pension 
program is also available.  In the orphanage projects, probably the biggest venture of the 
Society according to Hajj Mohamed and as was previously stated in the course of this 
study, the participation of the people is viewed as an incentive in itself, ―It is a service 
provided to them by giving them a window of opportunity to take part in a charitable 
activity that will bring them closer to God. There is a certain system by which this project 
operates and it depends on extended networking. Every new member joining the 
program, i.e. supplying the Society with donations, will be expected to bring in five new 
donors and so on.‖277  
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Indeed the Society follows a fairly modern scheme of organizational 
management, as stated by other interviewees, predominantly depending on mapping, 
networking…etc: 
The Society [JS] is very well organized, and it is indeed successful in 
infiltrating popular neighborhoods, often via modern methods of social 
work that are usually followed in social service NGOs...They begin by 
mapping the area, detecting the social and economic background of its 
population and the heads of the households within the neighborhood, then 
start networking with the families, knowing their needs and the kind of 
services they require. For instance, when the head of the household on 
their payroll passes away, they immediately allocate the necessary funds 
for the funeral and provide the family with a monthly income. They also 
sponsor the children, and supply the family with the basic clothing and 
school expenses in accordance with the number of their children enrolled 
in schools.
278
 
 
This outlook on the JS activities in the community also echoes with the narratives of the 
people of the area who assured that the social services provided by the JS and its 
personnel in times of dire need have often surpassed the similar support services that the 
state might sometimes provide.  
              A lot of Misr Al Qadima residents recall the aftermaths of the 1992 earthquake 
when many houses in the neighborhood either collapsed or were subject to severe 
damage and, subsequently, thousands of people were literally left homeless. The JS along 
with other ISIs were actually much quicker to react than the state authorities and from the 
first day they initiated a massive campaign to supply the people with blankets and food 
supplies. After a few days, the police intervened and banned the ISIs from pursuing their 
campaign, claiming that it was illegal as it has not been authorized by the relevant state 
authorities, primarily the Ministry of Social Affairs. And it was not until a few days later 
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that the Ministry started to react and supplied those people with food and temporary 
shelters.
279
 Here, it is safe to conclude that this personalized scheme of services provided 
by the JS is unmatched by the government or the party and that it sure plays a immense 
role in increasing the popularity of the MB on the ground, especially in the popular 
quarters, in which economic and social hardships are facts of life.    
Under the aid program of the JS, direct donations are additionally granted to the 
people of the area, supplying them with their basic needs: covers and sheets in the winter, 
food supplies…etc. There is also the marriage services section, providing matchmaking 
services to the young Muslim men and women who prefer a guaranteed and well-
monitored process of selection of their future partners. The medical sector is quite crucial 
as well as it provides the needy with a variety of medical services that are free of charge. 
One of the most important service units under the Aid program also is the emergency 
fund which is allocated for the immediate need of individuals (such as the demolition of 
one‘s home or the exposure to an accident…etc).280  
 
III- Activities 
In addition to the aid and awareness programs, the activities sector is mainly 
concerned with the needs that require more specialized expertise, and it involves a sizable 
amount of outsourcing of human resources that might not be available within the ranks of 
the Society. ―Most importantly, there is the specialized daycare center for the children 
and the daily medical clinic which employs skilled physicians and nurses that are capable 
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of dealing with the more severe medical conditions that require some enhanced medical 
attention and scrutiny.‖281 
In fact, the comparatively wide scope of services provided by the JS in Misr Al 
Qadima means that some of these services will have to be relatively limited compared to 
others. Setting the priorities of expenditure takes place on the local (branch) level in 
accordance with the amount of funding allocated from the central JS authority and, here, 
a degree of decentralization is somewhat granted to the local branches, allowing them to 
set their own priorities in accordance with the socioeconomic and political particularities 
of the area in which the branch operates.
282
 Overall, Hajj Mohamed reckons that the most 
important thing that the JS has done to the community of Misr Al Qadima was providing 
the people with some of their needs, which the state has failed to deliver: ―Look 
outside…you‘ll find this bread outlet across the road. This booth was funded and 
supervised by the Society. It is such mundane services that assist the simple people here 
the most…In the midst of the recent bread/food crisis, people were in dire need for these 
basic necessities and the government was too busy to help them. This is when we come 
in!‖283 On the other hand, Hajj Mohamed assures that there are no political connotations 
for the activities of the JS. ―We have no political agenda…we help the people of the area 
become better Muslims and provide them with some of the means by which they can get 
by their daily hardships, and if you want to call this political action then be it, but, on the 
official level of the JS, we have nothing to do with elections or party politics.‖284   
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Nevertheless, despite Hajj Mohamed‘s reluctance to admit the linkage with the 
MB or other Islamist activists, right outside the building of the Society it does not require 
much attention to notice the fliers of the MB candidates for the parliament and the 
Municipal Council hanging over the walls of JS headquarters. Here, the sympathy with 
the MB is rather explicit both in terms of the rhetoric and political views adopted by the 
JS members and affiliates as well as the sizable level of coordination present on the 
operative level as pointed out earlier. When asked about their political viewpoints and 
allegiances, those JS members who were willing to voice out their opinion stated that, 
unlike the current state politicians and regime personnel which are tarnished with 
corruption and have discarded the demands of the people for years, the MB actually 
deserves the support of the people in the community as it has, oppositely, served the area 
and provided it with some basic services.
285
      
 
                    
Illustration 4.b: HQ of the JS in Misr Al Qadima     Illustration 4.c: Bread Outlet by the JS HQ 
 
                                                 
285
 Interviews with JS members, February and March 2009 
 
Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter IV 
168 
 
The JS vis-à-vis the State in Misr Al Qadima: A Note on the priorities and limitations 
of the JS        
By and large, the influential role that the JS is playing in Cairo‘s popular quarters 
is defined by and further consolidated due to the vacuum that has been gradually growing 
with the ongoing state withdrawal from the arena of welfare services. The bulk of 
services provided by the JS could be classified into two prime categories: First, a set of 
services that have been almost totally abandoned by the state at certain junctures, such as 
the abovementioned example of the 1992 earthquake catastrophe, and, second, an array 
of services that compete with, and usually are superior to, similar services that are 
supposed to be the provided by the state yet, for a multitude of reasons, have deteriorated 
in terms of quality and/or quantity. The example of the JS bread outlets belongs to the 
latter category.  
Hence it could be argued that the JS has been quite savvy in prioritizing its set of 
activities in Misr Al Qadima and the similar popular quarters of Cairo. After all, and 
despite its considerably massive scope of activities, the JS is a social organization that 
has a specific budget with limitations and it has to prioritize its set of activities. The JS 
has more than 120 items of activities on its agenda but if we are to interpret the 
prioritization of these activities by the budget allocation, for instance, we will find that, 
according to its annual plan and budget and as testified by the members of the Society, 
the kafala (sponsorship) programs are at the core of the JS service sectors with a budget 
that exceeded L.E. 150 Million ($ US 28 Million) in 2000.
286
 These programs typically 
aim at providing the needy and socially devastated segments in the society; orphans, 
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widowers…etc, with constant financial and material support in the form of stipends and 
regular personalized social counseling. For example, as stated prior, more than 250,000 
children all over the country are enrolled in the Orphanage Program, making it the 
biggest and perhaps most viable orphanage service program in all of Egypt.
287
 In doing 
so, the JS has firmly established its stature within the Cairene popular quarters as an 
advocate of the poor and the disenfranchised classes. Unsurprisingly, when asked where 
would they go in case of extreme financial need or if there was a sudden catastrophe or a 
crisis in the area, even those that do not consider themselves sympathetic with the 
Islamist tendencies of the JS, responded that the JS is a much more reliable and helpful 
social service organization than the NDP office and most of its affiliated NGOs in Misr 
Al Qadima. Actually most of the respondents said that they are more likely to seek the JS 
for assistance in such contexts than its NDP counterparts.
288
            
 
ISIs and the MB in Misr Al Qadima: `Ain Al Sirra versus Misr Al Qadima proper 
As illustrated in Chapter III, Misr Al Qadima is composed of two main districts, 
Misr Al Qadima proper (the old quarter) and `Ain Al Sirra, the relatively newer quarter 
that was constructed in the 1950s. The two areas share some commonalities due to their 
adjacent geographical proximity, particularly in terms of their socioeconomic features; 
i.e. the prime economic problems that they suffer from, the predominant issues of state 
withdrawal from the services sector, the deteriorating status of their infrastructural 
utilities…etc. Yet the two also have some clear differences, for example, with regard to 
the professions and socioeconomic backgrounds of their inhabitants, as well as the 
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geographical origin of their current residents. There is a higher rate of rural/urban 
immigrants that reside in `Ain Al Sirra than there is in Misr Al Qadima proper for 
example, and this in turn affects the sort of political affiliations and activities within the 
two areas considerably.
289
 
The socioeconomic differences between the two quarters help shape the kind of 
ISIs and MB policies and activities in each of them. On aggregate, it could be argued 
that, although they are actively operational in the two areas, the MB and the ISIs are more 
present and influential in `Ain Al Sirra than in Misr Qadima proper. Hajj Ahmed Najar, 
the secretary of the shiyakha (district) of the NDP in Misr Al Qadima, echoes this 
observation as he states that the overall socioeconomic profile of the various 
constituencies of Misr Al Qadima plays a paramount role in determining the prowess of 
the MB and the affiliated ISIs within these areas.
290
  
Hajj Najar runs a car accessories shop in the area as well as a small travel agency 
and his family has been residing there for several generations. He also operates the 
People‘s Services Office of the NDP. By and large, Najar could be considered as a Lesser 
Notable with a respectable social and economic profile, based on his profitable business 
and sound reputation as a family notable with strong ties with the members of his 
community, a limited educational background, and a sizable political role to fulfill as an 
NDP member and a close aide and adviser to the MPs and the municipal council 
members of the area. When asked if he thinks there is more presence for the MB on the 
popular level rather than the NDP in Misr Al Qadima, he stated that it really varies 
according to the socioeconomic status of the area. ―We have the Sunni mosque nearby 
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and it has been used by some MB figures, but now there is a tight security-hold on such 
venues and they are not operational. In fact, a few years ago they were, but there seems to 
be a security revival nowadays that was largely successful in halting the activities of their 
cadres.‖ However, Hajj Najar states that in some other areas the MB cadres might be 
more active due to the socioeconomic context. In some areas of `Ain Al Sirra, for 
instance, and due to the harsh conditions that people live in there, it is easier for the MB 
to attract more popularity. People there are mainly manual laborers and they suffer from 
extremely rough living conditions, so it is easier for them to be polarized in the direction 
of the Islamists or in the direction of drugs and crime...etc.
291
  
Hajj Najar notes that whereas the prime beneficiaries from the social welfare 
activities of the ISIs and the MB mostly reside within the poorer areas of Misr Al 
Qadima, the cadres that in return ensure the delivery of these services, i.e. the doctors and 
the social workers who organize such activities, are not necessarily so. ―A sizable number 
of those cadres have to be trained or educated in certain fields in order to be able to 
deliver these services…These expertise are not always available in the poorer areas of 
`Ain Al Sirra itself and they have to be recruited from other places; such as Misr Al 
Qadima proper or Manial for instance.‖292  
 
The politicization of Misr Al Qadima: Mechanisms of political cooptation of The MB 
and The NDP 
 
As stated in Chapter III, the scheme of participation in the official political 
process; mainly via voting in municipal and parliamentary elections, is defined by the 
harsh economic conditions that the majority of the locals of the area suffer from. In order 
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to shed more light on some of the features of this process, a meeting with Hajj Sayyed 
Abdelaal was well in place. Hajj Abdelaal was described by the people of the locale as a 
Misr Qadima veteran as well as being a ―vote expert‖. He was a prominent leather 
craftsman and merchant and is now retired due to the lack of commercial opportunities 
for profiteering from small sized skin tannery and manufacturing workshops, thanks to 
the oligopoly of the major leather tycoons of the area, elaborated upon later in further 
detail in Chapter V in the testimonies of NDP cadre, Ms. Hannan Al Saidi, and others. 
Hajj Abdelaal suffers from very harsh economic conditions and has to feed an entire 
family. He considers himself quite a politicized person who has witnessed the ins and 
outs of the Misr Qadima polity and he has a few things to say about the political affairs of 
his district. 
Hajj Abdelaal says that he has stopped working primarily because of the market 
recession and instability caused by the quasi-monopoly exercised by a few big names in 
the field of skin processing and tannery. ―It became too costly for people like us to 
maintain their businesses in the face of those unequally titanic competitors. Now I have 
friends who help me with the daily costs of living…I have the responsibility of feeding a 
big family that is comprised of five sons and four grandchildren.‖293 Hajj Abdelaal asserts 
that a lot of people are now in his position; people that had a profitable profession which 
is now idle due to the new economic realities that forced them out of business.
294
 He 
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insists that these new realities have to be put in full consideration in order to comprehend 
the so called process of ―political participation‖ in the area of Misr Qadima. ―Political 
participation is existent but it is entirely money laden. People who participate get direct 
financial benefit. There is no secrecy in this matter and candidates compete to pay more 
for the voters…All of my sons are registered in the electoral schedules and get direct 
material benefit for their participation. The benefits vary from hard cash to bags of basic 
supplies (oil, sugar, bread…etc) that are usually distributed among voters prior to and 
during the electoral season.‖295        
Being a resident of the area for 50 years or so now, Hajj Abdelaal affirmed that 
this mode of voter bribery and state absence started appearing and increasing since the 
1995 and the 2000 parliamentary elections and reached the peak with the 2005 elections. 
These recent years witnessed an immense rise in the role played by businessmen and an 
increasing disappearance of the state. People in this district and other similarly popular 
quarters have been suffering from an apparent lack in the basic services that are supposed 
to be provided by the state. He said that, for instance, if you look just around the corner 
here you will find that the main bread outlet in our neighborhood has been idle for over 
10 years. This might seem like a simple service yet it is crucial for the lives of the 
thousands of citizens residing here and in other areas in Misr Qadima, and for whom the 
scarcity of the state-subsidized bread, produced by such outlets, has been a major 
problem. ―Now the reopening of this outlet has become the item on the top of the list of 
all the local council candidates in our area. Will the elected ones succeed in doing that? 
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displayed with further scrutiny as the researcher tackles the association those businessmen have with the 
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Well, thus far it is not clear, but if they do then the credit will go for them and not for the 
state. The state has turned a blind eye on us and millions of others that are like us all over 
the country.‖296      
Hajj Abdelaal stated that the mechanisms of voter bribery are not only exercised 
by the NDP candidates, and that other political forces do the same as well. In fact most of 
the viable candidates in these recent elections were either NDP or independent 
candidates, not belonging to an official political grouping. Practically speaking, there are 
no other political forces (parties) that play any meaningful role in the areas, except for the 
MB of course, whose candidates run as independent. This in part was caused by the 
official ban imposed on the MB, forcing all of their candidates to run as independent 
candidates. On the other hand, throughout these recent elections as well, the NDP has 
been following its well-known policy of co-opting the winning independent candidates 
into its ranks post the elections,
297
 which also didn‘t make much difference for the voters 
in terms of the orientation of the candidate prior to the elections. Also being independent, 
those candidates usually have a greater flexibility in maneuvering around various social 
and political policies and adherences provided that they didn‘t have to stick to a certain 
ideology or party platform. Yet, on aggregate, the same line was followed by most of the 
electoral candidates, be it for the parliament or the local council; networks of familial and 
communitarian support, along with the financial resources, are essential for entering the 
elections. The formula is quite simple and straightforward; some candidates grant 
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L.E.100 per vote
298
, while others give L.E.50 in addition to the bag of supplies. People 
are in dire need and it‘s only natural for them to accept this scheme to sell their votes 
willingly.
299
 
 
The MB in Misr Qadima’s old quarter versus `Ain Al Sirra 
  As stated earlier, in general, the MB enjoys a relatively stronger standing in `Ain 
Al Sirra as opposed to the old quarter of Misr Al Qadima, the chief reason being the 
abundance of potential beneficiaries from the services of the MB and the JS in `Ain Al 
Sirra in comparison to the old quarter. This note was emphasized by the people of the two 
areas, who noted that the MB and the JS are more present and active in `Ain Al Sirra. The 
socioeconomic context and historical experience of the area second this observation, and 
the accounts of the people of `Ain Al Sirra suggest that, with the overwhelming sentiment 
of being let down by the Egyptian state, the appeal of an organization like the JS has to 
be quite resonant in such an area. In addition, the MB cadres seem to be considerably 
savvy when it comes to their political performance in the legislative or municipal 
councils. In fact, over the years, the MB has worked very hard to profit from the 
tarnished image of the regime and the NDP as a corrupt and inefficient entity, by aiming 
at providing the counterexample of that, primarily via keeping the sound ties with the 
grassroots social base in these popular quarters thriving. Currently, one out of the four 
MPs of Misr Al Qadima is an MB cadre, and he is, by far, much more organized, down-
to-earth, and in touch with the constituency, more than the three other MPs, two of whom 
are NDP cadres, according to the testimony of various inhabitants of the area. Most of 
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those inhabitants were actually NDP aides and NGO workers. This also coincides with 
what Shehata and Stacher suggest with regard to the successful approach that the MB has 
been following with their electoral constituencies, unlike the NDP which is lagging 
behind in this realm, especially in the popular urban and rural quarters.
300
  
Hajj Abdelaal notes a significant difference however that characterized the 2005 
parliamentary elections, which is the rise in the role of the NGOs. Initially, he recalls, it 
had only been the Islamist foundations (ISIs) that were pro-active in this realm in the 
1980s and 1990s. More recently similar NGOs that are affiliated with NDP figures started 
entering the sphere of social services. The role of an organization like the JS has often 
been pivotal in the electoral process. The HQ of the JS in Misr Al Qadima has usually 
been in the service of the MB candidates, acting as the base of their electoral campaigns. 
During the elections, there is usually some close scrutiny between the social services 
provided by the JS and the activities of the MB candidates. For example, when the MB 
candidate associates himself with the wide array of services provided by the JS; it is 
likely for the voter to consider the benefits that he/she shall receive when the MB 
candidate makes it to office. Perhaps starting with the 2005 parliamentary elections then 
the 2007 municipal elections, similar NDP-affiliated NGOs entered the arena of 
politically-driven social services.
301
      
When asked about the lesser notabilities of the area and whether he thinks they 
play a major role in the polity of Misr Qadima or not, Hajj Abdelaal made a reference to 
the biytkabarluh figures, those traditional figures of authority in the popular quarters of 
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Cairo and who were introduced in detail earlier in chapters I and II. He affirmed that they 
are largely pivotal, if not as the candidates then as the main reservoirs of votes for the 
candidates, who are most likely to be lesser notable figures as well. There are different 
categories of what we would describe as lesser notabilities and the most powerful of them 
are the ones that are capable of acquiring a viable political role, which is mainly achieved 
via controlling votes; i.e. by being able to mobilize a certain number of votes in the favor 
of a certain electoral candidate during the time of elections.
302
  
This scheme of vote allocation is possible only when the biytkabarluh figure 
makes a reputable name for himself within the community and that is dependent upon 
two things; first, the financial capacity that enables the notable to endow some sound 
benefits to supporters and members of the family/clan/community…etc, and, second, a 
strong social standing within his clan/community as a man-of -good and a moral leader.  
This social/moral role is also quite important as it establishes a good 
reputation for the person as a pious notable and, you know, in our 
community this persona of giving, helpfulness, and piety is essential if a 
certain figure is to gain credibility and popularity. I think that most of 
them don‘t have a political line (agenda) of any sort…some of them end 
up allying with the NDP as this guarantees state support and good ties 
with the police, while others belong to the MB as it provides them with 
more popularity…In areas like ours, simply going against the NDP, the 
party of the government, could make one very popular due to the distaste 
that the inhabitants have developed towards the party and the 
consequences of the policies that they see that it stands for; mainly 
corruption, biases against the poor and the marginalized, economic 
stagnation...etc.
303
 
 
Yet this is not always the case. Sometimes, associating a candidate with the NDP could 
be a plus due to the sound linkage with the state authorities and the anticipated benefits 
this could reap for the people of the neighborhood. Overall, there is not a certain rule or 
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logic that governs this point and it is up for the activities and the services that are 
provided by the relevant candidates, along with the scope of services provided by the ISIs 
in the area, to determine whether an association with the NDP is a favorable notion for an 
electoral candidate or not in a specific district. 
 
The Lesser Notables of Misr Al Qadima: Exemplar roles in mediation and conflict 
The taxonomy of the Lesser Notable displayed earlier via the example of Hajj 
Mohamed of the JS is in fact a recurrent reality in the polity of Misr Al Qadima and is 
likely to be sought for utilization by the NDP and the MB alike, due to its sound political 
agency and the abundance of patron-client networks in its possession. Just like the 
majority of popular areas, the kbir (notable) plays a paramount role in the community of 
Misr Al Qadima. Madiha Ahmed, a social worker that has worked closely with the 
electoral campaigns in Misr Al Qadima notes, ―If a problem erupts between me and a 
certain person and remains unresolved, it is very likely for me to target the notable of the 
area/community/extended family or clan that this person belongs to and he (the kbir) will 
be able to resolve the dispute. The stature of these notables is usually determined 
according to their position within the family or clan, in addition to the size of resources 
they possess‖.304  
An example that could be cited here in the area of Misr Al Qadima is someone 
like Hajj Gad Megahed. He is an affluent merchant with very little or no education and 
enjoys a very prestigious standing within the Megahed family from Upper Egypt: 
A few days ago he was visited by another merchant and a quarrel erupted 
between the two, which ended up with the visiting merchant beaten 
severely by Megahed and his people. The beaten merchant reported the 
                                                 
304
 Interview with Madiha Ahmed, Cairo, June 14
th
, 2008. 
Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter IV 
179 
 
case to the police, who, in turn, contacted Megahed. This conversation 
took place while my husband was there…The police asked Megahed 
whether he wants this merchant released from the police station or not 
and Megahed responded that this man (the beaten merchant) is  a hazard 
to the community and that he should not be released until he is 
straightened. So, ironically, the man who got beaten ended up in prison 
for a few days, simply because he antagonized the wrong person.
305
  
 
Such cases happen on daily basis, and they regularly reflect a high degree of coordination 
between those kbir figures and the police stations of the areas within which they operate. 
Of course this involves a multitude of services and resources allocated to those police 
stations and personnel.  
Hajj Megahed was therefore capable of resolving disputes between people 
because of these sound ties with the police authorities and also by virtue of his standing 
as one of the head-figures of the Megahed family. Yet getting him to act as the problem-
solver also involves him benefiting from certain resources or services that could be given 
to him in return for the problem-solving service that he provides. Logically, the bigger 
the service provided, the higher the price.  Figures like Hajj Megahed are quite influential 
and a few of them are well known in the area. There is also Tawfiq Diab, Ramadan Abu 
Lebda, Waheed Hemdan(currently a Local Council member and originally an ’ahwagy 
(café waiter) who now owns his own café and is also the right hand of Ramadan E`lewa, 
and Fathy Gelid(an MP with sound Islamist tendencies and ties with the MB now).
306
 In 
fact, all of the aforementioned seemingly share the features of the Lesser Notables and 
their political affiliation seems to be irrelevant as some of them have actually swung back 
and forth between the NDP and the MB. This will be rather displayed in the upcoming 
section as we scrutinize the category of the Lesser Notables associated with the NDP.  
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The notables and the household in Misr Al Qadima: Job creation 
 
Given their sound social stature within the popular quarters of a district like Misr 
Qadima, the Lesser Notables are usually given the role of ‗natural leaders‘ who are 
typically approached and sought by the residents to facilitate their everyday mundane 
affairs. In addition to the generic services that are provided in the name of a particular 
notable or his affiliated NGO to the general public, usually in the form of health and 
education facilities or food and other basic services supplies, there is also a more 
personalized scheme of services and favors that is offered by the notables. Added up to 
their conciliatory role in mediation and conflict, some Misr Qadima notables, especially 
those of the MB, are well noted for their ability to provide jobs where applicable to the 
people of the area, mainly due to the interconnected nature of the financial and 
administrative networks operated by the Islamist political activists displayed earlier. ―In 
Misr Al Qadima certain notables are capable of finding us jobs, better than any public 
company or Labor Ministry. Some of them, like Ramadan E`lewa and Fathy Gelid, only 
require the name of the person seeking employment and sometimes his/her C.V and 
regardless of how well-qualified the person is, he/she will get a job. Of course, the 
employment favors asked by those that are more pious and religiously committed are 
very unlikely to be turned down.‖307 
Often, those notables grant employment either in their commercial ventures or 
within the vast interconnected network of commercial activities that is maintained by the 
MB affiliates and cadres in Misr Al Qadima and elsewhere in Cairo. Indeed those MB 
affiliated notables could be considered as a very efficient employment agency in the 
quarters of Misr Al Qadima, which augments their sociopolitical profile with an 
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economic dimension that complements their role as key-figures of authority and 
influence in the popular quarter.
308
    
 
Lesser notable figures vis-à-vis the MB and the state in Misr Al Qadima 
In Misr Al Qadima, the Lesser Notables that are affiliated with the MB have a 
paramount role to play in the polity and they serve a multitude of functions as shown 
prior in the cases of the JS and the MB, where the intermediary members that are 
concerned with building and enhancing the ties with the social base mostly belong to this 
category of notability. Despite the fact that the MB has almost boycotted the most recent 
municipal elections that took place in 2008 (an arena which is now a prime target of 
consolidation for the NDP also via the utilization of the lesser notability as will be 
discussed later in Chapter V), the stature of the MB notables is still quite sound in the 
area of Misr Al Qadima. A prime tactic that is exercised by the NDP in this regard is to 
attempt to co-opt those figures of lesser notability to its side in order to strengthen its 
patronage machine in the popular quarters.
309
   
In this area, Hajj Bakr Omar, who comes from a traditionally MB affiliated 
family, poses a good case for the interaction of such figures with the state authorities. 
Hajj Omar is a wholesale/retail trader in Misr Al Qadima and has been a beitkabarlu 
figure in the area due to his good repute and extensive familial ties and connections. He 
ran for parliamentary elections in 1995 and 2000 and was allegedly banned by the state 
security from proceeding in the electoral process, despite the fact that he won more votes 
than any other candidate did. When it came to the most recent 2005 elections however, he 
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actually joined the NDP and, subsequently, succeeded in becoming an MP. Nonetheless, 
after state security reports that connect between him and the prominent MB MP Yossry 
Bayoumy, another Lesser Notable who is officially linked to the MB and who reportedly 
supported him with votes and resources; it seems now that the state security is again 
considering him as a threat, in spite of his official affiliation with the NDP.
310
 
 
Picture 4.c: Posters of MB candidate Yossry Bayoumy 
 
Conclusions  
 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, it is safe to assume that the MB has 
succeeded in gaining more access to Cairo‘s popular bases, and more so than other 
political forces, including those political forces associated with the Egyptian state itself. 
By and large, The MB has been tactically savvy in dealing with the populace for most of 
its history.  In many aspects, the Brotherhood has utilized and helped enhance the state of 
Islamization that has been prevailing in the Egyptian society and exploited it to increase 
its popularity on the street level: 
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Look at slogans like ―Islam is the Solution!‖ Quite generic, yet effective 
and wholesome in a comparatively religious society like ours. Such simple 
and general themes and mottos are powerful tools in the hands of the MB 
as well as other Islamists, yet it is important to assure that these slogans by 
themselves are not the only tactics used by the MB. They are used in 
conjunction with pragmatic and street level operative schemes that aim at 
providing services to ordinary citizens. In a sense, the MB represents the 
only alternative available to the state-sponsored NDP, associated with a 
tarnished image of corruption and inefficiency.
311
 
  
As stated earlier in the course of this writing as we delved through the socioeconomic 
backgrounds of the MB parliamentary bloc, it is rather apparent that the popular appeal 
that the MB MPs have on the street level is attributed to their close connectedness with 
their constituencies and their ability to voice out the needs and demands of the people of 
their respective districts.  
The relationship between certain services/charity organizations, such as the JS, 
and the MB is evident. The main association is displayed in the operative cadres within 
such organizations. Most of the key-players in the JS are in fact MB members and 
affiliates, however since 1995 the state has realized this functional relationship and aimed 
at clamping down over the JS, shutting down some of its branches and imprisoning some 
of their cadres, accusing them of assisting in funding the banned group of the MB. 
Despite this repression, which has eventually affected the scheme of socioeconomic 
networking implemented by the MB, the latter was still capable of extending its web of 
services through the multitude of networks that are in synchronization with it.
312
 
Obviously, it was proven virtually impossible for the police to shut down or imprison the 
massive amount of formal and informal networks and the social workers associated with 
the MB.  
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Out of all the ISIs, the JS sure stands out as it is comprised of over 10,000 
mosques spread all over the country. In 1995, the state came very close to shutting the JS 
down due to its considerable influence and apparent relationship with the MB, 
nonetheless that did not take place due to the sizable apparatus that is possessed by the JS 
and the extremely negative impact that would have taken place on the street level had it 
been shut down. For the state, the JS is a timed social bomb that was awaiting detonation 
by the MB. Instead, severe attempts were made by the police apparatus to suppress the 
cadres that are involved with both entities; the MB and the JS, and the end-result was an 
implicit agreement with the leadership of the JS that there should be a humble separation 
between its activities and those of the MB,
313
 but in reality, and as we have seen in this 
chapter, that separation was never achieved. Until today, the wide scope of services 
presented to the populace, via those 10,000 mosques or so, is synonymously provided to 
the people in the name of the MB.                          
At the core of the web of networks that is maintained by the MB comes the lesser 
notables; this category of sociopolitical actors that thrived in the aftermath of the 1974 
infitah (Open Door) policies. The profile of those notables, being simply educated 
societal actors who are successful in infiltrating the communities in which they duel, 
thanks to the resources and networks in their possession, makes them the best candidates 
for the sort of social work and da`wa on which the JS and other ISIs depend in 
establishing and further consolidating their social base. Due to their sound 
interconnectedness and imbedded socioeconomic networks, particularly within the 
popular quarters of Cairo, those notables have a plethora of roles to fulfill in the contexts 
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of formal/informal politics, state-society relations, mediation and conflict, generation and 
direction of resources and awareness and the reproduction of culture.  
In some respects, the state is colonized by local notability and operates within the 
framework designed by the notables and their aides and associates. More often than not, 
the state is brought down to the stratum of the people, where it becomes a locale of 
everyday quarrels and disputes. Via their sound networks with public institutions and 
their position within the community, those lesser notables are often sought out by their 
clients to resolve disputes and provide them with a wide variety of services that the 
formal institutions of the state have failed to deliver.
314
 As we have seen in the case of 
Misr Al Qadima, the Lesser Notables appear to be the winning card of political agency 
and there is an ongoing competition between the MB and the NDP when it comes to co-
opting them. In Cairo‘s popular communities, the socioeconomic and political role of the 
lesser notability as influential societal actors is becoming increasingly noticeable. With 
the gradual withdrawal of the state from the everyday affairs of such populaces, lesser 
notabilities, in conjunction with other entities such as the ISIs, act sometimes as 
intermediaries with and viable alternatives to the official state-apparatuses. Thus, in the 
milieu of the popular quarters, the ‗lesser‘ nature of these notabilities, that stand in 
opposition to the classical landowning notabilities and the rather modern and sometimes 
NDP-associated mega-business notabilities, is in fact changing due to their increasingly 
elevating stature within the popular polity. Hence, it could be argued that the lesser 
notability of Cairo‘s popular communities is gradually moving out of its ‗lesser‘ status, 
and further to the forefront of the popular polity.  
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 Unsurprisingly in 2007 the amalgam of those MB cadres that were arrested and 
accused of the charge of being the ―financial arm‖ of the MB belonged to this category of 
lesser notability, including Khairat Al Shater, the deputy of the General Guide of the MB. 
By then it was made crystal-clear that the state-security apparatus of the regime has 
predominantly failed in containing the sizable influence of these sociopolitical agents and 
that it had to resort to oppressive mechanisms in order to attempt and limit their 
increasingly influential role within the Egyptian polity. 
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Chapter V: The National Democratic Party and the Lesser Notability in Misr Al 
Qadima 
 
Introducing the NDP 
 
The National Democratic Party (NDP), established by Former President Anwar 
Al Sadat as the majority party, succeeded the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which was set 
by the Nasser regime in the 1960s in order to fulfill the role of the sole political forum of 
the state. But with the increasing emphasis upon the supposed theme of economic and 
political reform as the main national policy of the state throughout President Hosni 
Mubarak‘s rule, more particularly strengthened with Egypt's adoption of the Economic 
Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in 1991, the party seems to be 
facing an existential threat that challenges the very same grounds upon which it was 
constituted. Some analysts argue that the existence of the NDP, an inheritor of the 
Nasserite mobilization instrument, the ASU, ―contradicts regime rhetoric of open markets 
and political pluralization…The NDP's sole remaining important function is to hold 
together a loyal and massive majority in parliament through the distribution of 
patronage.‖315 Yet the scheme of patronage channeled through the ranks of the NDP is 
not only limited to the echelons of the parliamentary elections. Regime cronies that 
formulate the backbone of President Hosni Mubarak‘s ruling clique since 1981 have been 
associated with a wide scope of irregularities that include financial corruption and 
exploitation of official posts to serve personal, familial and other clientelism purposes, 
mainly aiming at consolidating their positions within the NDP and the Egyptian polity at 
large even further.  
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 With the ascent of President Mubarak‘s son, Gamal Mubarak, into the apex of the 
NDP in 2000, there seemed to be a tendency on the part of Gamal Mubarak and his aides 
to reformulate the foundations of the NDP, making it more suitable for the mindset and 
prospective policies of Gamal Mubarak and his reformist faction. Entering the higher 
stratum of the Egyptian polity, Gamal Mubarak had to comply with the rules of the game 
and acquire his own power-base within such a polity. In this case, best fit with Gamal 
Mubarak's persona and affiliations, the suggested powerbase was the newly flourishing 
business community of Egypt. This community is mainly comprised of prominent 
businessmen that were on the rise with Egypt's adoption of a more liberal economy, 
ultimately giving way to a new class of business-owners to take over as the prime 
playmakers in the NDP and, subsequently, in the Egyptian polity at large. 
As a matter of fact, ―the younger Mubarak filled the party‘s upper ranks with like-
minded neo-liberals.
316
 Dominated by western educated academics and entrepreneurs, 
this emerging team had until recently made slow headway against the entrenched…that 
clog in the arteries of both the party and the government.‖317 Indeed names like 
Mahmoud Mohiey Eddin, minister of investment in Ahmed Nazif‘s 2004 cabinet and 
Anas Al Fiqi, minister of youth then media in the same cabinet, skyrocketed in the 
echelons of the party. Furthermore a sizeable structural modification took place, via 
which a newly established set of secretariats that orchestrate the work of the NDP were 
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created; It seemed as if the organizational strata of the party were actually coming into 
shape. 17 different secretariat committees were instituted, most important of which is the 
Policies Committee spearheaded by Gamal Mubarak himself and virtually responsible for 
setting the framework of the main macro-level politico-economic policies adopted by the 
NDP since 2004.
318
 By then, it was rather obvious that Gamal Mubarak is on his way to 
consolidate control over the party, with the Policies Committee empowered enough to be 
the most influential entity within the NDP. 
As described by the Economist, Egypt‘s neo-NDP is in a nutshell a patronage 
machine. ―A party that has governed for a quarter of a century would seem an unlikely 
instrument for change. But the National Democratic Party (NDP), the lumbering 
patronage machine that holds all but a few seats in Egypt's rubber-stamp parliament, has 
just embraced a platform of sweeping economic, political and social reform.‖319 However 
this platform of reform is clearly questionable as the foundational basis of the party 
remain unaltered. Patronage politics exemplified in the favoritism and the cooption 
policies undertaken by the NDP still prevail as the ruling party‘s main strategy in 
acquiring new alliances that would constitute its prowess within the Egyptian polity.    
In fact, the dependence of the party upon clientelist policies seems to be 
intensifying with the alliance in the making with Egypt‘s emerging business community. 
The dilemma in the case of the evolution of patronage networks that are mainly reliant on 
business-community clientelism resides in the fact that such a community offers, by 
nature, an extremely vivid playground for the exploitation of resources. By definition, 
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bigger businesses mean more resources, and the scope of endowments bestowed upon the 
clients from the regime will be comparatively immense when compared, for instance, to a 
clientele of army officers or public officials, as was the case during the Nasser era. 
As it stands today, the NDP is not a proper party with a clear platform and a 
unified strategy. When we refer to the ―NDP‖, we have to understand that this so-called 
party is in fact a fragmented entity that is comprised of a diverse set of ideas, beliefs, and 
personnel that, more often than not, conflict and collide with each other. Since its 
establishment in 1976 as the party of the state, the NDP was, in essence, an extension of 
the single party state system that was in place ever since the 1952 revolution. There is no 
unified ideology that characterizes the party. Within its ranks, one can find the secularists 
and the religious, the leftists and the right wingers, the pro-American neoliberals and the 
anti-globalization socialists…etc. All of those coexist and operate within the ranks of the 
NDP on the various echelons of the party, which displays that there is no clear-cut 
political platform that is being adopted by the NDP. This is of course reflected on the 
typology of social basis that such a party depends upon for popular support and the kind 
of relationship that is established between the party and social base.
320
 Logically, this 
relationship will not be based on the allegiance with the party platform or the support to 
the ideas and beliefs that the NDP champions. Conversely, such a relationship, which is 
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 Interviews with NDP cadres, Cairo, March-April, 2009. The official NDP discourse that is often 
displayed in public meetings and leading figures‘ announcements endorses the Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP), which  aims at promoting open market  politico-economic 
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likely to exist between the NDP and various types of individuals and communities, is 
based upon material benefit and co-optation.
321
  
Hence, the services and resources provided by the party to its elements have 
turned into a mechanism to co-opt some societal forces into the state structure. This 
cooptation is rather vivid in Cairo‘s low-income and popular quarters, where young men 
and women now join the NDP, not because they are convinced with the party line and 
strategies, but because they seek socioeconomic upward mobility; an elevation into the 
higher echelons of the society which is more likely to be attained if one is in the ranks of 
the NDP. Employment, health care, and a wide scope of state services are likely 
guaranteed for NDP members and affiliates.
322
 This chapter aims at dissecting the chief 
features of the political profile of the NDP in Misr Al Qadima, venturing then into the 
role that the lesser notabilities play in liaison with the NDP in this popular district.    
As illustrated in Figure 5.a, despite the fact that the Chairman is at the apex of the 
hierarchical structure of the NDP, most of the policy-making processes take place within 
the milieus of the Political Bureau, the General Secretariat, and the Policies Secretariat. 
According to Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the statute of the NDP: 
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, 2008.  
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 Ibid and interviews with NDP cadres, Misr Al Qadima, February-March 2009. Here, certain limitations 
indeed exist with regard to the scope of benefits that one is expected to reap as a result of his/her NDP 
membership. The higher the rank of the person within the hierarchy of the party, the more he/she will be 
expected to get in terms of resources and services, in accordance with the level of association that the 
person has with the leading figures in the NDP. For instance, the members of the Party Units (local offices) 
in the various neighborhoods are considered to be better connected to patronage resources stemming from 
the party and its affiliated personnel-usually MP‘s-than, say, the ordinary members of the party that might 
not have any direct relationship with the MP‘s. Subsequently, the members of the specialized local 
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Illustration 5.a: Hierarchical structure of the NDP
323
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The party's General Secretariat draws up the necessary rules for putting 
this Party structure into action. These principles become functional 
immediately after the Party's Chairman endorses them...At the same time, 
the General Secretariat designs the organizational structure of the party 
including responsibilities, status and mandates of the various party 
units...The organizational structure of the party consists of the following 
levels from bottom to top: 1-Party Unit level, 2-District Unit, 3- Central 
level and this consists of the General Secretariat and the Political Bureau. 
The Party Unit Committee is in charge of the affairs of the various units. 
Each of the committees at the various governorates and districts is 
responsible for party affairs in its realm of mandate. The General 
Secretariat and the Political Bureau are responsible for the central level.
324
  
Within the aforementioned organizational levels -the central, district and party unit 
levels- the role of Gamal Mubarak is quite influential particularly on the central and to a 
lesser extent on the district level, by virtue of being the chairman of the Policies 
Secretariat, the entity that is now responsible for outlining the main political and 
economic policies that are to be adopted by the party and the central government. 
Arguably, one of the main features that characterize the organizational structure of the 
party today is the power-balance that exists between Gamal Mubarak and Safwat Sharif, 
an old-guard of the Mubarak regime and the current Secretary General of the party whose 
influence is, on aggregate, more dominant over the district and Party Unit levels. This is 
primarily attributed to the sizable scope of networks of political patronage that Sharif and 
other old-guard affiliated figures, such as Kamal Al Shazly and Zakaria Azmy, have 
established and consolidated over the years.
325
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In the upcoming section and throughout the remainder of this chapter, the 
research would argue that, particularly with the ascent of Gamal Mubarak into the higher 
echelons of the NDP since 2001 or so, there have been some significant changes in the 
strategies and, subsequently, policies adopted by the party. Importantly, and as portrayed 
in the relatively recent emphasis on consolidating the grip of the NDP over the 
municipalities, a realization of the continuing deterioration of the popularity of the NDP 
on the level of the social bases seems to be well in place among Gamal Mubarak and his 
like-minded NDP associates. As shall be portrayed in the course of this chapter, for these 
new-guard NDP cadres there appears to be a conviction that one of the chief remedies for 
this lack of presence on the popular level could take place via the consolidation of the 
local MCs. Again, as shall be displayed in this chapter, despite the willingness of the 
new-guard to spread the influence of the NDP to the municipalities, it is the wide array of 
patron-client networks that are possessed and further orchestrated by the old-guard that 
would largely enable the NDP to actualize this objective.            
The rising importance of the Municipal Councils on the agenda of the NDP
326
 
 The NDP has been involved with a set of contradicting trends and policies with 
regard to the decentralization of local governance and the subsequent role played by local 
Municipal Councils in this process. A realization of the importance of the role that could 
                                                                                                                                                 
after the assassination of previous Speaker of Parliament Rifa‘at Al Mahjoub. He plays an immense role in 
orchestrating the parliament and manipulating municipal and parliamentary elections. With sizeable 
networks with the security apparatus, Shazly acquires a multitude of ―classified‖ files on parliamentary as 
well as other governmental personnel. Zakaria Azmy is the secretary of the Administrative and Financial 
Affairs of the NDP. He is one of President Hosni Mubarak‘s closest aides, mainly due to his occupation as 
the head officer of the President (rai’s al diwan). He plays an essential role in the parliament as the devil‘s 
advocate of the government, voicing out the opinion of the opposition. This gave him a sense of appeal 
within the parliament and served his ambition well concerning the elevation into the post of speaker of 
parliament Ahmed Fathi Sorrour, the current holder of the post.   
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be played by the municipalities in counteracting the popular appeal and services provided 
by the ISIs has arguably led the NDP to invest further in these institutions of local 
governance. Yet the main objective has not been to empower these local municipalities 
and turn them into meaningful actors on the community level but, rather, to co-opt them 
and ensure their loyalty to the central authority, in order to be utilized as a community-
level powerbases in the face of the rising ISIs.
327
 
As a matter of fact, local administrative units in Egypt are, in practice, extensions 
of the executive authority. The central government makes the decisions and policies and 
imposes them. In addition to this, it directs the activities of the administrative system, 
which implements the policy
328
. Overall, local governance is characterized with weak 
participation of citizens due to the dilemma of the political party system which includes a 
hegemonic role of the NDP and the presence of weak opposition parties and an electoral 
system that is tainted with a relatively high degree of irregularities and governing-regime 
manipulation. This of course weakens popular participation in municipal elections due to 
the decreasing trust in the fairness of elections, the prevalence of illiteracy and the 
widespread phenomenon of family and tribal votes. Logically, without participation from 
the bottom up, local governments are incapable of accurately structuring or administering 
public services. Popular participation is indeed necessary if accountability within local 
institutions and responsiveness to the community's needs are to be created. 
Local financial and fiscal decentralization is also quite limited. By and large, the 
local MCs suffer from the scarcity of self-funding, and a weak role in managing their 
budgets, as the majority of their financial resources comes from the central government in 
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the form of subsidies. Therefore, the sub-national government bodies in Egypt have 
relatively little fiscal autonomy. All governorate, district, and municipal budgets are part 
of the central budget approved by the legislature. Transfer of funds from the central 
government accounts for almost 90 percent of local revenues. Local governments raise 
funds through urban real estate, agricultural land, motor vehicle registration, and 
licensing. Most regional and local funds are allocated to existing expenditures, such as 
salaries and debt management. The absence of capital at the local level undermines the 
ability of these governments to initiate developmental projects of any kind in their own 
localities. Overall, without control over their own revenues and budgets, local 
governments cannot operate autonomously.
329
  
Nevertheless, and despite the aforementioned features of local governance in 
Egypt, the political discourse of President Hosni Mubarak stressed on decentralization 
since November 2003.
330
 This in fact seemed to be well in synchronization with the 
objectives of the neoliberal schemes of reform adopted by the WB and the IMF, under 
which the scheme of decentralization of local governance plays a paramount role in 
loosening the grip of the state over the localities, reducing its size and budget along the 
process. But, in practice, what the Mubarak regime did since then, spearheaded by the 
NDP, was not more than lip-service to this discourse of decentralization. What the NDP, 
backed up by the security apparatus, has done, instead, was to ensure that these MCs are 
filled with NDP loyalists who are keen on enhancing the stature of the ruling party in 
their own localities at the expense of other contesting political forces, such as the MB and 
its affiliated ISIs.  
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In the period from 2003-2007 the municipal elections were frozen by presidential 
decree and, instead, throughout this period the government appointed ad-hoc committees, 
comprised mainly of NDP members and affiliates of course, in order to run the affairs of 
the municipalities. The result was a scope of stagnant and predominantly inefficient MCs 
that, by and large, failed in fulfilling their commitments as executive branches of local 
governance.
331
 As shall be displayed below in the case of Misr Al Qadima, the most 
recent 2008 municipalities‘ elections have, consequently, witnessed a considerable 
degree of state intervention that was aimed at securing the bulk of MC seats to NDP 
loyalists. In short, it is rather safe to argue that, with the ascent of Egypt‘s neoliberal 
phase, the Mubarak regime seemed adamant on making the municipalities more effective, 
and that such a process was orchestrated in a manner that secures that these entities of 
local governance are to serve the best interests of the regime and its subordinate NDP.
332
    
 
The relationship between the NDP/state institutions and the NGOs   
 Another facet that has also shaped the socioeconomic/political policies adopted by 
the NDP and its government regarding the popular communities is the incrementally 
growing role of the NGOs in the popular polity, which seems to be coinciding with the 
NDP‘s discourse of neoliberalism, championed by the new guard-orientated Policies 
Committee. This discourse stresses on a bigger role for the private sector and the civil 
society and a reduction in the role of the state in managing and administering the 
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socioeconomic affairs of the society. In the NDP‘s most recent party platform drafted by 
the Policies Committee in 2005, there was a clear emphasis on the important role of the 
NGOs in aiding the state in confronting the socioeconomic hardships of the community. 
―Voluntary social work is an effective means for achieving more progress for society in 
its capacity as a real prop to the role the government plays. It is crystal clear that 
governments alone can not satisfy all the needs of their citizens. Neither can the 
governments solve all the problems society faces alone‖333.       
However, this recent rise in the scope and magnitude of the activities of the NGOs 
in the milieu of the popular communities was also associated with attempts to utilize this 
phenomenon in serving the interests of the NDP cadres in the popular polity. As will be 
displayed in the course of this chapter, different categories of sociopolitical actors, 
including some lesser notabilities associated with the NDP as well as NDP patrons and 
elitist notabilities operating within the popular echelons of the community, have all 
attempted to establish and consolidate their control over various NGOs. Quite often, the 
aim of the NDP patron/cadre is to orchestrate a process of channeling a wide variety of 
resources and services to the populace in the name of the political cadre him/herself and 
the party. Henceforth, there is a sense of competition between various NGOs over the 
arena of providing services to the populace, however not for charitable but, rather, 
political purposes. As will be shown in the cases of Mamdouk Mekky, Iman Bibars, and, 
to a lesser extent, the female lesser notable, Hannan Al Sa`idi, various NDP figures were 
all in charge of a set of NGOs that were either self-funded or dependent upon donations 
and financial support from the state, as well as a plethora of development donors. As 
attested by most of these cadres, the NGO has been quite often utilized by the NDP figure 
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that controls it for personal benefit, in order to raise his/her sociopolitical profile in the 
political constituency in which he/she operates.  
 
The NDP in Misr Al Qadima 
The geopolitics and history of Misr Al Qadima have played a great role in shaping 
the stature of the NDP in this popular quarter, as it has been the case with the MB, 
illustrated in the previous chapter. In Misr Al Qadima proper (the old quarter), the NDP‘s 
arrival into the political scene of the area coincided, more or less, with the construction of 
the newer quarters of `Ain Al Sirra in the 1960s. At that time, the ASU, the predecessor 
of the NDP, was introduced to the area as the mobilizing engine of political action and, 
subsequently, sizable numbers of young people joined the ranks of the ASU then, seeking 
the actualization of the proclaimed objectives of the ASU: national independence, social 
justice, and pan-Arab cooperation and development. The ASU, which was by and large 
synonymous with the state, represented itself as the guarantor of services and subsidies to 
the people, and it maintained a considerable degree of popularity in the district, especially 
in `Ain Al Sirra, the part of Misr Al Qadima that was originally constructed by the Nasser 
regime to provide housing to the low-income segments of the society.
334
          
 With the ascent of Sadat and his open door policies in the early 1970s, the stature 
of the state-sponsored ASU declined gradually all over the country, until it was ultimately 
dissolved by Sadat in 1972. Eventually, the vacuum left by the ASU was loosely filled 
with the NDP, established in 1976 as the political party representing the state. The party 
had a somehow vague platform that was described by the regime then as a ―centrist‖ 
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ideology, generically calling for national unity, economic development, and political 
stability. The mobilization machine and relative popularity that were previously 
maintained by the ASU were not at all inherited by the NDP, especially within the 
popular quarters where the state has withdrawn from its welfare services and subsidies, as 
shown prior in Chapter III and IV. Instead, the NDP focused most of its activities in the 
realm of elections, functioning as the chief vote gatherer for the candidates representing 
the state-party in the parliamentary and municipal elections. 
 In the 1980s and 1990s, the role of the NDP as a vote securer was rather 
solidified. In Misr Al Qadima, a district (shiyakha) office was established along with a 
plethora of smaller offices (party units) around the various sub-neighborhoods of the 
area. The shiyakha office was the leading party organization in the area, supposedly 
operating as the intermediary linkage between the higher echelons of the NDP and its 
grassroots basis on the lower strata of the Misr Al Qadima polity. Under its auspices 
came the smaller party units, which acted as the venues for recruiting new party cadres 
that would presumably disseminate the resources and services to the populace, 
maintaining the allegiance of these popular social bases to the party, particularly during 
election time. However, and as was the case with a multitude of low-income and popular 
quarters, the 1980s and 1990s also witnessed an enormous rise in the scope and 
magnitude of services provided by the ISIs of Misr Al Qadima, which in turn led to a 
sharp rise in the popularity of the Islamists in the area, particularly the MB. The waning 
popularity of the NDP in Misr Al Qadima was rather apparent with the 2000 and 2005 
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parliamentary elections, where the four seats of the parliament were equally distributed 
between NDP and MB affiliates.
335
 
In fact, the results of the 2005 parliamentary elections were virtually shocking for 
the NDP, as the MB succeeded in becoming the most sizable opposition force in 
parliament with 88 seats (out of 444) despite the harsh oppression and intimidation 
exercised against its candidates by the police apparatus all over the country. This was the 
ruling party‘s biggest parliamentarian defeat to date and, with that, it seemed as if the 
NDP had finally realized that the immense retreat in its stature was so grave that it 
required some fundamental alterations in the strategies and policies implemented by the 
party on the ground: 
I have been in the party for over 15 years now and I can sense the change 
taking place. There are some attempts towards introducing more 
transparency and democratization, like preliminary elections to determine 
the party candidates in the parliamentarian and local council 
elections…etc. The dichotomy still exists however between the old and 
the new generations, with this new-guard faction spearheaded by Gamal 
Mubarak and the Policies Committee he chairs. The divide between the 
old-guard and the new is, in my opinion, similar to a standoff between the 
traditional/corrupt and the young/enthused….etc. A few NDP members 
are now aware of the importance of addressing the needs of the lower 
level/popular level constituencies…Yet those remain to be a minority, and 
the majority could still be considered as the old-guard who are pretty 
much more interested in consolidating the domination of the NDP over 
popular politics, perhaps, among other factors, due to the traditional vision 
that is widespread among these cadres regarding the unimportance of 
transparency or democracy, unless utilized in the best interest of the ruling 
party.
336
 
 
One of the chief cornerstones of the reformed NDP policies that were encouraged by the 
new-guards of the party was how it viewed and attempted to utilize local municipalities 
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in raising the sociopolitical profile of the party and its incumbents in the popular and 
rural quarters. 
 
NDP: Detachment with the popular powerbases and attempts of reform 
Indeed there is an increasing degree of detachment between the NDP and the 
street level powerbases. This lack of popularity on the street level is one of the main 
reasons that made the 2005 parliamentary elections witness the worst results for the NDP 
to date: 
The NDP suffers from a lack of popularity on the street level when 
compared to the MB. Most of the candidates nominated by the NDP in the 
2005 elections lost, and if it weren‘t for the ‗independent‘ candidates 
joining the ranks of the party after the elections, the NDP wouldn‘t have 
enjoyed a majority in the parliament today. In fact in 2005 I presented a 
paper to the Policies Committee arguing that the lack of a meaningful 
scheme of services to the people is bringing the party down to the 
drain…Now the party is realizing the importance of spreading the scheme 
of its social services in the popular quarters…Ahmed Ezz, secretary [of 
organization] of the NDP, has specified over a 100,000 LE for every MP 
to provide services to his constituency.
337
  
 
Perhaps the abovementioned 100,000 LE (almost equivalent to 20,000 $US by 2008 
exchange rates) is an indicator of the increasing attention that is given by the decision-
making circles in the party with regard to the consolidation of popular powerbases. 
Despite the fact that only 100,000 LE is probably insufficient to fund for the needed 
social services in a single popular quarter, yet it could constitute an important 
contribution to this end and a sum that could be utilized in providing small-medium sized 
benefits to a good number of people in a popular locale.
338
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 For instance, by 2008 prices, this amount of money could, more or less, provide over 500 medium-sized 
households (five people) with their daily needs of semi-subsidized basic goods (bread, butter, oil, sugar, 
rice…etc) for nearly six months.   
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Overall, there have been a lot of voices within the NDP that urged the party to 
alter its tendency to implement certain policies regardless of their practical implications 
and effect on the people on the ground. The NDP seems to be realizing this gap now, and 
the Policies Committee is increasingly turning into a think-tank that tries to deal with the 
issues that involve the popular classes rather practically.
339
 In fact, The NDP‘s new guard 
faction represented by the Policies Committee is attempting to deal with this dilemma of 
lack of grassroots basis and there have been some initiatives that aim at reforming the 
party by putting it in touch with the popular echelons. In addition to the fact that the party 
now puts more emphasis over the MCs and the elections pertaining, some alteration in 
the tactics undertaken by the party in dealing with the popular constituencies is also 
taking place. For instance, the party units (local NDP bureaus) used to be dominated by 
the loyalists that were usually instated in their positions by their patron NDP MPs and 
MC members, regardless of their popularity or actual influence and ability to provide 
services to the people of their districts. Those loyalists, typically the electoral campaign 
facilitators and the relatives of the successful candidates, ended up being the local NDP 
bureau secretaries of the various committees and their respective posts had nothing to do 
with their areas of expertise or their capacity to serve in those committees.
340
 
Thus, there exists a divide between the higher ranks of the NDP and the lower 
echelons that supposedly connect with the popular constituencies. This is a major 
dilemma and now the NDP seems to be realizing that this gap exists. ―Now the NDP is 
quite aware that it can not afford not having a proper party and popular constituency and 
if we look at the 2005 party unit elections and the 2007 local council elections, we will 
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find that now a lot of the cadres occupying the leading positions within the party units are 
not the loyalists anymore.‖341 Furthermore, the party started designing and implementing 
political training and awareness programs, targeting the members of the local units and 
aiming at enhancing their political knowledge along with their interpersonal skills in 
order to enable them to deal with the populace as professional politicians. These steps 
were essential to separate the party from the cohorts of the MPs and the MC members 
and enable it to stand on its own as a sovereign entity that is not easily affected by the 
support of one person or another.
342
 However, the impact of these reforms is yet to be 
assessed. As shall be shown later in the course of this chapter, despite the emphasis that 
was put forward by the NDP on the MCs and the elections pertaining, the fact remains 
that those that were pivoted in the MCs and the party units depended on the alliances and 
networks of the old-guard of the NDP. As will be stated later, the old-guard, that seems to 
be quite wary of the reforms that are being introduced by Gamal Mubarak and his new-
guard cohorts, is still more capable of dealing with the intricate details of the popular 
communities than the new-guard. 
The NDP and the MC of Misr Al Qadima: Notabilities within the state 
 
Picture 5.a: The Complex hosting the MC of Misr Al Qadima 
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Picture 5.b: The Entrance to the MC and The various sub-divisions of offices inside 
 
The local MC of Misr Al Qadima lies on Salah Salem Road, almost at the 
junction between `Ain Al Sirra and the older quarter of Misr Al Qadima. As shown in the 
picture, the moderately constructed building that hosts the council is also home to a 
variety of other state administrative units pertaining to the area. Upon arriving in the MC, 
which occupied an entire floor in this four-story building, the researcher was met with a 
warm welcome from a person who introduced himself as the Chair of the Local Council. 
That was Mahmoud Al Khashab; a cheerful and helpful man who was apparently willing 
to present a picture of the activities of the MC. Another member in the Council, Khaled 
Abdelfattah, joined the discussion, only to reveal some insightful and in-depth details 
about the sociopolitical realities of Misr Al Qadima.
343
  
The profiles of the Misr Al Qadima MC members are in fact quite diverse. The 
majority of the members come from two main categories; they are either business-owners 
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or merchants like Abdelfattah himself, or state employees, just as Al Khashab, the 
chairperson of the MC. The 22 MC members are almost divided equally between these 
two categories. Abdelfattah, the MC member, was more involved in and aware of the 
daily affairs of the area than Al Khashab, the actual chair of the council. These two newly 
elected MC members come from two considerably different backgrounds. Al Khashab is 
an accountant and a state employee at the Ministry of Social Affairs and he is only 
available in the MC on part-time basis. The other, Abdelfattah, is a prominent Misr Al 
Qadima leather merchant and a notable of the area. He has only earned a primary 
education certificate and his political profile includes a zealous membership of the NDP 
which has lasted for over two decades, and a prime position in the party as the secretary 
of the shiyakha (district), following the footsteps of his late father.
344
 
Abdelfattah has embarked upon a wide scope of social and political activities 
since a very young age. In a sense, he has inherited his father‘s role, not only as the 
leading leather tannery manufacturer and merchant of the area, but also as a leading 
figure in the ranks of the NDP and the MC. In addition, he also pursued his line as the 
board member of the Commercial Chamber of Skin Tannery. ―My father had an excellent 
repute as someone who provides services to the people of his area and there was a certain 
responsibility that I had to continue in his footsteps, in order not let down those that 
depended on him as the facilitator with the state authorities‖.345 The demise of 
Abdelfattah‘s father almost coincided with the new wave of reform that was spearheaded 
by Gamal Mubarak and, subsequently, he had to go through the internal elections of the 
party to win the nomination for the MC elections, which he did. Eventually, he won a 
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seat in the MC and also made it through in the local NDP elections undertaken in the 
same year (2006), resulting in him winning the seat of the secretary of the district 
(shiyakha) of the party.  
Although some of the secretaries of the NDP districts prefer not to occupy a 
position in the MC, as they consider the tasks expected from the person occupying these 
two positions to be somehow burdensome, there was a certain rationale for Abdelfattah 
occupying these two seats: 
I think that in order for someone like me to be able to serve the people of 
his area proper, he has to be in as many posts as possible. This gives one a 
versatile window of opportunity, through which you can serve the people 
in a multiplicity of ways. For example, being in the Board of the 
Commercial Chamber has enabled me to provide a lot of services for the 
skin tannery and leather laborers, business owners, and merchants, who 
constitute a sizable portion of the population of our area. After all, in order 
to be efficient and helpful to the people of such an area, I have to be in the 
MC. The Local Council lies at the core of any scope of services that could 
be supplied. Infrastructure works, electricity, sanitation, building 
permits…etc., are among the mandates of the municipalities, and these are 
crucial services that are indispensible to the people of the area.
346
  
 
In fact, now with the relatively recent emphasis that is put by the party on the 
municipalities and the essentiality of their role in leading the process of socioeconomic 
development,
347
 especially in the popular areas, the importance of the role of the 
municipalities has arguably surpassed that of the legislative councils, i.e. the parliament 
and the Shura Council. ―Indeed those at the municipality are responsible for getting 
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What is being referred to as the process of socioeconomic development relates to President Hosni 
Mubarak‘s Presidential Program which is supposed to be implemented by the relevant central and local 
government entities. This Program was critiqued for being unsuccessful due to its failure in addressing 
major developmental issues of poverty alleviation, income distribution, and corruption on the level of the 
central/local governments, among others. Enhancing decentralization and empowering the MCs is supposed 
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things done for the people on the ground. That‘s why when an MP is willing to provide a 
certain service to the people of his district; he has to go through the municipality first.‖348  
Here, the importance of the NDP, cited by Abdelfattah, relates to the 
administrative role that the municipalities play and how essential that is for undertaking 
all the necessary constructional and infrastructural works within the municipality, for 
example. Because of this very same administrative role that is played by the MCs, it 
appears that the NDP is now considering the MCs as a potential foothold against other 
political forces, which could make the municipalities more important than other state 
institutions, such as the parliament, for the purpose of consolidating the influence of the 
NDP on the popular level.      
 
The MCs: A strong foothold for the NDP versus other political forces? 
On the local level, it is the municipalities that do most of the work pertaining to 
executing the policies of the NDP, according to Jamilla Abdelmajid, the Misr Al Qadima 
MC member. MC members are directed by the NDP on the policy level and, accordingly, 
these members take care of things on the executive level. As opposed to other political 
forces, other than the MB, the NDP could be considered as the political force which is 
capable of achieving some actual changes on the ground in the popular communities. 
―Health and educational services are primarily provided by the NDP and its subsequent 
members. Now with the new wave of NDP reform and increasing financial and 
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authoritative empowerment of the MCs, other political parties, including the MB, will be 
incapable of keeping up with us.‖349  
Perhaps the main realm in which the NDP can easily overcome any competition is 
constructing new facilities. Due to the need to obtain permits from relevant state 
authorities and ministries, mandatory for any new constructions to be erected, the NDP 
and its affiliated members can proceed in this arena with relative ease compared to other 
political forces, especially the Islamist ones. Throughout the past few years alone, in `Ain 
Al Sirra, and to a lesser extent also in the old Misr Al Qadima quarter, the local party unit 
under the auspices of several NDP notabilities in the area has actually constructed new 
co-ops, medical daycare centers and two new schools, in accordance with the 
developmental needs of the area.
350
 For NDP members and affiliates like Abdelmajid, 
these activities reflect the responsiveness of the NDP concerning the needs of the people 
of the area. However, for most of the locals of Misr Al Qadima, these relatively recent 
NDP-sponsored services constitute only a portion of the needs of the area and, as 
displayed in various sections of this study, the gap that is left with regard to the NDP-
provided services remains to be huge.
351
  
Importantly, the aforementioned reveals that the MCs indeed constitute potential 
powerhouses for the exploitation of the executive/administrative powers that are in the 
hands of MC members. As they monopolize the issuance of construction and other 
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they range from the severe shortage in the supply of basic goods as manifested in the bread crisis, outlined 
in Chapter IV, to the inadequacy of health, education, and infrastructural services expressed by the majority 
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permits, MC members and other local NDP officials and politicians are often engaged in 
rent-seeking activities that aim at gaining personal benefit – usually a certain sum of 
money – in return for the permit or the authorization that is granted by the MC with the 
help of the MC member or NDP official. It is not uncommon to find that in Misr Al 
Qadima, and in most other urban locales in Cairo, there is a certain price for such permits 
and that these prices vary according to the socioeconomic status of the neighborhood and 
the nature of the permit needed. For example, permits in the more affluent areas of Cairo 
are likely to cost more than they do in the popular areas. Also, the building permit for 
constructing an entirely new building will typically cost more than the one needed for 
adding an extra floor to an already-existing building, for instance. Of course, the NDP 
cadres associated with the MC would refuse to acknowledge that such irregularities exist, 
however a multitude of these cases have been reported in Misr Al Qadima and in other 
districts all over Cairo prior. ―Undoubtedly the MCs have been tainted with cases of 
corruption that would mainly involve the MC member facilitating the authorization of a 
building permit or a commercial license for a certain price. These prices are well-known 
to the locals of an area like Misr Al Qadima. For example, it would cost almost 10,000 
L.E to issue a permit for a new building.‖352          
The abovementioned also asserts that it is virtually impossible to draw the line 
between the jurisdictions and roles of the party and those of the state/central government. 
Hence, the distinction between the two becomes quite difficult, especially for the 
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 Ibid and Al Masry Al Yom, Vol. 6, Issue 2016, December 20
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 2009; the pricing of MC permits is so 
common to the extent that the state itself has admitted that this phenomenon is a happening reality. Zakaria 
Azmi, the chief of staff of the President‘s Office was famously quoted in the parliament in 2007 saying that 
―Corruption in the municipalities has reached unprecedented degrees‖.    
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majority of the people on the street, and, eventually, the NDP becomes synonymous to 
the state.  
This expansion in social services on the popular level is in the electoral 
program of President Mubarak…These priorities are set on the budget of 
the local councils and the relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Construction for example. Local council 
members are responsible for ensuring the allocation of land designated for 
building new schools, for instance, and some lobbying is needed within 
these ministries also to facilitate and speed up the bureaucratic procedural 
processes within such government entities in order to obtain building 
permits, secure approvals for financial allocations, and such.
353
  
This congruency between the NDP and the state apparatuses is in the benefit of the NDP 
and its personnel, as it reinforces the conviction that, in order for the people to benefit 
from the resources and services provided by the state, they have to ally themselves with 
the NDP.    
Abdelfattah reckons that there is a multitude of services that he has helped 
provide to the people of the area, utilizing his position/s in these entities, primarily the 
party and the MC. According to Abdelfattah, he is adamant on providing anything that he 
could do to serve the people of the constituency. In addition to the basic services that are 
typically provided by the MC, other services were also created to help levy some of the 
socioeconomic predicaments faced by the people of the area. For instance, he initiated an 
employment campaign whereby young people with relatively limited skills and education 
could apply for work and then, acting as a facilitator, he would utilize his networks 
within the party and the chamber to find them opportunities for trainings and 
apprenticeships and then fixed-term jobs, mostly as laborers in leather and other factories. 
His work in conjunction with other NGOs in the skin tannery workshops‘ relocation 
crisis was also of great benefit to the people of the area, he believes. The MC of Misr Al 
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Qadima did its best concerning the skin tannery workshops relocation, in order to assist 
the locals of the area. First, the municipality succeeded in voicing out a lot of concerns to 
the government, for there was a lot of hype and social refusal that was associated with the 
decision to relocate the workshops. ―A variety of NGOs and other social organizations 
fought to resist the decree or, at least, get the best terms possible for such a move and I 
think these forces combined succeeded in halting the transfer, to date, and until further 
scrutiny and studying is made to ensure that the interests of the skin tannery community 
are not affected.‖354 
The state has frozen the municipalities across the country for over four years 
before deciding to bring them back to life and reemphasize their role in 2007. The initial 
freezing and then the decision to reactivate the municipalities again at that point was 
justified by Abdelfattah in the light of a set of new policies that the NDP is now adopting 
in the realm of ―popular participation‖ as he put it. ―Constitutionally, the municipalities 
could not have been frozen further. When the time of the MC elections came in 2007, the 
realization of the state and the NDP that the best venue for infiltrating through to the 
popular communities can only be actualized in the municipalities was crystallized, 
especially with the rise of the various Islamist forces that have succeeded in providing a 
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 Interviews with Mahmoud Al Khashab and Khaled Abdelfattah, chair and member of the Misr Al 
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rd
, 2008. Look also Al Sai‘di and Bibars on the same issue of relocation of 
skin tannery workshops, pages 224 and 238-239. The crisis of the relocation of the skin tannery workshops 
is elaborated upon further in the course of the section on the NGOs of the area and their relationship with 
the NDP. Since 2005, the state has been adamant on relocating the workshops of skin tannery, the chief 
economic activity of sizable bulk of Misr Al Qadima residents, to poorly prepared sites on the desert 
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workshops themselves, who perceived this government plan as a mere uprooting from the locale of this 
industry, which does not provide them with proper alternatives or compensation. The newly suggested sites 
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fact that they were quite remote from where the owners and laborers of this industry have lived and worked 
for decades. 
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wide array of services in the popular areas in particular.‖355 There were no alternative 
outlets that could offset or at least compete with the social networks of the Islamists, 
other than the municipalities. Recently, with the advent of the municipalities‘ 
reactivation, the party has been increasingly involved in a wide of variety of trainings and 
workshops targeting the various MC members of the NDP. Also, now there are regular, 
usually monthly, meetings on the level of the entire governorate of Cairo with the 
leadership of the party, primarily with Gamal Mubarak and the rest of the politburo, 
aiming at raising the awareness of the MC members and acquainting them with the goals 
and objectives of the NDP at various points in time.     
As asserted by Abdelfattah, there are some clear-cut obstacles that hinder the 
municipalities from actualizing their role. Despite the recent boost, a lot could be still 
done by the state to further empower the municipalities. More financial resources and a 
sounder autonomy in management of their own affairs are indeed needed, if these entities 
are to meet the requirements of their huge mandates. ―The new law which is being 
currently drafted will also help enhance the prospects of the MC by granting it financial 
autonomy via a separate budget that is independent of that of the governorate‖.356 This 
will arguably help improve the quality of services provided and ensure the swiftness of 
the decisions taken by the MC, as it will have the financial capacity to implement its 
executive mandates, regardless of the pending approval of the higher administrative 
entities. However, thus far, the government seems to be quite reluctant regarding this 
                                                 
355
 Ibid. 
356
Ibid; the new law referred to here is the new municipalities‘ law that was being drafted at the parliament. 
According to the newly suggested law, more financial autonomy and, generally, a wider scope of 
jurisdictions shall be granted to the MCs. However, the government was quite cautious that the law does 
not pass in the milieu of the parliament-It still has not until 2009-before ensuring that incumbent NDP 
loyalists and affiliates are instated in the leading authoritative positions in the municipalities, which was 
largely actualized in the 2007 municipal elections.        
 Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter V 
214 
 
empowerment, preferring to strengthen the MCs insofar as they fulfill the role prescribed 
to them as subordinate bodies working under the jurisdiction of the NDP.  
 
The 2008 MC Elections 
It is rather important to signal that what is probably viewed by Abdelfattah and 
other NDP members and cadres as an attempt towards empowering the MCs, could be 
very well perceived also as an attempt to consolidate the hegemony of the party over 
these local governing councils. A good case for the NDP‘s willingness to consolidate its 
grip over the MCs could be displayed in the 2007/2008 municipal elections. Abdelfattah 
thinks that, despite the appearance of some irregularities in these past MC elections, on 
aggregate, the atmosphere of the elections and the accompanying activities of the 
candidates were rather positive features of the interconnectedness of these candidates 
with their polities. Nevertheless, this viewpoint is not shared by all NDP affiliates in Misr 
Al Qadima. For Hannan Al Sa`idi,
357
 a prominent Misr Al Qadima NDP cadre, the 2008 
MC elections was a big failure for the NDP. ―I resigned from the Women‘s Committee, 
protesting the atrocities of these elections. The irregularities started from the time of 
registration of the candidates for the elections. Potential candidates wanting to register for 
the elections were faced by harsh interrogations from State Security agents in the 
government offices pertaining, and were consequently deterred from running for the 
elections‖.358 Although it was initially said that such a move was aimed against the MB 
                                                 
357
Hannan Al Saidi is the chairperson of the local Women‘s NDP Secretariat and the chairperson of the 
New Fostat NGO. The exemplar case of Hannan Al Sai‘di as an NDP cadre will be elaborated on 
extensively later in this chapter. 
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candidates, the truth is it deterred a lot of other candidates that had nothing to do with the 
MB from participating.  
Al Sai‘di argues that the policies of reform that seem to be championed by the 
NDP are actually collapsing as a result of such irregularities. 
The selection of candidates for those elections was tainted with favoritism. 
A lot of the faithful young NDP members representing the new wave of 
reform were either deterred or prevented from running for the elections. In 
Misr Al Qadima, almost 1000 out of the total 7000 NDP members in the 
area resigned in protest. Even party members are now disillusioned…On 
the street level, feelings of hatred and mistrust towards the NDP have 
increased. Empowered and working from within, there was a good case 
for someone like me to defend the NDP. But now, after the failures in 
these elections, I couldn‘t even defend the line of the party to the layman 
on the street.
359
 
 
It is noteworthy also to mention that 2011 shall witness the presidential elections, in 
which the parliament and the municipalities will play the biggest role in accordance with 
the 2005 constitutional amendments.
360
 According to these amendments, an independent 
presidential candidate is required to first secure nominations from, at least, 250 MPs and 
MC members before being eligible for running for the elections. It is therefore essential 
for the ruling party to ensure that it holds a very tight grip over these local councils, from 
which a plethora of votes could be very easily secured, in order to block the chances of an 
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Carnegie Endowment For International Peace. In 2005 President Mubarak introduced a constitutional 
amendment that instated that the President of the Republic should be elected by direct voting in which 
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However, the prerequisites put forward for a nominee to be eligible for presidential candidacy were, in 
reality, very hard to achieve if the candidate was not an NDP candidate. One of these conditions dictated 
that independent candidates (those that do not belong to the senior rankings of an already existing political 
party) have to secure the approval of 250 MPs and MC members. Provided the overwhelming majority of 
the NDP in these two entities -Currently 343 out of Egypt‘s 444 MPs are from the NDP and also, after the 
2008 MC elections, the majority of MC members all over the country come from the NDP- it will be 
virtually impossible for any candidate that is not supported by the NDP to proceed in the presidential 
elections. Other political parties were given an interim phase of 10 years, in which they could nominate 
senior-ranking party members for presidency, and after which they will have to at least secure a 3 percent 
membership in the Parliament as well as in the Shura Council in order to be able to nominate any of their 
members for presidency.    
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MB candidate running for presidency. By virtue of being an officially banned group, the 
MB‘s candidate will most likely be an independent.  
In line with Al Saidi‘s testimony, and as shall be displayed later in this chapter, it 
appears as if these acts of intimidation were predominantly aimed at those NDP cadres 
that were associated with the new-guard. As will be reviewed, evidence seems to suggest 
that the old-guard cadres of the NDP, in conjunction with the allied state-apparatuses, 
primarily the police, are attempting to consolidate the supposed process of ―reform‖ that 
was initiated by the new-guard. 
 
NDP notables in Misr Al Qadima  
Hajj Ahmed Najar: The ‘Classical’ Lesser Notable 
Hajj Ahmed Najar is the secretary of the district (shiyakha) of the NDP in `Ain Al 
Sirra. He runs a car accessories shop in the area as well as a small travel agency and his 
family has been residing there for several generations. He also operates the People‘s 
Services Office of the NDP. By and large, Najar could be considered as a lesser notability 
due to the respectable socioeconomic status he preserves, based on his profitable business 
and sound reputation as a family notable with strong ties with the members of his 
community. Najar has a limited educational background, for he has not finished his high 
school education, yet he has a sizable political role to fulfill as an NDP member and a 
close aide and adviser to the MPs and the MC members of the area. Since his childhood, 
he was interested in political action in this district. Dr. Shahin, the father of the current 
MP Dr. Ahmed Shahin, was basically the one who trained and encouraged Najar and a 
few other youngsters in the area as young cadres at the time to get involved in political 
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campaigning and networking among the people. ―The actual membership of the NDP 
came in 1990 when I became a member in the party unit. In 2008, I became the secretary 
of the district. I didn‘t actually look for the post but it was offered by the party. This post 
requires some free time throughout the year, and that‘s why I couldn‘t accept it earlier. 
When the time was suitable, I accepted it.‖361 Hajj Najar is widely perceived in the area 
as a man-of-good and a notable to be sought in dire situations. Some people in the 
neighborhood were not even certain of his political affiliation, yet stated that they are 
well-acquainted with him as a helpful and influential figure in `Ain Al Sirra, and that they 
are likely to approach him to resolve a dispute or facilitate a health or an administrative 
service with state authorities.
362
  
The NDP Services Office that is supervised by Najar undertakes all kinds of 
services possible to the people of the area. In addition to the usual health, educational, 
and social services, the office also acts as a linkage between the people and the MPs. 
Najar ensures that the requests of the people of the area are submitted to and followed up 
on by the parliamentarians. The social spectrum of the office is probably the most vivid 
sector of activities it provides, and it includes frequent services to the poor, the orphans, 
the unemployed…etc. Students that are incapable of paying their tuition, patients that 
cannot afford their treatment and the youngsters that are unemployed are among the 
various echelons of locals that Najar serves. For example, if a patient is incapable of 
affording the cost of the hospital that he/she is to receive the treatment in or the price of 
the medication pertaining, it is sometimes sufficient for such a patient to approach the 
office and his/her financial condition would be assessed by the respective social worker 
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in the office. More often than not, the verification-of-need process is quick and simple in 
order to ensure the swift treatment of the patient. If the case is assessed to be eligible for 
treatment in one of the NDP-sponsored health clinics in the area, the patient is then 
directed to the clinic with the needed expertise to treat him/her and, if not, the office 
liaises with the relevant state hospital that the patient could receive the treatment at.
363
  
Of course, such services are quite popular, given the relatively harsh economic 
conditions that the majority of the locals suffer from, however Najar assures that the 
office usually does its best not to turn down any request that it receives. Yet, logically 
speaking, it would be virtually impossible for the few services offices of the area to meet 
all the demands of the patients in need in an area like Misr Al Qadima and, consequently, 
the waiting lists of these offices are quite sizable. Some of the locals that have attempted 
to apply for the services of the office assert that, in order to be considered for such 
services in a timely fashion, one has to have some personal connection or relationship 
with a figure like Najar to facilitate the process. Others maintained that it is usually those 
that are, one way or another, associated with the official rankings of the NDP that would 
expectedly get some preferential treatment in the services‘ offices.364           
The funding of these aforementioned services mainly comes from the party itself 
along with the donations of some ―benevolent‖ notables in the area, according to Najar. 
The local MC also plays a role in this process, as it often facilitates the channeling of 
these donations to the families of the area on the ground. The current MC is quite active 
in this regard, and it is comprised of 10 NDP members, one Wafd and one Tagamoe` 
member. The Services Office has been instilled in the area since 2007 and there is 
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another office also across the street, run by Shahin Fouad, the current MP, and it 
orchestrates a plethora of similar services and activities
365
 
During the electoral processes, whether it is a parliamentarian or a municipal 
election, the role of a figure like Hajj Najar is quite pivotal: 
Being the secretary of the district, I have to take care of a lot of issues 
relating to the NDP in the parliamentary and the municipal elections. 
Being educated or high classed is not sufficient here…you have to be 
humble, helpful to the people, and subsequently you will be popular: loved 
and accepted by the locals. This helped me in actualizing the role I opt for 
as the secretary of the shiyakha, campaigning for the candidates of the 
NDP in the parliamentary and municipal elections. Gathering/securing 
votes is a tedious process that requires a lot of networks and not only 
resources. In other words, you could have the funds and resources needed, 
but lacking the information on how to channel them or who to give them 
to can turn these capacities to idle resources.
366
 
  
Najar also reckons that, throughout the past few years, the scope of services provided in 
the popular neighborhoods in the name of the NDP has increased considerably. He states 
that, overall, there has been some positive change in the way the NDP deals with the 
popular basis of the society. ―I think, on aggregate, the party is now more focused on 
actually ensuring that it gets through to those in need with the biggest amount of services 
possible.  Sometimes also the services that are being increasingly channeled to the people 
do not stem directly from the party itself but from businessmen and other figures that are 
affiliated with it.‖367  
The examples that Hajj Najar cites here are Dr. Ahmed Shahin and Hajj 
Abdelhamid Sha`ban, the current MPs who both, he thinks, pose a good case for 
benevolent businessmen that spend from their own pockets for the good of the people. 
Shahin is the chair of the Islamic Unity NGO and a board member in the charity 
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foundation of Al Nour Mosque.
368
 Yet what Hajj Najar refers to as mere benevolence is 
not exactly so. The social and financial services provided by those figures have played a 
crucial part in consolidating their socio-economic profile and their popularity in the area 
as men-of-good. This, in turn led to a sizable boost regarding their political prospects 
within the party and on the street, which surely increases their chances in dominating 
upcoming parliamentary elections. And as asserted prior in the first and second chapters 
of this research, for such figures being an MP is a predominantly symbiotic relationship, 
in which, in return for disbursing funds and resources within the patron-client network,  
the MP /businessman gets closer to the circles of power within state institutions.            
In the `Ain Al Sirra area, there have been more attempts to attract people via 
direct incentives: jobs, tuition fees, health services…etc. For quite sometime, the 
activities of the NDP were concentrated in the realm of recreational trips and seminars 
and that was by no means sufficient to counterbalance the wide array of services provided 
by the MB. The realization of the importance of popular support was also reflected in the 
criteria set by the leadership of the party in selecting the party candidates for the most 
recent (2007) municipal elections, for example. NDP Secretary of Organization, Ahmed 
Ezz
369
, decided that in order for the member to be eligible for the party nomination, 
he/she has to recruit a certain number of new members into the ranks of the party. This 
encouraged the cadres of the party to focus more on networking and campaigning on the 
                                                 
368
Ibid. Note the Islamic characterization of the charitable activity despite the affiliation of Dr. Shahin to 
the supposedly secular NDP. Sometimes this Islamic façade is portrayed in order to compete with and 
offset the counter-services provided by the MB as the representative of the Islamic activities. 
369
Ahmed Ezz, mentioned in several parts of this writing, is arguably Egypt‘s most powerful regime 
collaborator/supporter from within the community of mega-businessmen and a very close aide and friend of 
Gamal Mubarak. He is the NDP membership secretary and the chair of the Parliamentarian Budgetary 
Committee, and he is also one of the country‘s biggest industry tycoons; a virtual monopolizer of the steel 
industry through his mega-corporate, Ezz Steel.       
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popular level. The least number that was gathered was 100 new memberships; others got 
200 and 300 new memberships. This also helped bring in new and fresh faces to the 
forefront of the NDP, as they were more adamant on popular networking than some of 
the old cadres that were not involved in the affairs of the polity on the ground level. 
Several of the old faces fell in the elections in this district due to the lack of networking 
and popular appeal.
370
     
Hajj Najar also states that, on the street level, the popularity of the NDP is on the 
rise when compared to the MB or the other Islamists. However, this popularity could still 
vary from one street to another. The competition between the NDP and the MB is fierce 
and ongoing:  
I think we have been scoring more points of popularity in the area lately. 
Sometimes, there is no unitary logic that determines areas of power and 
influence of the NDP vs. the MB. Yet, on aggregate, the socioeconomic 
status of the area determines to a great deal where its allegiance is. We 
have the Sunnia mosque nearby and it‘s been used by some MB affiliated 
figures, but now there‘s a tight security hold on such venues and they are 
not operational. A few years ago they were, but there seems to be a security 
revival nowadays that was largely successful in halting the activities of 
their cadres. However, in some other areas they might be more active due 
to the socioeconomic context. In areas like `Ezbet Qarn, for instance, and 
due to the harsh conditions that people live in there, it is easier for the MB 
to gain more popularity. People there are mainly manual laborers and they 
suffer from rough living conditions, so it is easier for them to be polarized 
in the direction of either the MB or in the direction of drugs and 
crime...etc.
371
 
 
Still, Najar thinks, more needs to be done by the NDP, if it is to offset the aggregate 
supremacy that the MB and the other Islamists have achieved over it, throughout the past 
two decades or so, on the street level. More emphasis has to be put on services; people 
are in need and despite the relatively recent realization of the importance of popular 
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outreach on the part of the NDP, there is still a lack in some of the basic services. 
According to Hajj Najar, the bulk of those that get the support of the NDP are still 
minimal when compared to the proportion of those who are actually in need or those that 
are supported by the MB and the other Islamists. 
 
Exemplar cases of various categories of NDP-affiliated lesser notabilities: Hannan Al 
Sa`idi versus Abdelhamid Shehata 
In the milieu of the Misr Al Qadima polity, there is indeed a variety of sorts of 
lesser notabilities that are associated with the NDP. Among those NDP-affiliated 
notabilities, the socioeconomic, cultural and political backgrounds of the notables could 
be so different to the extent that it leads to conflicts erupting between such figures. As 
stated earlier, the lack of homogeneity within the NDP is rather apparent due to the 
absence of a clear ideology or platform, which leads to this largely chaotic and 
sometimes contradictory set of profiles for NDP leaders and members. The upcoming 
example, however, suggests that within this pool of different sorts of notabilities, certain 
notables are by far more influential and successful than others.        
Hannan Al Sa`idi is one of the most active operative cadres of the NDP in `Ain Al 
Sirra. Her family originally comes from Assiut in Upper Egypt, like a multitude of other 
families in Misr Al Qadima, but she was born and raised in `Ain Al Sirra and considers 
herself to be bent balad 
372
(daughter of the land), in reference to her strong affinity and 
belonging to the popular area. Al Sa`idi poses an interesting and rather rare example of 
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In chapters II and III, the terms ibn balad and bent balad were introduced and elaborated upon 
extensively. These terms bear a plethora of cultural and social connotations, predominantly emphasizing 
the moral goodness, helpfulness and supportive character of the people of a certain area or neighborhood, 
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political agency in the area, and perhaps in the entirety of the popular quarters of Cairo, 
where the political participation and leadership of females is considerably limited, 
especially in the milieu of official institutions: political parties, NGOs…etc. Al Sa`idi is 
the chairperson of the local Women‘s NDP Secretariat and the chairperson of the New 
Fostat NGO. In `Ain Al Sirra, she is widely perceived as a respectable and influential 
figure who is capable of extending support to the people of the area.
373
   
 
Picture 5.c: Headquarters of the New Fostat NGO 
        The main activities of the New Fostat NGO are quite diverse and include a variety 
of trainings and course offerings in interpersonal skills, political awareness and 
empowerment, in addition to vocational skills programs for the local inhabitants of the 
area. So far, more than a 1000 people have been involved in these various training 
programs. Misr Al Qadima suffers from a set of socioeconomic problems, most 
importantly according to Al Sa`idi, dropping-out of primary education (14,000 children 
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in the age of schooling according to recent estimates), child labor and unemployment.
374
 
One of the biggest achievements of the New Fostat was aiding the local skin tannery 
laborers of the area in lobbying against the relocation of their workshops out of Misr Al 
Qadima to Al Robiki area on the outskirts of Cairo; almost 50 kilometers away form their 
original location now. Prospectively, 22,000 workers and shop-owners are expected to 
suffer from the consequences of this relocation, which was authorized by the Ministry of 
Industry and the Industrial Chamber of Skin Tannery:  
Under the auspices of New Fostat, a multifaceted campaign was organized 
to freeze the process or, at best, ensure the best terms possible if this 
relocation is to take place. The tannery workshops had their own demands 
that had to be fulfilled…A media campaign was also organized to present 
the various dimensions of the issue to the public. The NGO organized the 
necessary networks with the media. A surprise visit to the designated area 
was also organized in the presence of the media and a meeting with the 
deputy minister of industry took place on the spot. Accordingly, some of 
the demands of the skin tannery workers were met; mainly exempting the 
workers from the cost of the new workshops.
375
  
 
Of course a lot of the demands of the skin-tannery industrial community have not been 
yet met and, hence, the New Fostat campaign against the relocation continues.  
The lack of proper commuting facilities and the inadequate design of the new 
workshops (characterized with an Italian architectural design that is unsuitable with the 
comparatively hot atmosphere of Cairo) were among some of these still unresolved 
issues. There were five major businessmen that were in control of the Industrial Chamber 
of Skin Tannery that stood for this inadequate relocation and they were consequently 
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 Interview with Hannan Al Sai‘di, March 6th, 2008. These abovementioned figures cited by Al Sai‘di 
were documented in fieldwork studies undertaken by New Fostat-affiliated researchers in the area of Misr 
Al Qadima 
375
Ibid; the decision, which was taken by the ministry and encouraged by the chamber, was to be 
implemented in 2007 upon completion of the newly designated areas, however that did not take place in 
due time because of abovementioned opposition. Had the Ministry of Industry insisted on the relocation 
taking place in spite of the will of the workers, a confrontation between the executive authorities -in this 
case the police apparatus which would be mandated with closing down and evacuating the old workplace- 
and the people of the area, would have expectedly erupted.  
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sacked from the board during elections, as a result. There was a lobbying process within 
the Chamber that succeeded in bringing other new faces to the board of the Chamber and 
New Fostat had a role to play in this scheme as well. The NGO worked with those skin-
tannery professionals eligible to vote, on their presentation and negotiations skills, and 
aided them in organizing their campaign inside the Chamber against those businessmen 
and board members that supported the relocation of the workshops.
376
  
Being an NDP member, Al Sa`idi states, did not necessarily make their case 
stronger. ―I do not think it was the NDP affiliation that made things happen in that 
campaign. It was perhaps the NGO itself that made the difference…The NGO is in itself 
independent of the NDP.‖ She also thinks that she would not allow her NGO to turn into 
an arm for the NDP, differentiating it from the other deficient examples of some NGOs 
that are merely subservient to the whims of some political or religious orders. Yet, she 
stresses that, although by law it is banned for there to be a role for the party in channeling 
resources to the local population through an NGO for political reasons, there still exists 
some functional ties between the NGO and the NDP. ―Nonetheless some networking 
exists between the NGO and some party members that happen to be helpful when it 
comes to obtaining some permissions or services from the relevant government 
authorities. Yet some politicians now do not respect this divide, and end up establishing 
NGOs to increase their popularity and attain political objectives.‖377   
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Ibid; In Misr Al Qadima, Mamdouh Mekky is often cited as an exemplar case of NGO manipulation for 
the benefit of the NDP. Mekky, who is one of the five big businessmen mentioned earlier, is a local notable 
and an NDP veteran who has established an NGO that aims at channeling a multitude of resources and 
services to the people of the area in the name of the NDP. Mekky has a virtually non-existent record of 
social work as he only recently (in 1999) entered the realm of social work, arguably aiming only at raising 
his political profile.  
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Al Sa`idi reckons that, contrary to the widespread conviction among the residents 
of the area that the NDP is rather inefficient regarding the problems that are faced by the 
populace, there is still a lot of good that can come out of the NDP in this area. ―The 
problems are huge and they require a plethora of policy alterations…We have been 
working on altering some laws. As an NGO we tried to establish conventions that 
gathered some of the locals and some parliamentarians to address some of the problems 
faced by the people and the means and ways by which they could be overcome via 
legislating new legal codes or altering others.‖ Some successes were met for instance in 
modifying the labor law to reduce child labor, which is quite predominant in the area. 
The new law is much stricter now, severely punishing work-owners which are accused of 
facilitating or allowing child labor in the workplace. Additionally, and in the aftermath of 
the recent successes of the MB in enhancing their popularity by providing direct services 
to the people, the NDP had to follow suit and similar ventures, including medical 
caravans that provide health services throughout the year to various segments of the 
society were put forward.
378
       
 
`Ain Al Sirra and Misr Al Qadima proper: sociopolitical differences and the role of 
immigrants 
One of the main sociopolitical differences between these two constituencies of the 
Misr Al Qadima district is the impact of immigration coming from Upper Egypt. As 
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 Ibid; the researcher has observed some of these NDP-sponsored medical caravans which constitute one 
of the primary tools of polishing up the image of the party in rural and low-income urban communities. 
These caravans, organized and funded by the party along with some major financial corporations working 
under the umbrella of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), usually provide the people with simple and 
on-site medical services, such as blood pressure and sugar-level measurement, swift treatments for flu and 
headache, and sometimes also a section for diagnosing the cases of patients with more chronic symptoms 
and providing them with the relevant recipes. 
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opposed to the relatively homogenous and stable population of Misr Al Qadima proper, 
`Ain Al Sirra is still characterized with a sizable population of immigrants, particularly 
from the Upper Egyptian governorates of Sohag, Assiut and Qena. These waves of 
immigration have been ongoing until relatively recently, with a plethora of second and 
third generation of immigrants currently residing in the area. A big portion of those Sa`idi 
(Upper Egyptian) immigrants are engaged in economic activities like operating small 
restaurants, kiosks and juice shops or opening up real estate contractor workshops that 
provide semi-skilled workers for constructional activities; painters, builders…etc. These 
Sa`idi people indeed constitute a lively reservoir for the lesser notabilities that this 
research is concerned with. In addition to the extended family/clan aspect that sometimes 
characterizes the biases and political decisions of this immigrant population, there is also 
a dimension of regional solidarity, whereby the people of Sohag are expected to unite 
together in the face of those that come from other provinces and so forth. In the local 
polity, one finds that, within the six local Party Units which are composed of 10 members 
each, there is a lot of alliances and coordination taking place between some members 
based on this aspect of regional solidarity, mostly in the `Ain Al Sirra NDP Party Units. 
Yet one also finds that some of the NDP figures that trace their roots back to Upper 
Egypt, and who have been based and operational in `Ain Al Sirra for several generations, 
play vital roles in the local politics of the Misr Al Qadima district regardless of their 
regional or clan solidarities
379
. 
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Big Families…Enter the Notables 
 
There is a sizable role that is being played by the big families and notables in the 
polity of Misr Al Qadima. As it was the case with the areas of influence of the notables 
associated with the ISIs introduced in the previous chapter in the case of the MB, the 
areas of influence of the big families and notables affiliated with the NDP are most 
apparent in arenas such as, electoral competitions, mediation and conflict resolution 
between the inhabitants of the area, and in channeling resources and services to the 
populace. In this regard also, the Sa’idi (Upper Egyptian) families and clans stand out due 
to the dominance of the socio-cultural norms that place a great importance on the value of 
familial and clan bonding and cohesion among them.  
They have a very important role in elections. Magdy Allam (The NDP 
MP), for instance, depended on the support of the big families of Fom Al 
Khalij area, who simply vote in groups, often according to the 
recommendations of the big family notables. Some of the big leaders of 
certain areas have a certain price in accordance with the amount of votes 
they can secure. For example, a certain big name could guarantee that 
1000 votes (his following) would go in a certain direction if he was bought 
out by a certain price, say a 100,000 LE. Another could guarantee 2000 
votes and would, consequently, cost more…etc. Some of the big names in 
the Masr Qadima area include: Fathy Galid, the Abu Al Seoud 
family…etc. 380    
 
Regional alliances also play a role in the political decisions taken by the notables. For 
example, Assiut and Sohag are the two biggest governorates that are represented by 
respective immigrants. Some of the meaningful figures from each region would establish 
their own NGOs to ensure providing the necessary services, predominantly to their 
respective incumbent locals. More often that not, regional alliances play an important role 
in determining the direction of votes as well.
381
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Expectedly, if the notables of Assiut decide that their votes would be directed to a 
certain candidate, it becomes an issue of regional solidarity in the face of those of Sohag, 
and vice versa.
382
 Of course these regional solidarities are consolidated and further 
enhanced on the basis of mutual benefit. Again, revisiting the patron-client model 
introduced in chapters I and II, the clan leaders and sub-leaders here act as the patrons 
and sub-patrons of their communities and it is the disbursement of the resources 
vertically and horizontally that strengthens the loyalty of the client (clan 
member/voter…etc.) to the respective patron. 
 
Example of an NDP-affiliated lesser notability: Abdelhamid Shehata  
 
Abdelhamid Shehata is yet another example of lesser notability in Misr Al 
Qadima. He was a construction worker and, over the years, accumulated a considerable 
sum of savings that enabled him to become a real-estate contractor and 
construction/pebble factory owner.
383
 Gradually, he built a good repute for himself in the 
area as a benevolent societal leader and started establishing good contacts with the police 
and other state authorities. More than once, he has intervened with the local state 
authorities to resolve conflicts erupting between locals and has often helped in getting 
some people out of jail.
384
 He is also a semsar (election trader); he would first register for 
the elections, knowing quite well that he will not win, and then other candidates would 
start approaching him in order for him to withdraw and ensure that the votes that he 
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 The rise of Shehata is not very typical yet possible. In the post-infitah period, there were a lot of similar 
cases that witnessed the rise of a construction worker or a builder to prominence, thanks to the relatively 
high profitability resulting in from investing in the constructional activities in the post-Infitah era in 
general, especially if it was in the trendy constructional neighborhoods that flourished in that period. 
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controls go for them. Shehata has earned a reputation among the people originating from 
Assiut that he is the problem-solver and the dispenser of resources and services to the 
simple workers and other similar societal segments in the area. He controls an average of 
3,500 votes in Misr Al Qadima and Dar Essalam and there is usually an announced price 
for this bulk of votes. According to several respondents, the price of Shehata‘s votes is 
tentatively 250,000 LE. This sum of money is usually divided between Shehata and the 
voters that he controls.
385
  
However, sometimes, there could be a conflict between the regional alliance and 
the financial agreement. Depending upon the solidarity of the Assiutis of the area, 
sometimes figures like Shehata would direct the votes for the benefit of a candidate that 
is from Assiut instead of another that already paid the dues of these votes. Logically, such 
a scam would be almost impossible to discover, provided that it will be practically 
impossible to find out where those votes went exactly. When it came to the 2008 
municipal elections, Shehata‘s influence was so immense that his son was subsequently 
put on the lists of most candidates and eventually won a seat in the MC. In 2005, Taissir 
Mattar, the current Misr Al Qadima NDP MP, depended on his collaboration with 
Shehata for votes.
386
 
The tactics used by Shehata to enhance his repute and stature within the area vary. 
He could, for instance, spread rumors among the traditional cafes, which are quite 
popular in the relatively low-income communities such as Misr Al Qadima, enhancing 
his image of bravery and grandeur. Furthermore, he could utilize the strong ties with the 
police and make them arrest a few suspects and then appear as the hero of the day by 
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walking out of the police station a couple of days after with the briefly-imprisoned with 
him, again a display of power and influence in the neighborhood. He later joined the 
NDP as a member and helped make a good number of people also join the NDP.
387
 Some 
irregularities undertaken by Shehata could be overlooked by the authorities, in return for 
ensuring that the votes he controls would go for the candidate that is supported by the 
regime. For instance, the police apparatus is quite aware of the money that is paid to 
Shehata by certain candidates, but that could be overlooked provided that the votes would 
go for the candidate that is favored by the regime, usually the NDP candidate. For figures 
like Shehata, the relationship with the regime is a mutually beneficial one. For the police 
apparatus, Shehata fulfills a multitude of roles; sometimes as an informant on the 
activities that might be deemed threatening or unwelcomed by oppositional figures in the 
community, and sometimes as a dispenser of resources and services presented to the 
populace in the name of the NDP. He is also a popular and benevolent leader, whose 
appealing profile is, in a sense, an additive publicity tool for the NDP in the area. 
 
The 2007/2008 MC Elections Standoff 
Hannan Al Sa`idi‘s personal experience with the elections is somehow revealing. 
She was initially encouraged by various leaders within the party to apply for the internal 
preliminary elections within the NDP. However, the preliminaries were in fact a scam; 
more of a theatrical façade to ensure pivoting certain figures forward into the elections, 
and excluding others. Apparently, some powerful figures from the NDP of Misr Al 
Qadima considered Al Sa`idi as a threat and were adamant on preventing her from 
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advancing beyond the stage of the preliminaries. Violence was used against her 
campaigning crew, and the secretary of the NDP‘s local office, Diab Ramadan Abo 
Lebda, championed the scheme of preventing her from proceeding in her electoral 
campaign. Al Sa`idi‘s brother was attacked and injured by thugs that were allegedly, 
according to Al Sa`idi and members of her campaigning crew, linked to Abo Lebda and, 
although the case was reported by the police, no action was taken against the aggressors. 
Ultimately, Al Sa`idi withdrew her candidacy in the preliminaries, fearing for her security 
and her family‘s.388  
In fact the aforementioned Abo Lebda has a very strong relationship with Bakr 
Omar
389
, an MP from the Misr Al Qadima region, and there seemed to be a tacit 
agreement between them that figures like Al Sa`idi, who previously refused to be co-
opted by their clique, which also includes the previously mentioned popular NDP notable 
Abdelhamid Shehata, should not proceed in these elections. In the aftermath of the 
elections, Al Sa`idi resigned from her post at the Women‘s NDP Secretariat. Mofid 
Shehab, state minister for legal affairs, contacted her to try and make her change her 
mind, but she had decided. Later, the party denied the fact that it had received Al Sa`idi‘s 
and others‘ resignations, although massive collective resignations were submitted, but Al 
Sa`idi had kept a copy from the resignation memo she originally submitted. With the 
police on the side of those that almost violently forced her out of the elections and the 
party apparently incapable of supporting her case, Al Sa`idi had very little to do to levy 
the unjust situation that she was put in. The only thing she could do, as the MC elections 
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initiated, was to utilize the New Fostat NGO to monitor the elections and report the 
irregularities that were expected to take place during the elections.  
We, being those that were trained as a part of the Political Awareness 
Program, mostly simple people from the locals of the area, actually 
observed and monitored the elections. Out of sheer will, with no direct 
material benefits involved, those people, mostly young men and women, 
took part in observing the polling stations and monitoring the 
irregularities. In front each of the poll stations, we had an observer that 
monitored the timeframe of the operative times of the ballot boxes, the 
frequency of voters…etc. We were planning for a press conference to 
display the results of the report of the monitoring process but due to 
immense pressure from the police, we had to cancel it. The result, of 
course, was an immense amount of irregularities that were almost directed 
and manipulated by the strongmen of the area and the party to ensure the 
success of certain candidates.
390
 
 
Overall, the practices of the NDP along with the relevant state authorities involved in the 
electoral process show that there seems to be a tendency from the party to support certain 
figures that would maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with the regime. Those 
would be either some strongmen or powerful figures that have ties with the police and the 
big families…etc, or others that would simply listen to the orders of the party without 
critical thinking or discussion, or, preferably, both typologies.  
 As a matter of fact, over the past 30 years or so, the NDP has been adamant on co-
opting the popular figures that would enable the party to gain access to the populace in 
the low-income communities:  
Typically, such figures will have to, either belong to, or be in close touch 
with, the big families and clans of the areas within which they reign 
supreme, be it in the rural areas or the popular quarters within the urban 
areas. I come from Upper Egypt and usually the party leaders would go 
and look for the notables of the families and clans of the village or town 
and co-opt them to join the ranks of the NDP, particularly prior to the 
elections. During the Nasser years and afterwards the modern state/party 
regime was more or less shaped and made fit with the traditional 
society/polity of the rural and popular areas. This enabled the NDP to look 
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for and lure the traditional leadership of the family/clan/village…etc.391 
 
As will be suggested below, Al Sa`idi‘s case brings to the forefront some interesting 
observations regarding the dichotomy between the new-guard cadres versus the old-guard 
powerhouses of the party and the societal forces associated with them. 
 
Tensions and conflict within the NDP 
Within the NDP, there is a clear contradiction between the discourse of the party 
and the actions taken on the ground. The discourse of reform and democratization pivoted 
by the higher levels is transformed into alliances built with notable figures, regardless of 
the legitimacy of their activities, in order to secure votes and popularity on the street. 
Now, figures like Al Sa`idi and other likeminded NDP members have fallen out of the 
grace of some NDP and state circles after attempting to stand in the face of the popular 
notables and the police apparatus. As a result of lacking the power or the leverage to 
stand in opposition to the state-sponsored notabilities, these figures can not provide the 
people of the area with the same scale of services as they used to do before. For example, 
prior to this electoral dilemma, it was doable for someone like Al Sa`idi to get through to 
the relevant ministers and other figures of authority in the state system, but now it is 
almost possible for her to organize a press conference, let alone get through to one of the 
aforementioned figures within the state-system.  
Indeed people like Shehata and other figures like Bakr Omar and Yossry 
Bayoumy, who were both introduced in the previous chapter, in a sense, constitute a 
particular typology with their relatively profitable commercial activities and their socio-
cultural profile as big family notables with sound political networks. Subsequently, the 
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people of the area would seek such figures for conflict resolution and mediation due to 
their intermediary roles with the government. ―These are just a few examples and there 
are more of them on the lower levels. Those lesser people also help this clique of patrons 
accomplish their objectives by connecting them to the people on the street and, in return, 
gain protection from the thug activities exercised by people like Shehata and Abo Lebda 
and, at the same time, utilize the wide array of networks that such figures maintain with 
government offices and services‖.392  
In short, in the context of this lesser notability, financial resources and sound 
social and political networks within the community and the state-apparatus are now the 
main tools for political accession. For figures like Najar, Khaled Abdelfattah, and 
Abdelhamid Shehata, the previous attributions were obviously crucial for their political 
ascendance. For others, like Hannan Al Sa`idi, and despite her NDP affiliation, the lack 
of the right scope of networks within the community and the state apparatus, and even 
within the NDP itself, has apparently hindered her from actualizing her role as a notable, 
despite her successes in providing a multitude of services to the people of Misr Al 
Qadima via the New Fostat NGO, particularly to the skin-tannery community. And here a 
few question marks could also be raised regarding the role of the central authorities of the 
NDP and their role in pivoting certain NDP cadres at the expense of others. Importantly, 
the case of Al Sa`idi reflects that lacking the necessary linkages with the interconnected 
network of alliances that sometimes involve the old-guard patrons on the central level of 
the party, along with key-figures in state apparatuses, such as the police, and lesser 
notabilities like Shehata and Mattar, on the level of the lower echelons of the polity, 
would almost eventually deter the chances of someone like Al Sa`idi in elevating further 
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in the milieu of parliamentary or municipal elections. In the upcoming section, more light 
will be shed on the role played by lesser notabilities as intermediary sociopolitical agents. 
 
NDP patronage and clientelism in Misr Al Qadima: Intermediary sociopolitical 
roles of lesser notabilities   
  
This section aims at scrutinizing the role that the lesser notabilities play within the 
popular quarters as intermediary sociopolitical agents between the higher echelons of the 
NDP and the popular segments of the polity. In doing so, it also attempts to understand 
the advent of lesser notabilities and its potential impact on the prospects of the new-guard 
cadres of the NDP, within the popular polity.      
Iman Bibars: A counter example of the Lesser Notable? The female, well-educated 
Bibars and the collusion with the lesser notability 
Iman Bibars is the founder and chairperson of the Association for Development 
and Empowerment of Women (ADEW) NGO, which operates in Misr Al Qadima proper 
and `Ain Al Sirra. She initiated her social activism in the areas of Misr Al Qadima and 
Manial (the more affluent middle-class/bourgeois neighborhood adjacent to Misr Al 
Qadima where she was born and raised) in 1985, driven by the desire to help develop and 
empower the women of her district, as she says. She considered running for the 
parliamentary elections more than once in order to broaden the scope of services 
provided to the people of the area further, and has been a member in the NDP Policies 
Committee, the chief policymaking arm of the politburo of the party, since 2005.
393
 In a 
sense, Bibars represents a certain sort of notability in Misr Al Qadima, but it is by no 
means a lesser notability. With a PhD in Development Studies from the UK and a strong 
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functional relationship with people like Gamal Mubarak at the apex of the NDP, Bibars 
represents a sort of an elitist notability. Nonetheless, for someone like Bibars, in order to 
get through to the lower echelons of the Misr Al Qadima polity, strong alliances with 
lesser notabilities have to be in place to ensure the dissemination of resources and 
services to and among the populace of this popular neighborhood. In many senses, the 
interactions between such elitist notabilities at the zenith of the political hierarchy with 
the lesser notabilities help reveal how the Lesser Notables of a popular quarter like Misr 
Al Qadima play an essential role also in consolidating the sociopolitical profile of the 
NDP and the higher echelons of notables associated with it.          
Bibars says that there are mainly two categories of people that are involved in the 
social services sector (NGOs…etc) as well as in political action and mobilization. There 
are those that entered into the social services spectrum in order to enhance their political 
profile and gain political benefits via channeling services to the people, and there are 
those that were already involved in social work then got involved in the political process 
as a means to serve the people further.  
I think I belong to the latter category, which is by and large the minority. 
In 1984, I started my career in development by focusing on the popular 
quarters, which was a pioneering initiative as these areas where 
predominantly neglected on the level of the public discourse. ADEW was 
a pioneer in many senses, being secular, non-sectarian, 
development/women oriented NGO. Most of our social services were also 
novel at the time. For example, we were the first NGO to introduce 
projects of microcredit in the realm of the popular quarters…etc. More 
specifically, women were also at the core of our social services.
394
 
 
Bibars also claims that being in the NDP was not really a priority for her. ―I was mostly 
focused on the realm of the social rather than the political, but it seemed that the relative 
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success of the NGO on the popular level in the areas of Manial and Misr Al Qadima drew 
the attention of the NDP, especially with the new generation of Gamal Mubarak and his 
entourage, which is my generation.‖395  
In 2004 Bibars was approached by the NDP to join the ranks of the party and she 
agreed. At the time, she was actually convinced there was some positive change in the 
way the party was being operated. ―I went in with my own terms and I was pretty much 
able to say what I want in the ranks of the party even if it went against the whims of the 
members of the Policies Committee. I am not a militant and I‘ve always believed in the 
possibility of change from within the ranks of the system.‖396 Therefore joining the party 
gave Bibars an opportunity to lobby for the benefits of the people of the area; skin 
tannery laborers, street vendors, and the female heads of households were among those 
segments that she worked with closely.  
Bibars worked closely with several other NGOs and politicians with regard to 
issues such as the dilemma of the relocation of the skin tannery workshops, mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, where there was some scrutiny and coordination with people like 
Al Sa‘idi from New Fostat. With the street vendors, it was a funny story as there was a 
massive campaign that targeted their sheer presence on the street, coinciding with the 
presidential elections of 2005. As if the party was aiming at reducing its popularity on the 
street at the time of the elections, this governmental campaign was poorly timed and it 
even tackled those who had official licensing to practice their commercial activities on 
the street. ―I responded with organized mobilization of those people, in the form of 
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regular meetings and organizational charts of their tentative number and the scope of 
their activities, along with a media campaign that aimed at unfolding the brutality of the 
authorities in dealing with them. These efforts were partially fruitful in presenting their 
case to the public.‖397 A prospective solution that was suggested was to direct some of the 
microcredit activities of the ADEW NGO towards those people. The NGO initiated this 
scheme but then the preachers of some mosques got involved, fearing the cooptation of 
those segments by some NDP-affiliated entities like Bibars‘ NGO, and an alternative 
scheme of funding was provided to them by some MB-affiliated ISIs. Eventually, the 
scheme of funding provided by those ISIs was so massive that it simply overshadowed 
the efforts of Bibars.
398
 
 
The NDP Electoral Machine…Money Talks 
Magued Hammam is a lawyer and a professional elections campaign manager. He 
worked with various key NDP figures, including Bibars. Hammam is specialized in the 
elections business and was involved in the elections within the Lawyers Syndicate prior 
to pursuing his career in Misr Al Qadima. He was born and raised in the area and 
considers himself an original local of this constituency. Reflecting on the municipal and 
parliamentary elections in Cairo, Hammam assures that, nowadays, it is all about money. 
Votes have certain prices, and those candidates who can pay more are likely to win.
399
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The example of the 2005 elections was only a case in point, assuring that Shahinaz Al 
Naggar, the candidate who allegedly spent more than any other parliamentary candidate 
in this area, and perhaps in Cairo as a whole, channeling millions of pounds for this 
purpose, was, subsequently, capable of securing victory in the elections. The voters, who 
are, predominantly, poorly educated and suffer from severe economic conditions, are 
only limited to a short-term sighted approach that favors the direct material benefit at the 
time of the elections, but then they end up being deprived of any long-term services from 
their prospective MPs who had practically paid for their votes at the time of the elections 
and who are, in return, not expected to do anything further for them as MPs.
400
 
 
Patronage and clientelism in electoral campaigns 
In the milieu of electoral campaigns such as that of Bibars, Hammam reckons that 
the fact that the grassroots foundations are there, facilitates to a great deal the necessary 
publicity that has to be undergone on the popular level, polishing up the image of the 
candidate and portraying him/her as a benevolent community figure. For instance, Bibars 
had been already involved in the local polity of the area for several years as the 
chairperson of an NGO that was mainly concerned with empowering the women of the 
district, which made her the prime candidate for winning the elections in 2005. At first, 
Hammam and the campaigning crew tried stirring things for her, building on the already 
existing good repute she has in the area. Of course, the reputation in itself was 
insufficient and they had to channel resources and services to the constituency just like 
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the rest of the candidates, yet having this repute provided Hammam and his crew with a 
very good starting point. 
On the ground, there are several basic steps that had to be undertaken to organize 
a successful electoral campaign: 
First, we look at the districts (shiakhat) within the constituency. In our 
electoral circle (#22), there are five districts: Fom Al Khalig, Abol Seoud, 
Manial East, Manial West and Manial Al Roda. Then, in accordance with 
the dominant social and economic statuses of these districts, we start 
designing our plan. For starters, the relatively well-off areas are less 
important than the ones with harsher socio-economic conditions, as they 
don‘t have those potential voters who are willing to go through the hassle 
of voting in order to reap the benefits of voter clientelism. Conversely, 
those that reside within the less affluent areas are more willing to do so. In 
our electoral circle, therefore, more attention was given to the districts of 
Fom Al Khalig and Aboul Seoud as they clearly belonged to this 
category.
401
  
 
In such areas, all kinds of services had to be provided to the constituency at a certain time 
before the elections. Sometimes direct financial endowments have to be provided, 
granting the notables of the area the sufficient funds they expect in return for them 
directing the votes they control for the benefit of a certain candidate. These notables are 
almost four or five within every district, and the amount of money they take would have 
to be set in accordance with the number of votes they are expected to guarantee. The 
massive influence of those notables did not only stem from their economic status as the 
sizable merchants and commercial actors within the area, but it was also shaped by the 
positions they usually occupied as the heads of families residing within the area, mostly 
originating from Upper Egypt.
402
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Also in the milieu of an electoral campaign and on the lower level- that of the 
ordinary people (commoners) of the neighborhood – a wide array of supplies of goods 
and services have to be secured for the locals. Blankets, stoves, fridges, Ramadan food 
packages…etc, are usually distributed among the residents of the area in accordance with 
their respective needs. The simplest of procedures of verification-of-need have to be 
maintained to facilitate the ease of transfer of such goods and services, and, more often 
than not, a simple visit to the candidate‘s office or NGO is sufficient for a resident to get 
his/her demand fulfilled. Also, social services are quite important. In weddings and 
funerals, either the candidate him/herself or representatives on his/her behalf, depending 
of course on the status of the deceased or the newly wed and the stature of his/her family 
within the community, has to be present. The candidate or his representative will offer 
congratulations or condolences, and provide the family of the deceased or the newly wed 
with financial aid in order to help in the cost of the social congregation and the relevant 
commitments (the funeral, the wedding expenses…etc).403 In fact, in Misr Al Qadima and 
other popular communities, a few NDP cadres maintain the aforementioned activities in 
an ongoing relationship between them and the people of their constituencies, but the 
majority of them attempt to focus and intensify efforts in this realm mainly at election 
time.
404
  
Often, a candidate‘s NGO could also play a role in facilitating the process of 
getting through to the key-players on the popular level: 
The NGO serves as the basis and the inceptive point of most of our 
activities. The ―Natural Leaderships‖ (The cadres of the social work 
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within the NGO) usually have their networks of contacts within the 
various neighborhoods. We would gather with them and outline the main 
key-players in every district, and then capitalize upon that. The cafés also 
play a crucial role. Note that we are now in a cafeteria (Rahraha) in Al 
Roda…I must acquaint myself with the owner, the waiters…etc, and then 
also, through them, get to know more about those that frequent the place 
and their affiliations. This of course does not just happen automatically 
and I‘d have to dispense some resources to those working at the cafeteria 
as well.
405
 
 
In fact, this very same cafeteria served as the meeting point of the chief campaigners 
during a multitude of the campaigns that Hammam has worked with, including Bibars‘ 
campaign. 
Bibars had her own experience with the parliamentary elections in Misr Al 
Qadima, first in 2005 and then in 2007 in the supplementary elections. ―In 2005 Shahinaz 
Al Naggar won the elections simply because she spent the most among all candidates 
(more than 10 million LE.). In Misr Al Qadima and Manial, she was virtually an 
unknown face and, within the ranks of the party, she was definitely not wanted because 
she was an independent candidate, at the time of the elections, but only briefly as she 
joined the party after winning of course.‖406 But, importantly, the NDP was also 
somehow wary of Al Naggar as she was competing with Mamdouh Thabet Mekky, the 
strongman of the NDP in this locality. ―I think she simply won because she knew how to 
utilize her resources best and, above all, she was very successful in infiltrating the police 
and the state security administrations, which both play a crucial role in the electoral 
processes.‖ 407 In fact, as long as these state authorities succeed in blocking the Islamist 
candidates from winning, the higher ranks in the government and the party do not really 
care that much about who wins, as long as it is not an MB candidate. The tactics typically 
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employed by the security apparatuses to offset the chances of a certain candidate winning 
in the elections involve arresting the strongmen, usually the lesser notabilities, who 
support this candidate a few days prior to the elections. Indeed in 2005 they arrested the 
agents of Mekky and other candidates, but not those of Al Naggar.
408
 
In 2007 the NDP had to pick a new candidate to compete in the supplementary 
elections that were held to fill in the position of Al Naggar who had quit her post. With 
no other potential candidates in sight, it was only logical for Bibars to run as the nominee 
of the party. Surprisingly however, the party nominated Allam, who had no constituency 
or popular support whatsoever. All the indicators really did not stand on his side, 
nonetheless due to the will of Ahmed Ezz; he was chosen to represent the NDP in these 
elections, so Bibars subsequently decided to run as an independent candidate.
409
 ―There 
was sizable support from the people of the district and that came, I think, as a natural 
reaction to the scope of services provided by the ADEW NGO over the years and at the 
time of the elections as well. Thousands of school cases, educational funds, short and 
long-term loans, and home appliances…etc. were distributed among the people of the 
constituency by the cadres of our NGO.‖ Bibars admits to the fact that she spent a lot of 
money in her electoral campaign, sometimes utilizing the resources of the NGO, ―you 
have to spend a lot if you‘re entering the parliamentary elections in an environment like 
ours…But it was nowhere near to what someone like Shahinaz [Al Naggar] spent.‖410  
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Eventually, the will of the security apparatus, dictated by Ezz and his clique, 
prevailed and, thanks to an unprecedented scale of abrupt violence and coercion at the 
polling stations that virtually banned the majority of the people of Misr Al Qadima that 
were willing to vote from casting their votes, Allam eventually won the seat.
411
 
Apparently, and despite the successes that Bibars attained in the Misr Al Qadima district 
as a societal and political leaders, she was not yet capable of confronting the massive 
state and security apparatuses that were somewhat mobilized against her in accordance 
with the instructions of the regime‘s patron, Ezz. However, Bibars was still quite 
successful in infiltrating through to the lower/grassroots levels of the Misr Al Qadima 
polity, and perhaps tracing the hierarchy of networks that she utilized along the process 
can shed some light on the various strata of the Misr Al Qadima polity and the 
interactions that take place within the varying socioeconomic and political levels and 
classes in this area. In fact, tracing these alliances, as will be done below, shall reveal that 
lesser notabilities have a major role to play in the sociopolitical ascendance of figures like 
Bibars. 
The collusion of elitist and lesser notabilities: patron-client networks  
Madiha Ahmed could de described as a prime aide and consultant to several 
prominent NDP figures in Misr Al Qadima. She has been involved in the social services 
sector in Cairo‘s popular quarters for over 15 years. She has worked in ADEW for more 
than 10 years (1995-2006) and for a long time she was considered as one of Iman Bibars‘ 
closest aides. Madiha Ahmed has worked with Bibars as the Manshiyet Nasser
412
 resident 
representative of ADEW. Then, when Bibars decided to proceed further in the elections, 
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Ahmed was transferred to the Misr Al Qadima/Manial office. Her role was primarily to 
ensure the establishment of sound ties with the community and facilitate the proper 
channeling of the resources and services to the people of the area. This had to be also 
actualized via the recruitment of the cadres (leaderships) that could be beneficial in this 
scheme of networking. ―We started by enhancing the base of services provided to the 
Misr Al Qadima/Manial community via the NGO, then capitalized upon that to further 
advance the sociopolitical profile and repute of Iman Bibars‖.413 
In order to consolidate the stature of Bibars and such NDP leaders as the 
benevolent and philanthropic patrons of the Misr Al Qadima community, some linkage 
between the social services provided by their NGOs and their political roles as the leaders 
of the community has to be established. Initially, working within the milieu of ADEW 
allowed people like Ahmed to broaden their communication skills and raised their 
awareness of the hardships faced by the community and how to confront them. The prime 
social service provided by the ADEW NGO was short and medium-term loans. By 
investigating the case-studies of the people that were granted loans, Ahmed and her 
entourage worked with the people of the area closely and got to know a fair deal about 
the social and economic statuses of the people of the community and the areas in which 
they are most in need of assistance and support. Subsequently, when Bibars entered the 
political scene her repute was already well-established as the benevolent notable. By 
entering the political arena, Bibars was also capable of serving the community further by 
occupying an official role in the decision-making circles, mainly the NDP for this 
purpose. By and large, the ―Misr Al Qadima community is politicized and comparatively 
materialistic, which meant that the scope of services provided to it by the political patron 
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would not go unnoticed and would, to a large extent, determine the degree of popularity 
and appeal enjoyed by this political patron. Our district is mostly a poor one, which 
makes this mode of services of crucial importance for the people.‖414 
In the course of this patronage network, a wide array of services was provided to 
the people of the area:  
We would provide the people with pretty much anything that our budget 
could afford, depending on the financial resources allocated by the NGO 
or the patron him/herself. If you are to establish a reputation as the patron 
in a popular area like Misr Al Qadima, you have to meet the expectations 
of the locals. For example, when I was working with the NGOs that were 
primarily concerned with women‘s affairs, we used to get requests from 
the women of our district to obtain all kinds of things for them, ranging 
from stoves and ovens and all varieties of home appliances to educational 
loans, employment opportunities, and works of restoration and renovation 
in their homes. We were quite successful in meeting most of these 
demands, which, in the case of Bibars, added up to her credibility and 
popularity.
415
    
 
In addition to the acquisition of the resources and services endowed by the patrons to the 
respective clients, another crucial factor that also plays an important role in consolidating 
the sociopolitical prowess of such patrons is their interconnectedness with the 
intermediaries; the lesser notabilities that are likely to broaden their patron-client 
networks, ensuring the delivery and distribution of these services and resources among 
the populace.                 
Lesser Notables: Infiltrating through to them, features of their profile and their role in 
elections 
The notables here are mostly influential figures within the big families (clans) of 
the area. This area (Manial and Masr Al Qadima) has witnessed a massive overflow of 
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immigrants coming from Upper Egypt over the past three decades or so, and currently 
those that originally stem from the Misr Al Qadima/Manial, dating back to their 
grandfathers or older generations, are considered by those coming from Upper Egypt as 
Cairenes (Masarwa). This divide was indeed present and it affected to a great extent the 
way those extended families lobbied and voted in the elections. There is usually a severe 
competition over the votes of those big families between the candidates, because their 
votes come in bulk and they are more likely to vote than their Cairene counterparts, given 
their dire socio-economic statuses, and their need for the benefits reaped from partaking 
in the voting process.
416
 
The kbir el `ela (family notable) is capable of directing the votes due to his 
respectable status within the family and, accordingly, his community. The notable would 
take a certain amount of money in accordance with the number of votes he is expected to 
generate. These notables are generally involved with commercial activities; they are 
usually merchants and intermediaries of food supplies, cement, appliances…etc. Both the 
social and the economic factors combine to determine the degree of influence and power 
possessed by the notables. The financial aspect helps them elevate their status within their 
families and communities by dispensing the resources needed to the people of their 
family and community and also by pulling lots of strings with the state authorities. ―It is 
no secret to reveal that there is an immense amount of corruption and bribery going on 
within the various state authorities, including of course the security apparatus, and having 
the financial capabilities help create strong ties with the police.‖ On the other hand, the 
social aspect also help pivot the economic profile of the notable, boosting his reputation 
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as a respectable and a trustworthy merchant, and providing him with the networks needed 
to market his merchandise.
417
         
In recent years the state has started to realize the importance of co-opting those 
figures of lesser notability and the crucial roles they play in local politics:  
Look at the most recent municipal elections in 2008. The majority of those 
that were pushed forward by the NDP belonged to this category…Mostly 
illiterate or poorly educated local notables. They are the ones getting 
things done on the local/popular echelons, given their entrenchment within 
the community on the grassroots level, and their ability to capitalize upon 
the social networks they possess for the benefit of the party. For the 
popular kbir (notables) also, being in the MC is a great success that one 
should aspire for…It gives them social honor and prestige, and for 
someone with such a socio-economic profile, this is a very important 
achievement that can‘t be overlooked.418  
 
According to several NDP-affiliated respondents, the role of the lesser notabilities was 
also apparent in the 2007 supplementary elections that brought Allam to the parliament, 
where they somewhat succeeded in making a name for this virtually unknown figure in 
Misr Al Qadima over a relatively short period of time. 
 
Alliances and interactions between the lesser notabilities and the NDP patrons 
Hence, the lesser notabilities are indeed quite pivotal for the purpose of 
networking and gaining support on the grassroots level for NDP patrons like Bibars or 
Allam. Usually, different lesser notabilities are co-opted by different patrons, and the 
reasons why certain lesser notables collude with certain patrons vary from case to case. 
For instance, Hajj Gad Megahed
419
 collaborated with NDP tycoons, Mamdouh Thabet 
Mekky and Ragab Mawhoub. Perhaps Mawhoub had a stronger allegiance with him as 
                                                 
417
 Ibid 
418
 Ibid 
419Hajj Gad Megahed‘s profile was introduced earlier in Chapter IV; he is one of the most powerful lesser 
notabilities in Misr Al Qadima 
 Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter V 
250 
 
they both belong to same Sai’di (Upper Egyptian) province; Sohag. Bibars was relatively 
new to the area, when compared to these well-established old-guards of the NDP, who 
have implanted their networks of support for decades. Therefore, getting through to these 
lesser notables was like a dream for people like Ahmed or Hammam; as campaigners of 
parliamentary candidates. People like Megahed control and direct a lot of votes, and they 
have a certain pricing for that in accordance with the amount of votes they could direct 
for one MP candidate or another. Indeed, Ahmed cites that, in the course of Bibars‘ 
campaign for instance, the crew succeeded in reaching some of them and gathered with 
them, introducing their plan and program of action for the development of the area. But 
the soundness of their development profiles was not exactly what such notables would be 
interested in the most. It was rather, of course, the amount of resources that could be 
dispersed to them, as opposed to the other political actors in the community. ―Let alone 
the fact that our candidate was also a woman, which somehow affected the way such 
people, usually with very traditional perspectives on the role that should be played by 
women within the public sphere, received our campaign.‖420  
Despite the sound impact that Bibars and several other NDP patrons had on the 
popular level via the multitude of services that they provided, it was rather apparent also 
that, on the higher echelons of the NDP, they were not still as influential as the old-guard 
of the party, which is often more capable of entrenching through the state institutions: 
ministries, police apparatuses…etc. Yet, most of the new-guard patrons would still 
attempt to infiltrate those entities that are seemingly more supportive to the old-guard, 
such as the police stations or the NDP Party Units:  
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As intermediaries, we try to get through to these entities: sometimes 
through gifts of all sorts to the officers and policemen of the police station, 
and sometimes via offering funds to renovate or redecorate the 
headquarters of the station, and so forth. We also exerted a lot of effort in 
keeping our ties with the key-figures in the local Party Unit. But the 
problem was, more often than not, it was rather vague and difficult to 
pinpoint whether a certain person or office is on your side or not. They 
could accept the endowments and gifts that we provide pleasantly and help 
us out with some issues or permits when needed, but then comes the time 
of the elections and things get clearer.
421
  
 
Thus, in spite of the attempts made to win the police apparatus over, it has been almost a 
pattern that the police would firmly support the candidates associated with the NDP old-
guard clique.                                            
 
Lesser notabilities against Bibars in 2007 
Despite the fact that the state apparatus, spearheaded by Ezz, was not in favor of 
Bibars taking the parliamentary seat in accordance with the will of Al Naggar, there had 
to a certain façade to cover up for the process. In the elections, an unprecedented degree 
of forgery and manipulation was maintained to block any potential votes from getting 
through to Bibars. This electoral district has an estimate of 120,000 registered votes and 
typically only 20,000 to 25,000 out of those, end up voting. This time around the 
opposing candidate, Magdy Allam, won the elections with 14,000 votes. This was 
practically unreasonable, given that throughout the history of the district, the average 
number of votes that went for the winner was always between 4000-5000 votes.
422
 The 
police did everything possible to prevent anyone from voting in the first place, knowing 
that the votes will be most likely not in the favor of their preferable candidate. The 
notables of the area, mainly co-opted by the old-guard cadres of the NDP, were also 
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pivotal in this scheme. They helped spread negative rumors against Bibars among the 
populace, and, utilizing their influence, discouraged a lot of people from voting for her. 
Also, Allam himself (The victor MP) was quite successful in getting through to the 
notables as well with the help of the NDP Party Unit, and certain promises were given 
regarding positions in the local MCs for the notables that would support him. This was in 
fact actualized in the 2008 municipal elections which, as mentioned earlier, brought 
forward a good number of the old guard-affiliated lesser notabilities as members of the 
local MC.
423
  
 
The NDP and notabilities of minorities: The females and the Copts: A success story 
for lesser notability in Misr Al Qadima? 
The state apparatuses and the Copts post 1952 
As displayed in previous sections of this chapter, it is rather safe to assume that, at 
various junctures, the NDP has been keen on utilizing different kinds of notabilities to 
serve the best interest of the party within the popular quarters. A question of relevance 
here would be; to what extent has the NDP utilized certain lesser notabilities to increase 
its popularity and infiltrate through the minorities‘ communities in Egypt? Namely, 
minorities such as the Copts (Ethnic Egyptian Christians) and, to an extent also, the 
female population of Egypt, which could also be considered as conceptual minority, 
albeit not necessarily a numerical one, have always been on the agenda of the higher 
echelons of the party, one way or another, and the aim here is to shed some light on the 
practicalities of these proclaimed NDP policies. But first we have to clarify where the 
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NDP stands from the Coptic issue in the first place and whether there is a particular clear-
cut policy or strategy that the party is following in this regard. 
Some analysts view that the Coptic dilemma within the Egyptian state had its 
roots in the post 1952 phase. The initial features of this dilemma and potential 
discrimination were the establishment of state-sponsored media outlets, as the Holy 
Quran Radio Station in the 1960s. Then the alteration of Al Azhar from a sheer religious 
institution into an all encompassing religious/secular educational institution that also 
endorses natural and social sciences education, producing – supposedly - civic 
professionals in the various walks of life, yet with a rigid Islamic background, was 
another cornerstone in the policies of the state at the time. Such policies sponsored by the 
state were not paralleled with similar initiatives towards Copts. The cooptation of Egypt‘s 
largest Islamic institution, Al Azhar, along with the state sponsorship of a wide variety of 
media and cultural ventures and venues that were by default exclusively Islamic, meant 
that the state was clearly more biased towards its Muslim population and against the 
Copts.
424
  
Of course, these were just preliminary features of state biases, but then with the 
robust ascent of political Islamism in the Sadat phase, the Coptic dilemma took a new 
turn and, at least initially when the Sadat regime was sympathetic with and sometimes 
supportive of the Islamists as a potential political counterbalance to secular opposition, 
the insecurities and estrangement of sizable segments of the Coptic population were 
rather solidified. Throughout most of the Mubarak phase (1981-present), the status quo of 
the Copts has been more or less stagnant. President Hosni Mubarak has ensured, 
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however, to keep strong ties with the Coptic religious institution, represented by the 
Alexandrian Patriarchy. Pope Shenouda III is widely perceived as an independent and 
integral yet regime-friendly figure of religious authority.
425
  
 
The NDP and the Copts    
Today, on aggregate, for the majority of the Coptic population of Egypt, The NDP 
might seem as the best political option available, in terms of a ruling party. When 
compared to the biases inherent within the political platform of the MB against the Copts, 
the seemingly loose, yet predominantly secular agenda of the NDP, makes it the only 
viable politically organized entity with no discrimination agendas against Copts, 
women...etc. However, it could be still argued that the Coptic issue is not on top of the 
list of priorities of the NDP.
426
 With regard to the particular benefits that the Copts have 
reaped throughout the reign of the NDP, Youssef Sidhom, Coptic activist and journalist, 
says, ―Not much. Perhaps the National Council for Human Rights could be cited as a 
success, where it, despite being an offshoot of the ruling party, outlined a few of the 
atrocities practiced against minorities by some state institutions, particularly by the 
security apparatus. The NDP is potentially capable of empowering the Coptic population 
further but, thus far, it hasn‘t pursued a robust agenda or a clear-cut policy that empowers 
the Copts‖427.  
Indeed the reasons for the NDP not proceeding further with Coptic empowerment 
vary. Sometimes it is to appease the Islamists by showing its apathy towards the Coptic 
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demands, and in some other contexts it is to withhold some of the benefits that could be 
given to the Copts in order to play stick-and-carrot with the Coptic population and utilize 
these benefits as potential incentives and privileges to be endowed by the regime upon 
the Copts, when needed. An example of this is the Unified Law for Places of Worship, 
which grants the Copts equal rights of building churches as the Muslims who can much 
more easily secure permits for constructing mosques, pretty much anywhere possible. 
Such permits are hardly given to Copts, and the whole issue of building new churches has 
been exposed to some severe restrictions imposed by the state, almost since 1952. The 
draft of this aforementioned law has been proposed for over 30 years now and it could 
have been easily passed by the NDP majority in the parliament if it was willing to pursue 
the issue, yet this has not taken place until today
428
. 
 
The NDP and the political participation/representation of Copts 
Arguably, one of the main disparities existent concerning the status of the Copts 
in Egypt relates to the spectrum of their political participation and representation. Despite 
the fact that Copts constitute almost 9 percent of the total population of Egypt, this was 
by no means reflected in the number of Christian candidates running in the parliamentary 
elections held over the past decade or so. In the 1995, 2000, and 2005 parliamentary 
elections, Christians constituted 1.4, 1.8, and 1.5 percent of the total candidates 
respectively. Apparently, these ratios do not reflect the actual portion they represent 
within the Egyptian society.
429
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It is yet to be verified whether Gamal Mubarak and his new-guard NDP faction 
are willing to or capable of altering this stagnancy which has characterized the approach 
of the NDP towards the Coptic population, ―There is a grey zone where we can not 
foresee the future when we look at these businessmen and the neoliberal policies that are 
being currently adopted by the state. The most recent municipal elections were a 
disappointment. The slogans of minority empowerment championed by the NDP were 
not exercised whatsoever.‖430 In fact a few years ago, with the ascent of the new-guard 
group within the NDP, there seemed to be a growing tendency among Copts to join the 
ranks of the NDP- more in the rural areas and the out-of-Cairo governorates than in Cairo 
itself- yet the result was a severe blow to the aspirations of those newly recruited 
members. Indeed a lot of Copts and women were banned from running in the 2007/2008 
municipal elections, whether as independent candidates or as NDP affiliates, in favor of 
other figures that were desired by the party. Such figures were chosen by the party 
because they were considered more trustworthy than the newcomers, which meant that 
they were more reliable in terms of executing the policies that the NDP mandates.
431
  
There are instances however where local political figures succeeded in utilizing 
the NDP to attain benefits for the Coptic population within low-income popular 
communities. Youssef Boutros Ghali, currently Egypt‘s finance minister, is one of these 
examples. Ghali is by no means a lesser notability as he comes from a very affluent and 
politically powerful Coptic family-his uncle is the UN‘s Former Secretary General 
Boutros Ghali- yet as an NDP member, he served his locality in the popular district of 
Shobra very well. Due to his status and closeness to the decision-making circles, namely 
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President Hosni Mubarak himself, Ghali enjoyed a privileged position in the realm of the 
NDP. In Shobra, he secured a lot of services to the locality. This was actualized via 
providing job opportunities for the people of the area in the Ministry of Finance and other 
ministries, building new schools and establishing public parks and other recreational 
facilities in the district. 
432
 
 
Coptic lesser notabilities in Misr Al Qadima         
  As displayed earlier, the NDP is, in many senses, an extension of the single party 
establishments that came into being post 1952. On the grassroots level, those in charge of 
the local Party Units or within the MCs were either the exact same faces or the sons of 
those that held the leading positions in the ASU in the 1960s. It is in this light that the 
party has dealt with the Coptic leaderships on the popular level, in order to guarantee 
their loyalty to the regime. In Misr Al Qadima, one finds that there are a few Coptic 
families who have been involved with the NDP since the days of its ASU predecessor. 
For example, Mehanna Al Sohagy is the son of Habib Al Sohagy, a previous ASU/NDP 
notable/MC member. Mehanna is currently a MC member as well.
433
  
Another example of a Coptic Lesser Notable is Khaled Abdelmalak who 
represents a good case for the marriage between business and politics. Like many other 
examples of middle-level businessmen that aspire to ally with the NDP to enhance their 
business prospects, Abdelmalak probably entered the party with the hope that such entry 
will elevate his business profile, being a middle-ranking businessman in the area. His 
NGO, Amal Society, provides services to the people on non-sectarian basis. Social 
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services, vocational trainings, and employment opportunities are amongst some of the 
benefits that are channeled by Abdelmalak to the people. Subsequently, he succeeded in 
developing a very good repute for himself in the area and won a seat in the 2008 MC as 
an NDP candidate. Abdelmalak is in fact the only Copt in Misr Al Qadima‘s MC today, 
and reckons that, had not it been for the NDP support that he had in his electoral 
campaign and the wide scope of social services and activities that he orchestrates in the 
area, he would not have made it through to the MC. This is attributed to the animosity 
and sometimes anti-campaigning practiced against him by some powerful political 
Islamists in the community.
434
 
 
Female lesser notabilities of Misr Al Qadima…Jamilla Abdelmajid: A success story? 
 In the course of this chapter there were a few examples of NDP-associated female 
notabilities that have played a multitude of sociopolitical roles in the polity of Misr Al 
Qadima, including figures like Bibars and Al Sa`idi. Whereas the former did not really 
belong to the category of lesser notability, the latter, despite having the socioeconomic 
and political features that fit the lesser notable profile, was largely unsuccessful in 
competing with other lesser notabilities in the area due to a plethora of factors, elaborated 
upon earlier. The case of Jamilla Abdelmajid poses, however, an example of a female 
lesser notability who was, by and large, successful in cultivating an entrenched web of 
social and political networks within Misr Al Qadima, subsequently succeeding in 
becoming one of the most influential NDP figures on the popular level in the area, and 
winning herself a seat in the 2008 MC as well. Abdelmajid comes from a relatively 
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humble working-class background; her mother was a housewife who did not work out of 
the house and her father was a laborer in a local factory. Both of her parents were 
illiterate, and in fact Abdelmajid herself can barely read and write Arabic. However, 
Abdelmajid attests that, despite the simple background of her parents, they were still 
ardent believers in the Nasserite project of Arab Socialism. Abdelmajid is a full-time 
politician; she is a member of the NDP‘s local Women‘s Secretariat and takes pride in the 
fact that her main source of income comes from the allocations she obtains from the NDP 
Party Unit and the local MC, as this means that she makes a living out of the thing she 
treasures the most, which is ―serving her people‖435.          
The scope of activities of Abdelmajid with the NDP is quite rich. The primary 
post she holds within the party is her membership in the Women‘s Secretariat:  
One of the main duties of the Secretariat is to get specialized aid to women 
in all walks of life on the level of the governorate. Female doctors, 
lawyers…etc. are responsible for raising awareness among the women of 
the area. In the most recent municipal elections, political awareness had to 
be raised among the citizens of `Ain Al Sirra and Misr Al Qadima proper. 
Women voters and candidates were trained to know more about their 
rights and duties in the electoral process. In September of every year, the 
annual plan of the party is put and we start our activities accordingly. 
Educational services, illiteracy workshops, small and medium sized health 
clinics, vocational training courses and small and medium loans are 
among the main services that we provide to our community members. 
These issues constitute the main pillars of attention for this party 
committee and it is done in partnership with a variety of local NGOs and 
businessmen.
436
    
 
An example of such aforementioned NGOs is the Mekky NGO, run by NDP 
strongman/businessman Mamdouh Mekky. Such organizations are sometimes also 
utilized by various lesser NDP figures, other than its owner or founder, in accordance 
with the alliances and networks that such lesser NDP figures maintain with those big 
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NDP names. For the most part, Abdelmajid has been quite successful in sustaining a 
relatively sizable web of networks with the key NDP figures in the area, in addition also 
to strong ties with relevant state institutions; such as government ministries, security 
apparatuses…etc., which has subsequently facilitated her tasks as a local notability and 
an MC member.     
Abdelmajid states that the success story that she is most proud of in the course of 
her sociopolitical activities is her ―fruitful efforts in negotiating on behalf of 200 workers 
of the Electricity Holding Company to get their jobs back after being sacked and given a 
minimal amount of money for retirement that could have only met their living expenses 
for a couple of months.‖ Within less than a week, she got the demands of those workers 
met and secured their jobs back. Abdelmajid was successful in lobbying with the relevant 
ministries and drafted formal memos to the State Security, the Prime Minister, and the 
Presidency. She said that the intense level of her involvement in the issue could have 
reached the degree of antagonizing the people higher up in the company to take some 
action against her, possibly threatening her or her family with harm if she does not 
withhold her efforts in the case, yet Abdelmajid said she was not really afraid as it was a 
very worthy venture as she thought. ―Those people were very simple workers mostly and 
they were in very dire need…Getting these jobs back had to be accomplished. Ultimately, 
the company agreed to return them to their jobs with better terms.‖437  
Such incidents reveal that, as a lesser notability, Abdelmajid was more successful 
in attaining her objectives as an MC member and an influential NDP cadre, than, for 
example, Al Sa`idi, in spite of Al Sa`idi‘s seniority over her in the ranks of the NDP 
Women‘s Committee. The causes of these different degrees of success relate, 
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 Ibid 
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importantly, to the kind of alliances and networks that the lesser notability cultivates 
within his/her neighborhood and also the kind of opposition that he/she might face from 
lesser or other notabilities that are higher up in the party. As opposed to Abdelmajid, Al 
Sa`idi was not fortunate on both accounts as she was clearly unable of securing the 
needed networks and alliances that would enable her of infiltrating such state institutions 
as the government ministries or the police apparatus, and, at the same time, she was also 
faced with fierce competition/opposition form another very powerful NDP notable, 
Abdelhamid Shehata.  
 
Conclusions: Patronage politics and the cooptation of the Lesser Notables: The 
prospects of the NDP in Cairo’s popular quarters 
 
The central party vis-à-vis the local Party Units and the power structures within the 
NDP 
On aggregate, the local NDP Party Units are supposed to operate under the close 
scrutiny and guidance of the central authority of the party. However, it seems that the 
old-guard faction is more influential than the new-guard reformists in the ranks of these 
local units. As mentioned in the writing, on the central level, most of the NDP figures 
that have access to/knowledge of the ins and outs of the Party Units and the district-level 
operations happen to be old-guard sympathizers. The degree of autonomy of the local 
councils over their own affairs is quite limited, with the decisions regarding the financial 
allocations and administrative affairs of the MCs typically stemming from the central 
party. Additionally, virtually monopolizing the arena of issuing authorizations and 
permits for a wide variety of the everyday activities of the locals, the MCs could also be 
considered as the powerhouses that enable the NDP to exercise its power upon the 
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populace via bestowing certain advantages upon some individuals or groups.  This turns 
the MCs into venues for rent-seeking activities undertaken by NDP officials and 
politicians. Such rent-seeking behavior often means that permits and authorizations 
would be issued at a certain price or in return for political allegiance and support during 
elections, for instance.   
With the advent of Gamal Mubarak‘s new-guard, the local councils have been the 
prime target of the cooptation of the NDP. The main power structure that seems to be 
characterizing the ranks of the NDP today is this old-guard/new-guard dichotomy that 
exists between the reformist faction of Gamal Mubarak on one side and the old-guard 
cadres that have been in virtual domination over the party ever since its inception in 1976 
and even prior - for some of those old cadres have also been involved in the other state-
sponsored political organizations that preceded the NDP; the ASU…etc. - on the other. 
Within the ranks of the central party, the power struggle between these two forces is a 
happening reality. The new-guard is in control of the Policies Committee, chaired by 
Gamal Mubarak and responsible for outlining the politico-economic policies of the party 
and the different ministries on the macro-level. On the other hand, the old-guard faction 
is guided by a few key figures on the central level, and those figures, such as Safwat 
Sharif, the general secretary and Kamal Al Shazly the Organization Secretary, also hold 
multiple prime positions in the various central secretariats.  
There is no unitary logic that would suggest that the old-guard cadres are always 
dominant on the local level whereas, on the central level, the new-guard is always more 
powerful. Tensions and competitions between these two main lines within the party do 
exist on various levels and also with regard to the interest groups that are linked to them, 
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i.e. in the realm of the business community. Yet, this research shows that it is rather safe 
to assume that, more often than not, the old-guard are more capable of influencing local 
politics than the new-guard. The reformist/new-guard interests and forces are not 
necessarily weak in Misr Al Qadima although some of the new-guard associated cadres 
did not actually succeed on the popular level. For example, interest groups, such as major 
businessmen and figures like Ahmed Ezz, have a strong say in the affairs of the polity 
however, again, the power structure/struggle that evolves, pretty much on case-by-case 
basis, is the main determinant that shapes the outcome of such potential tensions between 
various interest groups and key figures. In the case of Ezz, he succeeded in attaining his 
objectives concerning the elections, due to his prime position in the party and the 
extensive networks he maintains with the various state-institutions, such as the police 
apparatus. On the other hand, the sizable power that a figure like Ezz enjoys is not 
matched, for instance, by the other businessmen that were involved with the skin tannery 
factories, who were faced with strong oppositions when it came to the relocation of the 
skin tannery workshops.  
This study reveals that, in the milieu of Misr Al Qadima and the other popular 
communities of Cairo, the lesser notabilities do not seem to harbor a particular preference 
for a certain NDP faction over the other. Lesser notabilities are nonetheless expected to 
cooperate and ally with those NDP figures that acknowledge their role as popular 
notables in the low-income communities, and, more often than not, those NDP cadres 
happen to be the old-guard affiliated cadres. As displayed in the cases of Bibars and Al 
Sa`idi in Misr Al Qadima, and in other cases all over Cairo as well, like in the case of 
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Hossam Badrawy, the prominent new-guard NDP cadre in the Qasr Al Nil district
438
, the 
new-guard associated cadres who were unsuccessful in the 2005 parliamentary elections 
were, by and large, incapable of consolidating the scope of socioeconomic and political 
networks maintained by their old-guard affiliated counterparts. Despite the general 
tendency of most of the NDP-affiliated cadres to cooperate and ally with lesser 
notabilities, in some instances some new-guard figures would refuse to give weight to the 
role of lesser notabilities and other sociopolitical actors and would deliberately attempt to 
orchestrate their campaigns without allying with the popular notables of the 
community.
439
 
 
 
The NDP’s symbiotic relationship with lesser notabilities 
 
 As displayed in this chapter, ever since its inception as the state‘s ruling party in 
1976, the NDP has been suffering from a severe detachment with the necessary 
popular/grassroots bases that would prospectively solidify its position in the popular 
polity vis-à-vis other political forces, particularly the MB and its affiliated ISIs. Hence, in 
order for it to establish and further consolidate its stature as a viable political actor in 
Cairo‘s popular quarters, the NDP has been adamant on utilizing the lesser notabilities, 
which have been thriving in these areas as influential sociopolitical figures for over three 
                                                 
438
 Interviews with Hisham Khalil and NDP cadres, May-June 2008. In 2005 the parliamentary seat in this 
district went to Hisham Khalil, whose ascent to the parliament poses an interesting case. He succeeded in 
winning his seat against Hossam Badrawy, one of the NDP‘s most powerful figures and a very close aide 
and consultant to Gamal Mubarak. Khalil was in fact supported by the old-guard figures of the NDP such 
as Kamal Shazly, who, in Qasr Al Nil as well as in a multitude of electoral circles all over Egypt, including 
Misr Al Qadima, were not fond of the idea of having the new-guard figures associated with Gamal 
Mubarak rise to prominence in the parliament. 
439
 Interviews with NDP cadres, Cairo, June-July 2008; in fact some NDP members cited that, in the light 
of the reformist approach taken by the new-guard, the phenomenon of lesser notabilities was perceived by 
some of the new-guard cadres as a manifestation of corruption and illegitimate political practice that had to 
be eradicated. 
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decades or so, especially since the adoption of the Open Door policies in the Sadat phase. 
In Misr Al Qadima as well as in a multitude of other popular quarters in Cairo and 
elsewhere in Egypt, the MCs have served as a prime locale for creating the necessary 
alliances with those lesser notabilities, which now constitute the majority of the MC 
members and administrators, especially in the post-2005 phase which witnessed a surge 
in the attention given by the NDP to the MCs.  This cooptation of lesser notabilities has 
ensured their loyalty to the ruling party, and guaranteed the NDP a venue that would, 
with relative ease, administer the affairs of the popular quarter in line with the guidelines 
of the NDP. At the same time, the MCs also provide the ruling party with an excellent 
setting for distributing resources and services among the populace of the popular 
quarters. 
  In Misr Al Qadima, the NDP has succeeded in co-opting various lesser 
notabilities into its ranks. A chief factor that has affected the ability of certain lesser 
notabilities to ascend within the ranks of the party has been their propensity to generate a 
web of networks within the influential state institutions in the polity, namely the police 
apparatus and a wide variety of government ministries, such as, education, health, 
infrastructure, and so forth. Additionally, the lesser notabilities that have maintained a 
scope of sound networks and alliances with the big families of the area have also 
succeeded in pivoting their socioeconomic and political profiles further, especially in 
`Ain Al Sirra, where a sizable population of Upper Egyptian immigrants is present. The 
entrenchment within/influence upon these big families is crucial for the NDP, particularly 
during the time of elections, when regional solidarity and traditional authority within the 
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big family/clan can help direct tens of thousands of votes towards one candidate or 
another.            
The lesser notabilities of Misr Al Qadima play an essential role also as 
intermediaries between other categories of notables on the higher echelons of the polity 
and the grassroots basis on the popular level. In order for this relationship to be attained, 
an amalgam of patron-client networks has to be instated to ensure that the dissemination 
of resources, from the notable on the higher echelons to the lower strata within the 
popular community, takes place. For the most part, the older generation of the NDP 
leaderships, referred to in the course of this chapter as the old-guard, has been by far 
more successful in playing political patronage in Misr Al Qadima, as opposed to the new-
guard represented by Gamal Mubarak and his neo-liberal entourage. The new-guard 
generation of the NDP has been predominantly incapable of cultivating the sort of 
clientelist networks necessary for entrenching within the popular polity, as illustrated in 
the case of Bibars. In spite of holding a prime position in the party as a Political Bureau 
member, Bibars was yet incapable of mastering the sort of expertise that would enable 
her to infiltrate through the various state institutions, as opposed to the categories of 
lesser notabilities who are often better equipped to infiltrate the popular communities as 
well as the state institutions. Particularly, institutions such as the police apparatus play an 
essential role in the political processes of the popular communities, as was observed in 
the 2007 elections which witnessed some abrupt intervention from the police authorities 
for the benefit of the other NDP candidate, Allam. In fact, this old-guard/new-guard 
dichotomy was also existent in other electoral circles in Cairo, and similar pro-old guard 
scenarios also took place. 
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The new-guard/old-guard divide and the cooptation of the MCs 
  As stated earlier, there seems to be a realization among the new-guard that there 
needs to be a sounder connectedness with the grassroots basis and that this could be 
achieved via the consolidation of local governance entities, such as the municipalities. 
However, in spite of the general detachment with the lower echelons of the polity which 
has characterized the dealings of the old guard-controlled NDP with such strata for 
decades, the old-guard cadres could still be considered as the ones who are more capable 
of attaining this scheme of consolidation, due to the sizable scope of patron-client 
networks that they have cultivated within the polity over the years. Here, it is important 
to point-out that possessing and further orchestrating these interconnected webs of 
political patronage, which the old-guard have maintained for decades, does not 
necessarily reflect the old-guard‘s conviction in the importance of the MCs and their 
prospective role as powerbases for the NDP on the lower echelons. Instead, what the old-
guard appears to be doing in the course of these recent, so-called, pro-decentralization 
reforms which were mainly instated by Gamal Mubarak and the new-guard cadres is 
capturing the opportunity to cling back to the circle of influence and decision-making 
processes in the NDP via attempting to hijack this aspired process of revitalization of the 
municipalities. This is actualized by virtue of those old-guard cadres being the arm of the 
NDP that is most capable of dealing with the lower echelons of the Cairene polity.  
So, why is Gamal Mubarak pushing for reviving the municipalities if he is at odds 
with the old-guards who are stronger at the local level? Perhaps the new-guard cadres 
were driven by their firm conviction that decentralization attained via the empowerment 
of municipalities is a vital policy option. The execution of this policy along with a 
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possible underestimation of the power and influence of the old-guard on the ground, 
especially in the popular quarters, led to the standpoint that this research attempts to 
analyze. The findings here relate to the impact of these policies on the ground and how 
they were met by the various sociopolitical stakeholders in the popular polity, and it is 
quite probable that the new-guard would respond with a set of policies in order to offset 
the prowess of the old-guard on the local level, but this is yet to be observed.     
 On aggregate, it could be argued that, just as it has been in the case of the MB, the 
NDP has been also dependent on an amalgamation of patron-client networks that aim at 
co-opting lesser notabilities and other sorts of societal actors in order to infiltrate the 
Cairene popular quarter; and Misr Al Qadima is a vivid example of that. Unlike the MB 
which mainly operates in liaison with a wide scope of ISIs, the NDP, in addition to the 
NGOs that are virtually owned and operated by a wide of variety of its members and 
affiliates in the popular communities, also tends to utilize various state institutions to help 
disseminate resources and services among the populace. NDP-affiliated state apparatuses, 
such as the municipalities and the police, also provide the party with venues for 
exercising its power and influence over the populace Out of those institutions; the MCs 
stand out as an essential venue for politico-economic cooptation. Despite its relatively 
late arrival on the scene of popular political patronage, as opposed to the ISIs which have 
been operational in Cairo‘s popular quarters for decades, the NDP seems to be gradually 
competing with the MB and other politically Islamist forces in the realm of social 
services. To this end, Misr Al Qadima could be yet considered as an open ground for this 
ongoing competition between these two political forces, and thus far there appears to be 
no decisive domination for one of them over the other.   
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Lesser notabilities…Why politics? 
 This chapter also argues that, overall, there is no evidence for a unitary logic that 
explains why the Lesser Notable chooses to enter the realm of politics in Cairo‘s popular 
quarters. In fact, in the cases of a good portion of the lesser notabilities that this study has 
attempted to scrutinize, there were not that many options that a Lesser Notable could 
choose from with regard to his/her role in the community, yet the reasons for the 
involvement of the Lesser Notable in politics vary. For example, Hajj Najar from the 
NDP Services Office and Hajj Khaled Abdelfattah from the Misr Al Qadima MC both 
virtually inherited their roles as community notabilities from their fathers. Other lesser 
notabilities such as Hannan Al Sa`idi and Jamilla Abdelmajid had their own aspirations 
concerning their empowerment as female societal leaders and politicians and both, 
especially Abdelmajid, profiteered from their NDP association. The financial aspect also 
plays an essential role with lesser notabilities such as Abdelhamid Shehata who 
reportedly makes hundreds of thousands of pounds for the votes that he helps secure at 
election time.         
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Chapter VI: Conclusions: The NDP vs. The MB: Reflections on the sociopolitical 
agency and the Prospective Role of Lesser Notabilities in the Egyptian Polity
440
 
 
Essentiality of the role of lesser notabilities in popular politics: NDP vs. MB 
 
It could be argued that the competition over establishing alliances with lesser 
notabilities is one of the main pillars of the ongoing struggle between the NDP and the 
MB over the soul of Cairo‘s popular quarters. As displayed in the previous chapters, the 
Lesser Notable plays an important role in determining electoral outcomes, administering 
local affairs, and even affecting the street popularity and appeal of the NDP and the MB, 
on the grassroots level. This chapter aims at drawing a multiplicity of findings and 
conclusions regarding the role of lesser notabilities in the popular polities of Cairo and 
the subsequent prospective scenarios concerning the success of NDP versus the MB in 
allying with this category of sociopolitical leaderships.     
 
The flexibility of the NDP platform, its cooptation machine and the new-guard/old-
guard divide 
More often than not, in the case of the NDP, the absence of a rigid party platform 
has helped in broadening the kind of sociopolitical bases co-opted by the ruling party. 
This gives the NDP more flexibility; for instance, as it enjoys the versatility of 
cooperating with a wide scope of collaborates from different or even sometimes 
conflicting backgrounds and convictions. In doing so, the NDP has been mostly focusing 
on collaborating with societal figures such as the lesser notabilities in order to utilize the 
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 It is hereby important to note that, as this thesis unfolded, it has become increasingly concerned with the 
role of lesser notabilities in formal party and electoral politics. As shall be discussed later in this chapter, 
this is attributed to the importance of the Lesser Notable establishing networks and symbiotic relationships 
with various state institutions in order for him/her to actualize his/her role properly in the popular 
community as a mediator, arbitrator, powerful figure of authority, distributor of resources…etc.   
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wide scope of networks and the moral and physical power and influence such figures 
possess over the families and clans of the popular polity. As stated in Chapter V, today 
several segments within the NDP are becoming gradually incapable of getting through to 
such figures, which reflects the increasing detachment from the realities of the polities 
that the party is supposed to be operating within.  
At first instance, some might partially attribute this detachment to the old-guard 
of the NDP, which is, presumably, growing increasingly weaker due to its lack of touch 
with the popular powerbases, making way to the new-guard of Gamal Mubarak and his 
neo-liberal policies. Yet, the new-guard appears to be only strong enough at the 
top/central level of the party and, as these policies reach the lower/local levels, the old-
guard appears to be more powerful and therefore capable of implementing such policies 
in the way that best serves its interests. This was shown in the case of the MCs in Chapter 
V, where the old-guard was capable of virtually manipulating the process of promoting 
decentralization via reforming the MCs.  
In practical terms, the old-guard has been tactically savvy when it comes to the 
game of political patronage in comparison to the new-guard. It is in fact the lack of 
experience and inability of the newer NDP generations to infiltrate through the popular 
echelons that has caused the already-existing detachment between the NDP and the 
popular echelons to increase even further. On the ideological level also, some of the new-
guard of the NDP do not seem to have the conviction that the strategies maintained by the 
old-guard cadres for decades with regard to political patronage are in fact fruitful. As 
shown in more than one case in Chapter V, one notes that the new-guard‘s neoliberal 
project is characterized with an overall rejection of the macro-level conceptualization of 
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the state as a welfare entity, along with a subsequent negligence of the importance of 
infiltrating through to the grassroots levels of the community. The ideas and discourses of 
the new-guard of the NDP towards the disenfranchised classes and quarters of popular 
Cairo are best shown in the already ongoing reform programs which they champion, 
calling for a considerable reduction in the role and size of the welfare-state project.  
The exemplar cases of Iman Bibars and Hannan Al Saidi, among others, as cited 
in the course of Chapter V, reveal that the new-guard of the NDP has been, by and large, 
unsuccessful in infiltrating through to the grassroots bases in Cairo‘s popular quarters, 
particularly with regard to political patronage and electoral scheming. As mentioned, the 
macro-level worldview of such new-guard cadres differs from their old-guard 
counterparts and this is reflected in the way they perceive the role of the state on the local 
level and, subsequently, the policies they employ in dealing with the popular polity. For 
example, Bibars and Al Saidi appear to be quite critical of the role of the lesser 
notabilities in administering the affairs of the popular polity, yet Bibars attempted to 
collaborate with various lesser notables in order to pivot her electoral campaign. As a 
figure of leadership in the elite circles of the NDP and the local polity, Bibars viewed the 
rise of such figures of lesser notabilities to the forefront of socioeconomic and political 
arenas as a negative feature of social change, primarily due to the fact that they usually 
come from humble socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds. For her, the educated and 
the elite should claim their position and play the main role in leading the community. 
Nonetheless, Bibars‘ campaigners acknowledged the prime role lesser notabilities play in 
the popular polity and thought it was important to collaborate with such notabilities in 
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order for their electoral campaign to succeed. Al Saidi also attempted to collaborate with 
popular notables as shall be discussed in the upcoming section of this chapter. 
 As stated in Chapter V, in spite of the negative perception they hold regarding 
popular notables, some NDP cadres are sometimes willing, albeit not necessarily able, to 
utilize lesser notabilities to serve their political aspirations. However, these seemingly 
seasonal attempts of establishing relationships and networks with lesser notabilities have 
proven to be unsuccessful in consolidating a scope of sound ties with local notables, 
compared to the ongoing and relatively more well-established networks culminated by 
some NDP old-guard figures, for example.          
In short, one of the main reasons behind the failure of the new-guard in popular 
politics could be attributed to the fact that, quite often, these NDP cadres have been 
incapable of collaborating with political intermediaries such as the lesser notabilities. As 
shown earlier in chapters IV and V, these notabilities indeed play a tremendous role in 
either enhancing the prospects of a parliamentary or a municipal candidate or, oppositely, 
offsetting the chances of another. On the other hand, the MB and its affiliated ISIs have 
been considerably more successful in the realm of cooptation of lesser notabilities, thanks 
to the extensive webs of patron-client networks that they orchestrate and that, by default, 
require the presence of intermediary agents as such to ensure the consolidation of these 
patronage networks. The success that the MB and its affiliated ISIs have met in 
delivering much-needed resources and services to the popular quarters has been 
predominantly unmatched by the NDP, especially in the light of the incremental 
reduction in the social welfare services provided by state-institutions.
441
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 On aggregate, the disengagement of the state from the arena of social and economic services is 
manifested in the virtual elimination of subsidies on food stuffs and other basic goods, the increasing 
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Attempts at political mobilization portrayed as independent of lesser notabilities: 
Evaluating the experiment of the New Fostat NGO  
 
 Given the eminent role of lesser notabilities in the popular polity of Misr Al 
Qadima, are there any potentialities for some sort of political action/mobilization to take 
place independent of the intervention of such lesser notabilities? As reviewed in previous 
sections of this research, most of the political activities that took place in the popular 
neighborhood, independent of or in opposition to the politically active lesser notabilities 
were predominantly doomed to failure. However in some cases, alternative quasi-political 
entities, such as some NGOs, have claimed to pioneer certain attempts that aim at 
creating an alternative scheme of political mobilization that is not predominantly 
dependent on the intermediary roles of prominent lesser notabilities. A case in a point 
here is the New Fostat‘s project which aimed to raise the level of participation of various 
segments of the Misr Al Qadima populace in the formal venues of political participation, 
i.e. parliamentary and municipal elections…etc. Could such attempts at raising the level 
of public political awareness of/participation in the ‗official‘ institutional venues/outlets 
of the state in such areas be considered as successful venture for counterbalancing the 
dominant role of lesser notabilities?  
The project that was pioneered by the New Fostat NGO, and which was based on 
a study that was undertaken on Misr Qadima, could be considered as a pilot project. The 
basic rationale behind the project, labeled as the Political Awareness Campaign, is quite 
straightforward and it depended on selecting a group of cadres that would operate as a 
starting point and a nucleus for the project within the community. These cadres were then 
                                                                                                                                                 
informalisation of the economy and the ongoing privatization of the public sector. See Chapter III, pages 
103-113, for an overview of the features of state disengagement from the arena of social and economic 
services to the low-income communities.  
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educated and trained by the NGO to be proactively aware political participants, mainly 
via organized workshops, seminars and activities within their areas (election 
monitoring…etc). After completing their training program they were then responsible for 
recruiting ten more cadres each and these newly added cadres were to join the same 
scheme of activities and so forth, until a sizable network of a tentative 1,000 societal 
cadres was created. Initially, the process of selection of these cadres was quite crucial 
because by default of being societal leaders, those recruits were supposed to occupy 
certain social roles that enable them to communicate and connect with the inhabitants 
within their community. So far, the experiment of the New Fostat has been considerably 
successful in rooting and further spreading a group of cadres, who are considerably aware 
of the political realities of their area. These cadres were also willing and able to 
participate in the ‗formal‘ political processes and they spread awareness among the 
populace concerning the official venues of political participation.
442
 
Both Ms. Faten and Mr. Abdou have been involved in extensive fieldwork as 
executives of the Political Awareness Campaign instrumented by the New Fostat NGO. 
In fact, this program and the resultant findings provide us with some insightful 
observations regarding the social and political backgrounds of the inhabitants of the Misr 
Al Qadima/Manial area.
443
 Additionally, the accounts of those fieldworkers and the 
observations they came out with in the context of their interaction with the locals of the 
area are quite revealing when it comes to the machinations of this campaign.
444
 Ms. Faten 
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 Interviews with Khaled Abdelfattah, Researcher and Urban Politics Specialist, Cairo, July 2008. 
443
 Look Chapter III for a detailed overview of the proceedings and findings of this study. 
444
 Interviews with Ms. Faten & Mr. Abdou, New Fostat NGO, Misr Qadima, Cairo, June 2008. 
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and Mr. Abdou both emphasized upon the importance of the role of the ―natural cadres‖ 
and stressed that they were, by and large, pivotal in the proceedings of the project: 
 ―The role of the natural cadres was vital...Within an area like Misr Al Qadima, 
societal ties and networks are crucial if we are to get through to the various echelons of 
the society. Those cadres were then prudently trained to deal with the locals, in a manner 
that is quite similar to the way social workers are trained‖. However the additive those 
cadres have is the fact that they belong to the areas they work within and are, 
subsequently, well acquainted with these areas and the people that dwell there.
445
 Hence, 
such ―natural cadres‖ played a role that was, in sorts, similar to that of the Lesser 
Notables, being the intermediary sociopolitical agents that connect with and between the 
various echelons of the community and, at various junctures, participate in the 
formal/official political venues that are sanctioned by the modern state. And, in doing so, 
such sociopolitical figures play an essential role in bridging the gap between the state-
sanctioned political processes and the social conditions and practices within the polity. 
Yet was there a particular socioeconomic profile for such ―natural cadres‖? And did they 
have certain political aspirations or ambitions that motivated them to pursue such a 
mission, provided that the financial incentives provided by the NGO were rather 
humble?
446
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 Ibid. 
446
In the narratives of the social workers of the Political Awareness Campaign, there was some resemblance 
between those natural cadres of leadership and the biyitkabarluh figures introduced earlier in chapters I and 
II. From the outset, the biyitkabarluh figure usually has an apolitical persona yet, as we have seen in 
various sections of this study, those figures are also potential targets for political cooptation stemming from 
the NDP or the MB and their affiliated organizations.      
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The practitioners involved in the program state that they tried their best to 
diversify these groups of cadres in terms of gender and age, and think that they succeeded 
in doing that, to an extent:  
There were a lot of middle aged men and women that got involved. I don‘t 
have the numbers…In order for us to select such natural cadres; those 
people had to have a certain social stature that would make their words 
heard by the people of the community. In other words, they had to have a 
certain position within the extended family or the neighborhood. This 
enabled the cadre to reach a sizable number of people who would, in 
return, most likely receive the actions of these cadres positively. 
Educational attainment was not necessarily a requirement; in fact most of 
them had a limited educational background. A lot of them performed some 
commercial activities within their neighborhoods as merchants, workshop 
owners…etc. Expectedly, some of them had some political ambition or at 
least an expectation that such an activity would enhance their social 
statuses as notabilities of sorts.
447
   
 
The Political Awareness Campaign is considered by the New Fostat as a step forward in 
the context of social and political awareness in a popular area like Misr Al Qadima. Yet 
its aims and objectives do not appear to be purely neutral or developmental as stated by 
some of those involved in it. Furthermore, despite the proclaimed independence from the 
influence of lesser notabilities, the Political Awareness Campaign represents, in effect, an 
attempt to collaborate with a grouping of socioeconomic cadres that could be considered, 
after all, an amalgam of aspiring lesser notabilities that are looking for a political role to 
play in the Misr Al Qadima polity.   
In accordance with the testimony of the social workers and researchers that 
conducted the preliminary case study which opened the door for this project to be 
launched, the program aimed at targeting a certain group of Misr Qadima locals (cadres) 
that could be potentially helpful in spreading awareness and networking, but who were 
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 Interviews with Ms. Faten & Mr. Abdou, New Fostat NGO, Misr Qadima, Cairo, June 2008. 
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also considered as a grouping that is loyal to Ms. Hannan Al Saidi. Al Saidi herself states 
that those cadres, along with several other beneficiaries of that project, were delegated 
with the task of monitoring the municipal elections only after she lost, or was forced to 
lose, due to the intervention of the police apparatus.
448
 Despite its seemingly educational 
and awareness components spilling over to the community, the program was somehow 
designed and further utilized to serve some of the interests of its inceptor and the 
sponsoring NGO.  
The Political Awareness Campaign could be considered as a potentially viable 
idea for enhancing the political awareness of some Misr Al Qadima locals. However, 
looking at this program for the purpose of this research, a few relevant observations could 
be drawn out concerning the relationship between the ‗official‘ political leaderships, as 
Al Saidi, and the popular notabilities. Most importantly, the program and the scope of 
activities that it sponsors only confirm the findings stated in Chapter V concerning the 
NDP‘s cadres‘ utilization of arenas for seemingly apolitical socioeconomic services, such 
as NGOs, to serve their own benefits. Hannan Al Sa‘idi, the very same NDP cadre that 
robustly opposed the utilization of the leading figures in the NDP and the MB for NGOs 
to attain personal political gain, has actually used the New Fostat NGO which she chairs 
for purposes that serve her best interest.
449
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Look Chapter V for an elaborate discussion of Ms. Hannan Al Saidi‘s case and her attempts to launch a 
counter-campaign against some of the NDP old-guard cadres in Misr Qadima, utilizing her social networks 
in the area. Despite being an NDP member herself, Al Saidi was faced with some fierce opposition from 
within the NDP, especially in the course of the elections, primarily due to her new-guard affiliations. 
449
A multiplicity of the social workers and researchers that the writer has interviewed emphasized that the 
idea of a grassroots community-based political awareness program is arguably one of the very few potential 
remedies that could successfully tackle the issue of the lack of political participation and awareness in the 
popular quarters. Nonetheless, when scrutinized closely, one finds that the conditions under which such 
―remedies‖ and programs operate reflect its minimal success in meeting its claimed objectives of raising 
political awareness and participation impartially and independent of the influence and whims of powerful 
 Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter VI 
279 
 
In addition, such attempts at political mobilization further emphasize the essential 
role played by intermediaries of lesser notabilities in infiltrating through to the popular 
echelons of the polity. Although the Political Awareness Campaign had originally aimed 
at offsetting the sociopolitical prowess of the typical powerhouses of NDP and MB-based  
notability in the area, it was yet dependent on ―natural cadres‖ of societal leaderships that 
were, by and large, lesser notabilities of sorts, in networking and reaching out to the 
populace. 
 
The NDP’s lesser notabilities and implications pertaining to state/society relations in 
the wider context of Cairo’s popular quarters 
  
The individual/state dichotomy and the state/lesser notabilities power struggle in the 
popular quarter 
 
As displayed in the course of this study, in Misr Al Qadima the individual‘s 
loyalty to/conviction and realization of the goals and objectives of the ruling party and 
the state apparatus linked to it is, by and large, absent. The individual‘s basic needs of 
food stuffs, health care services…etc, are hardly met by such state apparatuses and, 
instead, the NDP and MB-affiliated NGOs and powerful patrons are now attempting to 
fill-in the gaps of the already diminishing role of the state. This is actualized with the aid 
of lesser notabilities and other categories of sociopolitical agents, which act as active 
sociopolitical actors that are capable of playing a multitude of social, economic and 
political roles. In short, the gradually waning role of state-institutions meant that the state 
had abdicated its responsibility as a welfare state. In this context the legitimacy and 
popular acquiescence of one political entity or another, be it the MB or the NDP, are 
                                                                                                                                                 
patrons and clients of lesser notabilities. The Political Awareness Program is arguably one of those, as it 
was particularly designed in favor of a specific political faction within the NDP. 
 Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter VI 
280 
 
primarily attained through the intervention of local actors who provide services and also 
gain power and influence. These local agents fulfill a variety of sociopolitical roles as 
figures of leadership, authority, and sometimes even piety and good deeds, as manifested 
in some of the examples of lesser notabilities presented in chapters IV and V.  
Therefore, with the observation that lesser notabilities serve a plethora of personal 
and political interests, a question of power and also exploitation and exercise of influence 
by these notabilities over the popular polity is well in place. In fact, as shown in the 
example of Misr Al Qadima, the popular polity is incrementally morphing into a setting 
for ongoing contests over power and authority between state and societal/non-state actors, 
exemplified in this study by the lesser notabilities. In addition to the crucial role played 
by lesser notabilities as distributors of resources among the populace
450
, they have also 
fulfilled other sociopolitical roles as intermediaries between locals and state authorities, 
mediators and arbitrators in personal conflicts, election brokers and campaigners and 
sometimes even as coercive executers of order – in their own terms – within the polity. 
Given their crucial role in administering the affairs of the popular community, lesser 
notabilities have become a major target for the cooptation of state authorities, due to their 
increasingly elevating stature as powerful sociopolitical actors. 
                                                 
450
 Lesser notabilities and the political groups they are affiliated with engage predominantly in distribution 
of resources and, to a lesser extent, in the production and acquisition of some commodities and resources, 
as shown in the involvement of some popular notables in the skin tannery and construction industries. The 
main focus of this study, however, has been on the role played by lesser notabilities in distribution and 
circulation rather than production. This is due to the fact that, first, and as portrayed in Nazih Ayubi‘s 
contributions presented in Chapter I, in the relatively nascent Middle Eastern polity of the modern state, 
modes of circulation play a more important role than modes of production in determining the sociopolitical 
agency of individuals and institutions. This in part relates to the fact that most of the Middle Eastern and a 
multiple other so-called Third World polities are yet characterized with a class-structure that, to date, is not 
similar to the modern western/industrial/capitalist society, where modes of production are by far more 
influential in determining socioeconomic and political outcomes rather than modes of circulation. This 
point is discussed with further detail in Chapter I, pages 22 and 30.    
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The Lesser Notable and Contours of State/Society Interaction, Collision and Collusion: 
A State within the State?  Al Hokouma and the alternative state 
In the first chapter of this writing, it was stated that the people‘s conceptualization 
of the state on the popular level determines to a great deal the way they perceive and deal 
with the official institutions of the state. Practically speaking, for most of Cairo‘s popular 
dwellers, the word ‗state‘, in Arabic ‗dawla‘, is almost synonymous to ‗hokouma‘ or 
‗government‘ in English. Yet, in the context of Cairo‘s popular quarters, the main agent 
of governance is the police apparatus, and thus what those people mean by ‗hokouma’ is 
actually the police apparatus. Put simply, in the eyes and minds of the majority of Cairo‘s 
popular quarter dwellers, the state is the police. 
 Applying this model on the case of Misr Al Qadima, one notes that this sort of 
state conceptualization sheds some light on the role of the state in the lives of Cairo‘s 
popular polity dwellers today. The perception of the state only as the police apparatus and 
the sheer reduction in its perceived role to solely reflect the coercive and enforcing police 
apparatus reveals that the modern Egyptian nation-state, perhaps as originally perceived 
by the Nasser regime post 1952 as a service-based welfare entity is, in reality, no more, 
particularly within the popular communities. Logically, the gap that was created with the 
gradual retreat of the welfare state had to be filled by a variety of actors, mostly from 
within the society, and this explains the rise of intermediaries such as lesser notabilities to 
prominence, and the increasing importance of their role in channeling a wide set of 
services and resources to the populace. Hence, the ability of such notabilities to have 
access to and circulate resources among potential clients is a main determinant in shaping 
the scope and magnitude of the political agency enjoyed by these intermediaries, for this 
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also enhances their propensity to fulfill the aforementioned multitude of social and 
political roles they fulfill as virtual administrators of the popular community.       
As catapulted in Misr Al Qadima, in fulfilling their roles as vital sociopolitical 
actors in the popular polity, lesser notabilities have virtually collectively, albeit mostly 
unconsciously, engaged in a process of creating a societal structure that has become 
increasingly capable of fulfilling a lot of the functionalities of the waning and 
withdrawing state-institutions. This process also entails a crucial role for NGOs such as 
ISIs, within which the lesser notabilities have been quite pivotal also, as seen in the case 
of the JS. The mounting importance of the roles that such notabilities play in the popular 
community is reflected in the growing dependence of the ‗formal‘ political actors, i.e. the 
MPs and the MC members, on these figures to consolidate their positions in and 
administer the affairs of the popular polity. This is reflected, for example, in arenas such 
as the parliamentary and municipal electoral processes in Misr Al Qadima, in which the 
informal networks maintained by the lesser notabilities play a tremendous role in 
determining electoral outcomes.   
And here it could be argued that this lesser notability-influenced societal structure 
is indeed echoing what was suggested in Chapter I regarding the process of cultivating an 
alternative state; a ‗state-within-a state‘, which is, in a sense, gradually encroaching upon 
the venues of the formal state; almost colonizing them. This is exemplified, for instance, 
in the networks that several notabilities posses with the police apparatus and their 
subsequent ability to act as intermediaries between the populace and such state-
institutions, as portrayed in chapters IV and V. Henceforth, it is safe to assume that a 
symbiotic relationship between the informal and the formal is in the making. In such a 
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relation, the state benefits from the array of social networks possessed by figures like 
lesser notabilities and, in return, it provides them with a plethora of benefits and 
privileges that empower them further and help consolidate their positions as powerful 
sociopolitical actors in the popular community. This connotes that, almost coinciding 
with its withdrawal from the arena of administering the affairs of the popular polity and 
in order for it to execute its policies and govern the populace; the ‗formal‘ state is, in 
practice, becoming increasingly reliant on the sociopolitical agency of lesser notabilities 
in fulfilling a number of its previously ascribed functionalities. Indeed this process of 
‗informalisation‘ that the Egyptian state has been going through coincides with the 
state/society models introduced by analysts such as Joel Migdal and Salwa Ismail, in the 
first chapter. Similar to what is portrayed in the Egyptian polity, Migdal says that, often, 
there exists an ongoing process of interactive dynamism between the official venues of 
the state and the informal actors within the society, which makes it unrealistic to attempt 
to perceive the state in isolation of the society or vice versa.  
The sovereignty of the Egyptian state in the popular polity is also challenged on 
regular basis. As shown in the case of Misr Al Qadima, the state finds itself in constant 
competition with other centers of sovereignty that tend to challenge its authority and 
sometimes create alternative venues in order to fulfill the functions that state-institutions 
are supposed to be performing. This echoes Thomas Hansen's and Finn Stepputat‘s 
propositions concerning the limitations of the sovereignty enjoyed by the state. The 
incremental withdrawal of the state from administering the affairs of the populace in the 
popular communities of Cairo makes state sovereignty an arena for contestation with 
social groups, as the MB, or certain actors like the lesser notabilities. As reviewed in 
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several cases in this research, these entities often attempt to assert their claim to 
sovereignty via a plethora of socioeconomic and political venues. The case of the JS 
which was represented in Chapter IV is an example that reveals that the influence of 
some of these non-state actors can sometimes exceed that of the state in the 
socioeconomic and political realms.       
Also the dominant role that the informal patron-client networks play in 
influencing the affairs and further shaping the ideologies and policies of various civil 
society organizations, such as the ISIs and the state-sponsored NGOs, suggests that the 
neoliberal model which calls for the empowerment of civil society organizations as 
substitutes to the state is, in practice, unrealistic.  
Civil society is the area where political and social forces are most active 
and where political confrontations between these forces are forged. It is 
also where the state is a major political and economic player... [It] should 
be seen as more than the sum of its organisations: it is the environment in 
which these organisations develop and interact. Civil society 
organisations are the product as well as the components of the society as 
a whole and their formation an ongoing process which is born out of 
continuing changes in domestic social forces, the state, and the complex 
in which the two interact.
451
 
 
Indeed the various examples of civil society organizations cited in this study portray that 
the mainstream ‗modernist‘ approaches that place the civil society in opposition to the 
state and perceives the two as distinctively separate entities with clear-cut boundaries are, 
in reality, impractical. In addition to the wide array of NGOs and other sorts of civil 
society organizations that are directly or indirectly supported and sponsored by the state 
and the ruling NDP, the heavy intervention and considerable restrictions that are imposed 
                                                 
451 Maha Abdelrahman (2002) ―The Politics of Un-Civil Society in Egypt‖. Review of African Political 
Economy 29, 91 
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by the Egyptian state on the civil society show that it is virtually a hegemonic actor in the 
civil society arena.       
The prospects of the NDP vis-à-vis the MB: political patronage, cooptation of lesser 
notabilities and the role of the MCs 
 
Whether it is attained via the overarching web of ISIs or the relatively more 
recently established NGOs that are affiliated with prominent NDP cadres, the competition 
over recruiting and co-opting lesser notabilities is a happening reality in Cairo‘s popular 
quarters. Chapters IV and V revealed that, for most of the electoral campaigners and the 
political cadres affiliated with the NDP and the MB, recruiting such notabilities and 
collaborating with them within the web of political patronage of the NDP and MB 
leading cadres was a prime target to be achieved. This is not to say that lesser notabilities 
are, in this context, merely passive objects that are on the receiving end of the NDP‘s and 
MB‘s activities. As manifested in various sections of this study, despite the fact that the 
gradual rise in the role of the Lesser Notable as a viable popular sociopolitical figure 
almost coincided with the launch of the Open Door and liberalization policies adopted by 
the state, the elevation of the lesser notabilities to the forefront of the popular polity was 
not a sheer byproduct of such policies. Lesser notabilities have indeed utilized and built 
upon on the opportunities that were created for filling-in the gaps within the 
socioeconomic and political maps of the popular community.  
As mentioned in Chapter I and II, in the Middle Eastern polity, a plethora of 
categories of lesser notabilities have gone through a process of historical evolution that 
situated them in a position that allowed them to acquire considerable power and influence 
within the popular polity, even after the inception of the modern nation-state in the 20
th
 
Century. Chapters II and III explained that, post infitah, the sociopolitical agency of 
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lesser notabilities evolved in a way that enabled them to increasingly fulfill a variety of 
socioeconomic and political functionalities in the popular polity. Thus, it is noteworthy to 
mention that the sociopolitical agency of lesser notabilities appears to be an evolving, 
rather than a stagnant or a fixed, agency, which is affected by and is interactive with the 
socioeconomic and political contexts within which lesser notabilities thrive.   
As far as most of the lesser notabilities are concerned, no particular political 
allegiances are necessarily constant or fixed. Subsequently, depending on the 
sociopolitical context and the benefits that they could reap from the prospective mutually-
beneficial relationships that are to be established and consolidated with the NDP or the 
MB at particular points in time, several examples of these notabilities have switched 
alliances between the NDP and MB. Generally speaking, most of the lesser notabilities 
do not adhere to particular ideologies or political platforms.
452
 
It is the observation of the researcher and a handful of those interviewed for the 
purpose of this study in the milieu of Misr Al Qadima community, that, to date, the MB 
and its affiliated organizations have been more capable of impacting the lives of the Misr 
Qadima locals than the NDP.
453
 This comparative supremacy could be attributed to the 
prevalence of the MB-affiliated grassroots and community-based socioeconomic and 
                                                 
452
Look Chapter IV, pages 177-182, for a note on the general characteristics of the Lesser Notable, which 
include the recurring tendency of some notabilities to swing back and forth between the NDP and the MB. 
Examples like Hajj Bakr Omar and Hajj Sayyed Abdelaal show that the political convictions and 
allegiances of lesser notabilities are likely to be altered between the NDP and the MB. 
453
Here, there are no particular indicators for a comparison of the degrees of influence of the NDP vis-à-vis 
the MB. The observation that the researcher and the respondents have noted relate to the scope of services 
that is provided by MB-affiliated organizations and which remain unmatched by NDP-affiliated entities to 
date. As asserted in different sections of the research, in areas like Misr Al Qadima and other popular 
communities in Cairo, and apart from some individual initiatives from one governor or MC member or 
another, the state has been only partially successful in terms of providing inhabitants with basic 
infrastructural services: water, sanitation, electricity…etc. This makes social services like health care and 
educational facilities almost secondary on the agenda of the state and the ruling party; a virtual luxury that 
the state is hardly able to provide, and that is where such MB-affiliated organizations come in to fill in parts 
of this increasingly growing gap.        
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political services in the popular quarters for a very long time, compared to the relatively 
more recent awakening that brought the NDP and its affiliated personnel and NGOs to 
the forefront of popular mobilization. Other factors also add up to the comparative 
supremacy of the MB in the popular milieu, such as the presence of a plethora of ISIs 
with comparatively sizable budgets that sometimes exceed those of the state itself in the 
realm of certain aspects of social services, as seen in the example of the JS.  
The ISIs indeed constitute an integral part of the Islamist project of the MB, 
which consists of an amalgam of socioeconomic and political networks, including MB-
associated businesses, educational facilities, communal mosques…etc. Chapter IV shows 
that this virtual state-within-a-state of the MB, which arguably aims at redefining 
state/society boundaries via establishing an alternative system to the failing state-
institutions, has played a considerable role in providing the populace with a wide scope 
of services that were largely unmatched by the NDP. Conversely, in the case of the NDP, 
the lack of such social institutions, mostly for decades, has left the ground open for the 
MB and its affiliated ISIs to reign supreme in this department throughout the 1970‘s, 
1980‘s and most of the 1990‘s, as this was the period that witnessed the gradual 
disappearance of the modern/secular state from the realm of socioeconomic services.
454
  
          There are some mixed signals concerning the prospective scenarios pertaining to 
political patronage and lesser notability alliances with the NDP vis-à-vis the MB. Despite 
the tendency of the NDP to focus its activities in the realm of popular politics in the 
                                                 
454
 As one tries to assess performance of the political parties (the NDP and the MB), they might sometimes 
appear as external forces with exogenous resources facing passive recipients. This is so because the focus 
of this section is specifically on party activity. It is yet crucial to note that lesser notabilities and other 
sociopolitical figures have been also active subjects that helped stir social and political change in the 
popular communities of Cairo.   
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recent years, the MB and its affiliated ISIs still appear to be an influential side in this 
milieu, as we have seen in Misr Al Qadima. The exemplar case of Al Jamme`yya Al 
Sharr`eyya displays that it will be virtually impossible for the NDP or the state-apparatus 
to breakdown the multifaceted web of patron-client networks and resources maintained 
by the ISIs, unless they succeed in substituting the socioeconomic roles such ISIs seem to 
fulfill. In the meantime this is somewhat impractical given the wide scope of activities 
sponsored by the ISIs and the subsequent inability of the state-apparatuses to compete 
with them. Instead, an arena that might hold some promise for the efforts of the NDP in 
this regard is the municipalities (MCs)
455
 that the NDP and its associated state-
apparatuses seem adamant on consolidating, as mentioned in chapters IV and V. It 
remains questionable whether this prospective clampdown over the municipalities will 
suffice for offsetting the entrenched network of political patronage that is maintained by 
the MB and the ISIs, as we are yet to see how the NDP will perform in this arena. 
However the municipalities appear to be a potential window of opportunity that the NDP 
could capitalize upon in order to counterbalance the prowess of the MB on the popular 
level. 
Summations: An Attempt to answer the research questions posed in the first 
chapter  
 
One of the main questions posed earlier in the course of this study relates to the 
seeming structural reconfiguration that is taking place within the Egyptian polity in the 
early 21
st
 Century and the implications this reconfiguration might have with regard to 
reshaping the political map of Egypt. Put simply, with the mobilization of societal actors 
                                                 
455
 See Chapter I, pages 23-24, and Chapter V, pages 194-197, for a discussion of the role of municipalities 
and the recent emphasis that the NDP has been putting on the prospective role of the MCs in leading the 
process of decentralization. 
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and sociopolitical classes that is taking place in the Egyptian polity, new categories of 
viable and politically meaningful actors that differ from the ones prevalent during the 
Nasser and the Sadat phases (1952-1981) are being created.  For example, the 1980‘s and 
1990‘s witnessed the elevating importance of the political agency of the business 
community as opposed to the military and the technocratic classes which were rather 
dominant during the socialist heydays of Nasserite Egypt. So, to what extent has this 
structural alteration - witnessed in the post-infitah phase - empowered new classes of 
sociopolitical patrons and clients? And if so can one identify a certain set/sets of 
sociopolitical actors that are likely to prevail within the Egyptian polity as a result?  
As shown in various parts of this study, it is safe to assume that, especially within 
Cairo‘s popular quarters, there is an increasingly noticeable role that is being played by a 
variety of non-state sociopolitical actors, be it individuals or social entities/institutions, in 
most of the mundane and daily affairs of the people of the popular polity. The 
sociopolitical meaningfulness and influence of those non-state actors coincided with and 
was directly proportional to the gradual, and sometimes abrupt, state withdrawal from the 
arena of social and economic services. For the most part, the category of the Lesser 
Notable stands out as one of the most visible and powerful categories of sociopolitical 
actors in the popular polity today.  
As displayed in chapters II and III, lesser notabilities have dwelled and thrived in 
various historical junctures within the Middle-Eastern city and it is not an entirely novel 
social phenomenon to see this grouping of sociopolitical actors rise to prominence in the 
popular quarters of Cairo in the early 21
st
 Century. However, it is yet important to try and 
analyze the factors that led to the societal restructuring that brought those lesser 
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notabilities to the forefront of the political setting of the popular polity. Aggregately, the 
category of sociopolitical actors that this study refers to as ‗Lesser Notables‘ are those 
societal figures that posses and have access to extensive and multifaceted webs of 
socioeconomic and political networks, within the community and on the level of state-
institutions, and are characterized with their popular socio-cultural personas. They are 
also noted for their piety and good deeds in the popular community
456
, being the 
mediators in conflicts and the intermediaries with state authorities and administrations. 
This research suggests that the failure/withdrawal of the welfare state created 
socioeconomic and political gaps of sorts that were almost necessarily filled by this 
category of notabilities.  
Also, and as stated prior in various sections of this writing, there appears to be a 
directly proportional relationship between the withdrawal of the state and the rise of 
lesser notabilities, whereby the sociopolitical agency of the Lesser Notable came into 
shape and was rather enhanced with the increasing retreat of the welfare state in the post-
infitah phase. Concluding this writing, one notes that a finer category of lesser 
notabilities than the one this study introduced initially is well in place. In addition to the 
aforementioned characteristics of the Lesser Notable, the findings of this research also 
show that most of the lesser notabilities that were scrutinized in the course of this study 
are becoming increasingly involved in the formal/official state-sponsored venues of 
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 In chapters I and II, the importance of lesser notabilities projecting an image of piety and benevolence is 
stressed. This is exemplified in the case of various Lesser Notables acquiring the title ‗Hajj‘, which 
connotes religious piety and moral goodness. Look also Chapter IV, page 177, where Hajj Sayyed Abdelaal 
refers to the importance of the lesser notability figure maintaining a social/moral role as a pious notable, 
sustaining a persona of helpfulness and giving, regardless of his MB or NDP affiliation. As seen in Chapter 
IV, this image of piety and good deeds is essential for almost all of the MB-affiliated notabilities and in 
Chapter V we have seen also examples for this with several NDP-affiliated notabilities such as the NDP 
Services Office secretary, Hajj Ahmed Najjar, and others like Hajj Abdelhamid Shaalan, and Hajj Gad 
Megahed.   
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political action. Even the MB-affiliated notabilities are now becoming increasingly 
involved with state institutions, such as the police apparatus and government ministries, 
and state-sponsored political activities, such as the municipal and parliamentary elections. 
This aspect of involvement is indeed crucial; in order for the notability to fulfill his/her 
social function properly. Building alliances and networks within state-institutions helps in 
elevating the sociopolitical stature of the notable, allowing him/her to actualize social 
roles such as the intermediary with the state and the arbitrator at times of conflict.              
With the dominance of political patronage, and the widespread role that patron-
client networks have as an effective tool of circulating resources and cultivating political 
power and influence within the Egyptian polity in general, it was logical for lesser 
notabilities to utilize such tactics of political patronage to establish and further 
consolidate their statures. The absence of the state and the ascent of the lesser notabilities 
mostly coincided with the rise of politically Islamist groups- mainly the MB- to the 
forefront of the political scene in Egypt. Particularly within the popular quarters, the 
Islamists‘ rise to political prominence was also majorly attributed to the withdrawal of 
the state and its institutions, which were no longer capable of delivering the services 
needed by the people, especially those of the low-income communities. The MB, which 
has been active in the realm of social work since its establishment, benefited to a great 
deal from such state failures. Eventually, the scope and magnitude of the services 
provided by the MB and the affiliated ISIs, more often than not, surpassed the services 
granted by the state, in terms of quantity, quality and even promptness, as seen in the case 
of the 1992 earthquake.  
 Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Chapter VI 
292 
 
The first chapter of this study displayed that the sociopolitical agency of lesser 
notabilities has been identified as a social phenomenon by a variety of contributors and 
analysts. Diane Singerman and Janine Clark argued that, in Cairo‘s popular quarters, 
informal networks play an important role in administering the affairs of the populace. In 
this sense, patron-client networks should be viewed as amalgams of reciprocal networks 
that represent a political resource as well as a political institution for the populace, rather 
than a mere embodiment of exploitative relationships. Thus, building upon this 
conceptualization, it is only safe to assume that the role of the intermediaries that would 
facilitate the smooth exchange of resources and benefits between patrons and respective 
clients within such networks is rather crucial, as shown in various sections of this study. 
Salwa Ismail, in specific, outlined the seeming rise of the Lesser Notable figure in 
Cairo‘s popular quarters and drew a general sketch that summarizes the main 
socioeconomic features of such personas. In doing so, Ismail stated that the sociopolitical 
agency of the lesser notabilities is in the making and that, subsequently, one needs to 
analyze their modes of action, alliances, and allegiances.
457
 
One of the main objectives of this research is to build upon the contributions of 
these aforementioned analysts who called for an alternative perception concerning the 
dynamics of informal networks in the popular polity, as opposed to the dominant focus 
on state-centered institutional politics that characterized the majority of the literature 
dealing with Middle East society and politics. In this regard, the study at hand aimed at 
scrutinizing the politics of lesser notabilities and the possible directions that their 
involvement in local and national politics may take. The findings of this research suggest 
                                                 
457
 See Chapter I, pages 36-41, for an overview of the contributions of the second generation of analysts 
that tackled the issue of informal networks of politics in the modern Middle Eastern polity. 
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that, primarily due to the sizable role they play in shaping the informal socioeconomic 
and political networks of the popular polity, lesser notabilities partake in reducing the 
already blurry boundaries between sate and society and have thus been key-players in the 
political patronage of the NDP as well as the MB. Indeed lesser notabilities could be 
considered as meaningful actors in the MB‘s project, which has succeeded in getting 
through to the predominantly state-neglected popular communities. As long as the 
socioeconomic setting which has favored the flourishing of lesser notabilities as viable 
sociopolitical actors prevails, they are likely to remain active subjects that fulfill a 
plethora of social, economic and political roles in the popular communities of Cairo. The 
lack of a particular political agenda or ideology that gathers them and the fact that 
sometimes these lesser notabilities also have a set of diverse social and cultural 
backgrounds, despite the fact that they also share an array of commonalities between 
them, makes it likely that many of these lesser notabilities could also collaborate with the 
NDP. This research argues that there appears to be no unitary logic why certain lesser 
notabilities choose to collaborate with the MB while others ally with the NDP.  
Yet, there is of course, as seen in chapters IV and V, a multitude of factors that 
could drive the Lesser Notable in the direction of the NDP rather than the MB and vice 
versa. The scope and magnitude of such factors vary, depending mainly on the 
socioeconomic, political and cultural conditions of the community in which the Lesser 
Notable thrives and the sort of socioeconomic networks within which he/she operates. 
For example, in some professional middle-class dominated Cairene polities, it is not 
uncommon for a Lesser Notable to collaborate with the MB and not the NDP due to the 
relatively influential socioeconomic and political roles played by the MB in some of 
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these polities. Within the popular quarter, which is the subject-area of this research, 
allegiances between lesser notabilities and the NDP or the MB are, by and large, 
contingent on a diverse set of constantly changing socioeconomic and political rationales, 
which makes such alliances rather volatile and ever-changing, as asserted earlier. For 
example, within the popular areas in which the ISIs are active, it is likely to find a 
handful of MB-associated lesser notabilities. Oppositely, and at certain junctures when 
the state attempts to, say, clampdown on the activities of political Islamists in a certain 
neighborhood, as noted in some areas of Misr Al Qadima, it would be rather logical for 
the lesser notabilities to alter their alliances away from the MB and towards the NDP and 
so forth. Overall, as manifested in the NDP‘s attempts to reinvigorate and co-opt the 
MCs, it appears as if the state-sponsored party is following in the footsteps of the MB 
when it comes to the attempts of allying itself with the political patronage of lesser 
notabilities in order to infiltrate through to wider segments of the popular polity. 
Throughout this research, it has been shown that the sociopolitical phenomenon of 
patronage is predominantly present along the various echelons of the Egyptian polity. 
The Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak political regimes have all attempted to benefit from this 
scope of patron-client networks in various means and ways. A set of common 
preconditions for political patronage was somehow prevalent throughout the phases of 
Egypt‘s three chief regimes post 1952. First, the presence of a shilla or a clique of first-
rate clients that are all linked to the ruling circles has been a recurrent theme with Nasser, 
Sadat and Mubarak. The functioning of these shillal took place in a horizontal manner 
among the various key-players of the Egyptian polity. A vertical scope of patronage that 
stems from the patron at the apex to clients in a top-down approach has not been 
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uncommon also throughout that period. Second, the existence of a specific category of 
clients, a pool from which these clients emerge and that is characterized with a bundle of 
sociopolitical inclinations and strata, was also crucial for the patron-client networks to 
take shape and become actualized. As displayed in various sections of this writing, these 
‗classes‘ of patrons and clients have altered throughout the eras of Nasser, Sadat and 
Mubarak. Each of these eras was characterized with a particular taxonomy of relevant 
patrons and clients, which varied depending on the context that the Egyptian political 
system existed within at the time.  
Building upon the observations regarding patron-client networks, it is safe to 
assume that the scheme of patronage politics, which operates on various societal and 
political echelons, plays a great role in shaping the features of the Egyptian polity in the 
ascent of the 21
st
 Century. What this writing is trying to say is, simply speaking; political 
patronage has been an existent accompaniment to all the ruling systems post-1952. 
Indeed, throughout this writing, it has been rather apparent that the political system is 
mainly reliant also on this scheme of patronage politics in an attempt to build alliances 
with the relevant political agents in the community. Putting in mind that patronage is an 
outcome of interlinked processes of clientelism, the presence of a powerful group of 
patrons within the system is vital for such a complex network to survive and prevail. 
Contextualizing the phenomenon of political patronage and comprehending the factors 
that nourish such a scheme is essential, as it would be somehow misleading if we strip 
such a phenomenon from the realities of the polity within which it is present. Indeed, in 
order to dissect patronage, we have to examine its manifestations in line with the general 
politico-economic context within which it is operational. Issues such as socioeconomic 
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stratification, resources availability, income distribution, and the presence of venues of 
political participation/representation are among the main topics that need be addressed in 
order to scrutinize patronage politics. As reviewed in this study, the socioeconomic and 
political contexts of Egypt in the early 21
st
 Century seem to suggest that different 
categories of relevant patrons and clients are in place along the various echelons of the 
polity. Within the popular polity, the lesser notabilities constitute the chief category of 
sociopolitical agents that shape and influence the scope and magnitude of patron-client 
networks.   
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POSTSCRIPT 
Unsuccessful Attempts at Political Ascent: Alternative categories of notabilities: 
Ahmed Abdalla ‘Roza’ and Al Jeel Center 
In the popular polity, one finds that there are societal notables that belonged to the 
well-educated/secular classes and who were also incapable of pivoting their 
socioeconomic/political profiles as powerful political actors. In Misr Al Qadima, Ahmed 
Abdalla ‗Rozza‘ poses a very relevant example in this regard. In fact the experience of 
Rozza, who passed away in the aftermath of a shocking loss in the 2005 parliamentary 
elections, probably represents the counter-example of the lesser notable phenomenon, 
obviously with a minimal degree of political soundness and success. Rozza, who was a 
well-educated Cambridge graduate and a prominent activist and intellectual ever since 
the student movement that strongly opposed the policies of President Sadat circa 1971 
and onwards, scored a surprisingly low number of votes when he decided to run in the 
parliamentary election
458
. He did not have well-known strong familial or clan ties to any 
of the major families of the area, and he was not certainly occupying any commercial or 
business roles that could enable him to channel some resources and services to his 
potential supporters. Instead Rozza attempted to create an educational/cultural grassroots 
base within the Misr Al Qadima community via providing recreational and educational 
activities to some segments of that community; primarily to the massive population of 
youth and children in the area.
459
     
Rozza‘s version of societal services came with Al Jeel Center for Research and 
Youth Development, which could arguably constitute a case study in itself. In fact, the 
                                                 
458
 According to his Al Jeel co-workers, Rozza roughly got 250 something votes, while the winning 
candidate amassed between 3000-4000 votes. 
459
 Interviews with founders and social workers of Al Jeel Center, Cairo, July and August 2008 
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history and progression that this entity has gone through signify, to a great extent, some 
of the most vital socioeconomic and political phases that have been witnessed, not only 
by  the `Ain Al Sirra area in particular but also, on the broader level, by Egypt as a whole. 
Established in 1995 as an initiative by the prominent intellectual and activist Ahmed 
Rozza to serve the area he belongs to, the center is now home to only a handful of old 
friends and acquaintances that strive to keep it alive after the demise of its founder in 
2006.
460
 Once established, the prime objective of the Jeel Center was to act as a focal 
point of research pertaining to the Misr Al Qadima area, in specific, and the entirety of 
Egypt in general.  
The center had a sizable depository of sources on a wide variety of social, 
economic, and political issues relating to Misr Qadima and other urban and rural districts 
in Cairo and other governorates. A periodical journal had also been initiated as a regular 
produce provided by the center. Additionally, the center paid special attention to the 
issues facing the children of the area; indeed the Misr Qadima area has one of the highest 
ratios of child labor all over Egypt,
461
 and Rozza had a firm vision that some bondage has 
to be set between the young activists working at the center and the children of the area, 
providing those children with an outlet to vent out their creative energy. Rozza‘s project 
depended on utilizing the capabilities of those children in some recreational activities that 
are not necessarily related to a rigid educational program, so he constituted the activities 
unit at the Jeel Center to serve this purpose. The outcome was somehow successful and 
                                                 
460
 Ibid 
461
According to the figures obtained by development practitioners affiliated with UNICEF and working 
within the Misr Al Qadima area, the Misr Al Qadima district has one of the highest rates of street children 
and child labor in all of Cairo, relative to its size and population. The figures revolve around 10,000-20,000 
children. Approximately also 14,000 children were considered as primary education drop-outs as stated in 
the New Fostat documents.       
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eventually a considerable number of children started to attend the weekly activities of the 
center.
462
 
Furthermore, the center also provided a multitude of other services to the people 
of the A`in Sira community; a medium-sized library was available for reading and 
borrowing a wide variety of books in almost all walks of life, and a few resident social 
workers were available to help solve some of the social hardships faced by the people of 
the area. However, the center also suffered from a multitude of hindrances that prevented 
it from creating a sound social base within the community. Mainly, there was a general 
lack of financial resources, due to Rozza‘s tendency not to accept any funding or grants 
from abroad as he viewed that this will inevitably infringe upon the autonomy of the 
center. Therefore, the main sources of funding were individual contributions from those 
who were enthusiastic about the center and the principles that it stood for, primarily 
Rozza and the camaraderie working with him in the milieu of the center. This, by and 
large, limited the sources of income available. Moreover, the mere nature of the activities 
and services provided by the center, as a think tank and an activities locale for the 
marginalized and the voiceless segments of the society, did not help in establishing any 
networks of support within the community. Thus, when compared to other NGOs or ISIs 
that were mainly concerned with providing the people of the area with direct services and 
resources that aided them in their daily affairs, more often than not in return for political 
allegiance and support to the leading figures within those organizations, the impact of the 
center was minimal.
463
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 Interviews with founders and social workers of Al Jeel Center, Cairo, July and August 2008 
463
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Rozza‘s comparatively poor results at the polling stations were not actually a 
surprise. Overall, the scope of cultural and recreational activities for the marginalized was 
not a viable asset that one could solely depend upon in the context of political popularity 
in an area like `Ain Al Sira. This in fact draws some noteworthy observations regarding 
the category of the ‗lesser notable‘ and the meaningfulness of the role that he/she could 
play in the context of the popular quarters of Cairo. Sound financial capacities, 
irrelevance of educational merits, firm familial/clan ties and a prominent position within 
the community as the leader or the ―Ibn El Balad‖464 are all essential features if one is to 
enter the realm of the ‗lesser notables‘ and, one way or another, these features were all 
absent in the case of Ahmed Rozza. When entering the contest of political popularity, 
Rozza could not compete with such figures on that level. In actuality, the alternative 
example that he attempted to provide further clarifies that such ventures could not bring 
their inceptors to the forefront of political agency, unless they were armed with the 
necessary tools mentioned above.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
464
 Look chapters II and III for an elaborate discussion of the Ibn Al Balad figure and his/her role in the 
popular quarter. 
 Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Appendix 
301 
 
APPENDIX: OUTLINE OF INTERVIEWS 
 
The fieldwork upon which this study is based was conducted over a period of a 
year and a half of field visits to Misr Al Qadima and other popular quarters in Cairo, 
which extended from the fall of 2007 to the spring of 2009. It consisted of more than 50 
in-depth and open-ended interviews, mainly with the people of the Misr Al Qadima area, 
in addition to personal observations of everyday activities and interactions. During the 
same period, I also conducted a set of interviews with a variety of politicians, journalists 
and NGO activists from all over Cairo. The names of most of the interviewees mentioned 
in this writing are real names, used of course with the permission of those interviewed. 
However, with some of the lesser notabilities cited, and due to the sensitive nature of the 
information they provided, I have used pseudonyms, in accordance with the preference of 
the interviewees.           
 Most of the interviews were on a one-to-one basis, nonetheless some of them 
were held in small groups at a café, an NGO or a party office, or at the workplace, as 
stated in the research. The socioeconomic backgrounds and professional occupations of 
the majority of those that I conducted in-depth and one-to-one interviews with are 
elaborated upon in the writing. Yet this has not been the case with some of the 
respondents interviewed in small groups or on the street, and these were referred to in the 
course of the writing as Misr Al Qadima residents or NDP members…etc.  Therefore, in 
order to display an overall sketch of the socioeconomic biographies of the respondents, it 
is rather relevant to insert the following table, which represents an overview of the gender 
and the principal occupation of all of those interviewed for the purpose of this study. 
 
 Mohamed Ibrahim Fahmy  
The Rise of The Lesser Notables in Cairo‘s Popular Quarters: Patronage Politics of The NDP and The MB/ 
Appendix 
302 
 
 
Job/Sociopolitical 
Occupation 
Male Female Total 
Doctors 2 1 3 
Engineers 2  2 
Journalists 3  3 
JS employees 4  4 
Lawyer 1  1 
Leather Merchants 4  4 
Merchants (other) 1 1 2 
MC members 2 1 3 
MPs 2  2 
NDP employees 
(income solely form 
the NDP) 
2 1 3 
NGO Chairperson  2 2 
NGO employees 5 4 9 
Peddlers  2 2 
Researchers 2  2 
State employees 1  1 
University students 3 1 4 
Workers 3  3 
Workshop owners 4  4 
Total 41 13 54 
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